

THE  
GOOD GOVERNANCE  
AGENDA FOR CIVIL SOCIETY:  
LESSONS FROM THE  
FA'ASAMOA

*An analysis of the good governance  
agenda for civil society and its liberal  
counterpart as they pertain to civil society  
institutions based on 'affective ties'*

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A

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Masters of Arts

in

Political Science

By Iati Iati

***T**rust in the Lord with all your*

*heart.*

*Lean not on your own*

*understanding.*

*In all your ways acknowledge*

*Him, and He will direct your*

*paths. (Proverbs 3:5)*

*To my parents:*

***Talosaga & Ulusagogo Iati***

*Fa'amalo le onosa'i ma le tapua'i.*

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## **Abstract**

This thesis sets out to use the case of Samoa to challenge arguments contained in, the good governance agenda, and a liberal prescription, for civil society. The good governance agenda argues that institutions based on “affective ties” must be eliminated from civil society. It argues that these kinds of institutions inhibit public sector efficiency and brings about or at least facilitates corruption. A liberal prescription for civil society, posited by Ernest Gellner and John A. Hall, advocates that institutions which, rely on rites and rituals to maintain solidarity and cohesion, should not be classed as civil society because they inhibit individual autonomy and freedom. This thesis will demonstrate through a critical review of the literature and through interviews conducted in Samoa that the claims made in both these paradigms give a narrow and incomplete account of; the functions of ‘social cages’, the impact of “affective ties” on capital accumulation and the role of affective ties vis-à-vis corruption.

# C HAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION

## **Good governance and the civil society agenda**

The good governance development programme was first publicly unveiled in the 1989 World Bank Long Term Perspective Study (LPTS), *Sub-Saharan Africa, from Crisis to Sustainable Development*.<sup>1</sup> It came to the fore of development discourse as a solution to the problems faced by the then predominant development paradigm: 'structural adjustment reform'. Structural adjustment reform concentrated on engendering economic growth as a prelude to and facilitator of sustainable development. It sought to achieve this through various fiscal and economic policies geared towards encouraging private investment. Despite an apparent success in African countries such as Ghana and Senegal, structural reform failed to create an engine for sustained economic growth.<sup>2</sup> The programmes failures, that were masked for a time by brief periods of success, soon surfaced in the face of a global recession and tight monetary restraints imposed by the international community during the late 1980's. The LPTS concluded that the failures, associated with structural adjustment reform, stemmed from 'poor governance' which it associated with factors such as, lack of legitimacy, accountability, transparency and respect for the rule of law and human rights.<sup>3</sup> It claimed that these factors created a volatile environment that inhibited private sector investment and consequently debilitated efforts to create an engine

for sustained economic growth.<sup>4</sup> In order to combat these problems, the LPTS recommended several initiatives that it subsumed under the heading, 'good governance'.

Good governance brings a holistic approach to development efforts, engaging social, economic and political concerns in the hope of attaining sustainable human development. It seeks to engender economic growth as the backbone of development. It continues to advocate the importance of the economic centred initiatives promoted under structural adjustment reform. It argues however, that these mechanisms require a complementary political framework and appropriate institutions in order to function properly. The LPTS linked good governance with an independent judiciary, respect for the law and human rights, transparency, accountability, and legitimacy.<sup>5</sup> It is stipulated that these factors are best facilitated by a government based on liberal democratic principles. Additionally, good governance also posits socially centred initiatives to encourage economic and political efficiency.

An important area that the good governance programme seeks to influence is civil society.<sup>6</sup> In the good governance programme it is argued that a certain kind of civil society is required in order to engender public sector efficiency, develop the private sector and providing for social well being. The good governance agenda seeks to make civil society the exclusive domain of institutions based on contractual, non-community and non-affective ties. It is contended that these institutions secure accountability, legitimacy and transparency from and within the public sector, promotes the accumulation and efficient use of capital and provides for social justice. The construction of these institutions is to take place of the

expense of any and all institutions that are based on ethnic, community and other affective ties. It is argued that institutions based on affective ties compel individuals in ways that are difficult to predetermine. This undermines the 'certainty' that is fundamental to the framework which the good governance programme seeks to construct. Additionally, institutions based on affective ties are said to foster weak societies that lack sufficient bite to keep the public sector accountable and more importantly, precipitate corruption and other inefficient practices. Furthermore, they are seen as a drain on capital and a barrier to capital accumulation. In total, individuals who are caught up or who participate in these types of institutions are seen to have obligations that leads them into corrupt activities, taxes their efforts and diminishes their resources.

### **Parallels with a neo-liberal prescription**

This agenda has very strong parallels with a liberal prescription for civil society posited by Ernest Gellner and John Hall.<sup>7</sup> In defining civil society and the kinds of institutions that fall under this banner, Gellner begins by positing what is arguably its most common characteristic: separation from the state. He then argues that the satisfaction of this criteria does not immediately qualify an institution as part of civil society. He stipulates that although an institution may be free from state interference, having autonomy and solidarity, it cannot be classed as civil society if it should inhere these qualities through the subjugation of the individual. As cases in point, he specifies those institutions who obtain the support and co-operation of the individual through means such as rituals, enforced through certain disciplinary measures.<sup>8</sup> Hall, encapsulates these in a term that was first coined by

Michael Mann, 'social cage'.<sup>9</sup> In parallel with institutions based on 'affective ties', a 'social cage' compels the individual to act in a particular way. Both Gellner and Hall argue that civil society institutions must not only have a significant amount of freedom from state interference, but must also be free of 'social cages'. They prescribe that civil society institutions must be free from 'social cages'.

It is argued that affective ties and 'social cages' are different parts of the same phenomenon, a system of affective ties. Affective ties are simply bonds between people that are based on informal and affective foundations such as kin, ethnicity, community and so forth. They contrast non-affective ties that are based on formal mechanisms such as contracts. A 'social cage' or 'social cages' serve important functions in relation to affective ties: they maintain the characteristics of affective ties, informing people of the characteristics and importance of the affective ties between them. They impress upon people certain forms of behaviour and values and acts to maintain these throughout their lives. Hall argues that social cages keep the individual in awe of a particular social order. Arguably, this order is the equivalent of 'affective ties'. The entire phenomenon may be referred to as 'a system of affective ties'. As 'affective ties' and 'social cages' are both part of this phenomenon, it is imperative that the analysis of one is done in conjunction with an analysis of the other. This imperative is compounded by the fact that the elimination of affective ties strongly suggests the elimination of 'social cages'.

### **The objectives and related arguments**

This thesis addresses three rationales posited by the liberal prescription and the good governance agenda for eliminating 'affective ties' and 'social cages': to

eliminate barriers to individual autonomy and freedom, to encourage private sector development and to eliminate corruption. Using the case study of Samoa, it seeks to analyse the influence and implications of affective ties and 'social cages' in so far as they pertain to individual freedom, private sector development and public sector efficiency. It pursues three general objectives. First, to inquire into the argument that, 'affective ties precipitates public sector inefficiency and in particular corruption,. Second, to inquire into the argument that affective ties hinders private sector development and henceforth economic development, by inhibiting capital accumulation. Third, to inquire into the argument that 'social cages' inhibit individual freedom and autonomy.

There are three propositions that correspond with these objectives. First, it will be argued that *affective ties do not precipitate public sector inefficiency*. They may facilitate the occurrence of inefficiency and corruption, but cannot be said to directly cause these ends. Second, it is argued that *affective ties inhibits but also facilitates capital accumulation*. Finally, it is argued that *although 'social cages' inhibit individual freedom and autonomy they do so in order to serve other very important functions in society*.

In hypothetical terms, if it can be shown that affective ties do not directly cause inefficiency and corruption, that while they inhibit capital accumulation they also facilitate it, and that there are justifiable reasons why 'social cages' inhibit individual freedom and autonomy, then the grounds posited by the 'good governance agenda', Gellner and Hall for eliminating affective ties from civil society institutions have not fully appreciated the roles and functions of 'affective ties' and 'social cages'. This would suggest that there should be reservations about

the universal applicability of their propositions. It is important to elucidate here the objective of the author, should it be misconstrued from what is stated above. The value and utility of the agenda and the prescription posited by their respective sources is questioned on the foundation on which they are built, not on their own merit.

The pursuit of these objectives requires the selection of an appropriate case study. The case study must be strongly inundated with the good governance programme. This would furnish it with a measure of realism and immediacy to issues that are central to the thesis. More importantly it needs to reflect a system equating to 'a system of affective ties'. This system needs to have clear and visible manifestation to facilitate a study of them. It must also have a significant influence in the various sectors of society. In particular, its influence must be perceived on the individual and in the areas of corruption and capital accumulation so as to facilitate an examination of its impact on these factors.

Samoa provides an ideal case study for this inquiry. Samoa's recent post-independence history, prior to the advent of good governance, reflects an inclination towards various elements that are integral to the good governance programme. At least two areas that the country has paid significant attention to are democracy and private sector development. In recent years, the Samoan Government has embarked on reform programmes that reflect many good governance initiatives. The statements it has released concerning these reforms reads like a checklist of the good governance programme.<sup>10</sup> More importantly, Samoans adhere to a system that is strongly comparable to 'a system of affective ties', the *fa'aSamoa*. The *fa'aSamoa* is comprised of various kin, ethnic,

community and cultural ties. These are manifested in a powerful institution called the *fa'amatai*. Within the system, affective ties are constructed and maintained by myriad of rites and rituals comparable to a 'social cage'. The thesis will use the term *fa'aSamoa* to refer to these 'affective ties' and their relevant 'social cages'. However, it is important to note that the *fa'aSamoa* is not the sole providence of these elements. Instead, it is a very complex system that has many elements. This thesis does not indulge in a discussion of these. It is a subject matter worthy of its own study.

### **Incorporating the case study into the analysis**

#### ***Research objectives***

In the context of the 'general objective', the research has three specific objective that are directly pertinent to Samoa. First, the thesis seeks to understand and explicate the role of the *fa'aSamoa* in corrupt activities or allegations thereof. Second, it analyses the role of the *fa'aSamoa* on the ability to accumulate capital. Finally, it seeks to understand why the *fa'aSamoa* inhibits individual autonomy and liberty. It is hoped that the fulfilment of these will reflect on those objectives and arguments pertaining to the good governance agenda and Gellners and Halls prescription for civil society.

#### ***Unit of analysis***

According to Singleton the units of analysis are "what or who is to be described or analyzed."<sup>11</sup> Applied to Samoa, this points to Samoan society and in particularly Samoan individuals. Arguably, 'affective ties, 'social cages', the



public sector, the private sector and individual autonomy and freedom, all essentially pertain to the dynamics within a society, and in particular amongst the individuals that comprise it. There is a qualification that needs to be explicated concerning these. Those that fall under the heading 'Samoan' need not necessarily be of Samoan ethnicity. There are at least two reasons for taking this approach. The first is that the question of ethnicity is very difficult to handle and opens up a Pandora's box of issues: how does one determine the ethnicity of a person? Does their blood have to contain a certain amount of blood from the ethnic group in question and if so, how much, who decides the amount and what is the basis for such a decision? The second is that there are people who clearly are not of Samoan ethnicity but nevertheless perceive themselves as Samoans for instance Europeans that permanently live in Samoa..

### *Isolating the Variables*

There are four variables or characteristics of these units which may be isolated for the purposes of this study. The *fa'aSamoa* comprises the independent variable. The dependent variables are corruption, the ability to accumulate capital and the behaviour that is exacted from the individual.

### *Propositions specific to Samoa*

There are three propositions specifically put forward in relation to Samoa. First, the *fa'aSamoa* does not foster corruption. Second, the *fa'aSamoa* inhibits and facilitates capital accumulation. It inheres avenues that inhibit as well as aid in the accumulation of capital. Third, there are important reasons for why the *fa'aSamoa* inhibits individual freedom and autonomy.

In hypothetical terms, if these propositions are confirmed, then the grounds upon which the good governance agenda and the liberal prescription seek to eliminate affective ties and social cages are not justified with regards Samoa. Moreover, it would also suggest that affective ties, as utilised in the good governance agenda, do not foster corruption, and that their function with regards capital accumulation are greater than what it is credited with. Furthermore, it would suggest, with regards the liberal prescription for 'social cages', that there are justifiable reasons for why individual freedom and autonomy are inhibited.

#### *Data sources and data collection*

The research relied on three sources for data collection; secondary material, interviews carried out by the author, and direct observations made during the research period in Samoa. The secondary material, comprised of books, newspapers, magazines, reports and others of this kind is used predominantly in the establishment of the theoretical model posited by the thesis. It is used to gain and understanding of the good governance programme, its agenda for civil society as well as the liberal prescription for civil society. Additionally it is used to establish the relationship between these two paradigms. The secondary material also serves to introduce the case study and provide additional information about it as the thesis develops.

The interviews provide the majority of the data that required to understand and analyse the case study in relation to the objectives, propositions and hypothesis set out in the thesis. Thirty-one interviews were conducted, four in New Zealand and the rest in Samoa. The four that were held in New Zealand was with Samoans who reside in Samoa and were on a holiday trip. The author

conducted interviews with two of these four in Samoa. The interviews were held over a period that spanned a period of just over two months. They began with informal and unstructured discussions held with the four subjects interviewed in New Zealand. While they were used to obtain data they also served the purpose of gauging the type of questions that would be required for later interviews and more importantly the manner by which they should be conducted.<sup>12</sup>

The questions were never rigidly set in terms of asking them in the same grammatical structure on each interview occasion.<sup>13</sup> There were at least two reasons for taking this approach. First, it was grammatically difficult as some interviews were held in Samoan, some in English, and some in a mixture of the two languages. Second, experience with the first four subjects highlighted the tendency for the responses to go beyond the boundaries of the questions asked. Most of the subjects that came after these four went on to give explanations that were relevant to other predetermined questions.<sup>14</sup> Instead of basing the interviews on a particular structure of questions the preferred avenue was to entertain differently structured questions but centre all of these and develop the interview along a constant theme: the role of the fa'aSamoa in various of their life and their perception of life in Samoa.

Initially the observation that were made while researching in Samoa were not intended as a source of data for this thesis. However, upon reflection, the author realised that events outside the interviews were very important to gaining a full and complete understanding of the things relayed to him during the interviews. The actions and behaviour of those with whom he interacted told as

much about the impact of the *fa'aSamoa* as their words. Because of these reasons, certain material obtained through this avenue has been included.

Subjects<sup>15</sup> of varying backgrounds were chosen in the hope of attaining a wide range of views. They included matai (both men and women), high ranking public sector servants such as Heads of Departments, a former Prime Minister, ministers, business owners, operators and workers and non-government organisations employees. It was hoped that the different range of views would inform on the three essential spheres of the study; social, political and economic. This was fulfilled. Each subject gave comprehensive answers to the questions pertaining to that part of their background for which they were selected. However, despite the distinguishing features of their backgrounds, the subjects also shared many common elements, for instance, most had a matai title or were a *faletua*, (*matai's* wife).

The interviews were undertaken in a very informal manner akin to an open discussion. There are at least two reasons why this approach was adopted. First, it complemented an important characteristic of Samoan communication: they are predominantly an oral-language based society.<sup>16</sup> This inclines Samoans to present their thoughts in rich and colourful expressions. The interviews had to cater for this, providing a forum where each subject talked freely instead of being limited by specific questions and a specific structure. Second, affective ties, the *fa'aSamoa*, public sector inefficiency, individual autonomy, freedom and so forth are all abstract terms. Constant clarification was required in order to convey these concepts clearly to the subjects and also to understand it from their discussion of them. The third reason relates to the variety and differences in the background of

the subjects. When the subjects discussed similar issues, irrelevant of their background, the author focussed on any differences that were specifically pertinent to the subjects background while at the same time allowing for the discussion on those points of similarity.

### *Thesis structure*

The thesis is divided into six chapters. The first three chapters establish the framework for the study. Chapter one introduces good governance, describing its historical origins, development and present configuration. Chapter two explores the good governance agenda for civil society and how this agenda parallels the liberal prescription for civil society as posited by Gellner and Hall. It focuses specifically on 'affective ties', the initiatives that pertain to it and how it is causally related to the 'social cage' concept. Chapter three establishes the legitimacy of Samoa as a case in which to carry out the study and discusses the *fa'aSamoa* as a 'system of affective ties'. The last three chapters are research oriented, comprising mainly interview data. Chapter four discusses the impact of the *fa'aSamoa* on individual behaviour. It discusses the ends to which this impact is theoretically engineered, and the functions in which it has been practically manifested. Chapter five discusses the role of the *fa'aSamoa* in both inhibiting and facilitating capital accumulation. Chapter six addresses the *fa'aSamoa's* role in relation to corruption.

### *Other relevant Studies*

One of the most definitive studies concerning 'affective ties' is Hyden's 1983 study, *"No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective"*.<sup>17</sup> This did not use the terminology of 'affective ties' but a concept that is representative of the same phenomenon, 'economy of affection'. The study alluded to the importance of the economy of affection to governance concerns. More importantly, as Williams and Young argue, it is this study that explicitly posits the good governance agenda for civil society: to eliminate civil society institutions based on affective ties.<sup>18</sup> In this respect, Hyden's study is therefore related to this thesis through a similarity of content, and through a genealogical link.

Hyden closely associated affective ties with what he termed a "peasant mode of production". He characterised this mode as a "rudimentary division of labour", with an absence of "product specialisation", resulting in "very little exchange between the various units of production".<sup>19</sup> He argued that this mode of production facilitates the existence of a society that is incapacitated from the state: the relations that emerge from the peasant mode of production mean that "African countries are societies without a state."<sup>20</sup> In reality, the peasant mode of production does not exist in isolation: as a pure form, but interacts with other forms of production. Hyden contends that,

"The concept of mode of production is of course merely an abstraction identifying the basic logic and structures of given social formations. It is never articulated in a single or pure form."

As a case in point, he notes that, "African societies display characteristics of both the peasant and the capitalist modes of production."

According to Hyden, the peasant mode of production inheres a peculiar type of economy, the “economy of affection.”<sup>21</sup> He defines the economy of affection as,

“a network of support, communications and interaction among structurally defined groups connected by blood, kin, community or other affinities, for example, religion. It links together in a systematic fashion a variety of discrete economic and social units which in other regards may be autonomous.”

He goes on to say that,

“Such a co-operation...tends to be ad hoc and informal rather than regular and formalised.”

In Africa, Hyden claims that this type of economy is usually related to customary functions but also has manifestations that are prevalent in contemporary ones. Its influence pervades all sectors of society, “from the grass-roots to the apex of society.”

Hyden’s study posits three functional purposes of the economy of affection: basic survival, social maintenance, and development. In the case of Africa, the economy of affection facilitates for members of households to meet obligations to other members. For instance, poor rural peasants, who do not qualify for loans from formal credit institutions may receive cash from a relative or friend, goods such as food and clothing and basic services such as labour or child care. Other circumstances when the economy of affection is strongly manifested include time of crisis such as natural disasters and warfare. In terms of social maintenance, the economy of affection facilitates activities that span from gift-making to contributions for religious or political purposes. In the case of Africa, predominant social maintenance activities include incurring considerable, sometimes vast expenses for ceremonial functions such as weddings and burials. Finally, the

economy of affection serves various development efforts; providing easy rental term for capital and labour services, parents receiving help from their relatives to give their children an education, assisting relatives migrate and so forth.

Hyden's study parallels this study through the similarity of the central concepts that are discussed: the economy of affection parallels the system of affective ties and 'social cage'. All are concerned with networks between similar types of institutions; ethnic, community, kin and so forth. Additionally, they provide a basis and framework for societal interaction that consequently fosters autonomy and solidarity. All three are concerned with governance systems, each providing or serving crucial functions within society. Their governance structures imbues them with the ability to avoid state interference. Furthermore, none are based on formal instruments such as contracts. Finally, all three have significant implications for governance and development.

However, this thesis differs slightly in its purpose and coverage. Hyden seeks to highlight the importance of the 'economy of affection' so as to incorporate it, into development calculations. Although he provides a positive outlook on this type of economy, most of which has been discussed above, his primary focus is on how this economy inhibits development. Hyden argues that economic development, in fact capitalism is the best avenue to achieve development and that this is best facilitated by a systemic superstructure and macro-economic structures such as those provided by a state.<sup>22</sup> The economy of affection operating within small groups, along informal lines acts to counteract the manifestations of these factors.<sup>23</sup> Hyden reiterates this same theme but for a slightly different goal four years later, confirming his anti-'economy of affection'



stance. In his article, *Ethnicity and State Coherence in Africa*,<sup>24</sup> Hyden argues that the 'economy of affection' fosters a 'soft state'. He posits several positive effects this may have, such as reducing ethnic conflict and claims of self determination. However, he argues that this economy hinders economic development and therefore should be eliminated. This study seeks to explore the negative implications that Hyden has associated with the economy of affection in terms of 'a system of affective ties'. However, it adopts a different perspective than that espoused by Hyden and questions the contentions he makes about the effects that the economy of affection.

Various other studies have addressed the concept of 'economy of affection'. Michael Bamberger's study, *Support Networks and Survival Strategies of the Urban Poor*,<sup>25</sup> looked at the role of informal support networks in development. Another, *Female-Headed Households in Kenya: Coping with Rural and Urban Socio-economic Change*,<sup>26</sup> by Mari Clark presented detailed figures of the economy of affection operating in Kenya. It included an analysis of the purpose as well as the currency of exchange for the economy of affection. In a study concerning the West Laikipia District of Kenya, the 'economy of affection' was found to be a significant factor in aiding small-scale farmers.<sup>27</sup> Of special mention must be the critiques of this concept. At least two are prominent in this field. The first, by Rene Lemarchand, *African Peasantry's, Reciprocity and the Market: The Economy of Affection Reconsidered*, contends that the concept cannot hold up to analytical requirements.<sup>28</sup> Essentially, it discredits the use of the concept in understanding the way that peasants relate to economic issues. The second, by Tony Waters, *A Cultural Analysis of the Economy of Affection and the*

*Uncaptured Peasantry in Tanzania*, confirms the legitimacy of the concept but emphasises the need to view it as a cultural construct.<sup>29</sup>

These four studies dealt with the concept of 'economy of affection'. However, they applied this concept in ways and for purposes that are significantly different to this thesis. The first two studies were primarily concerned with the concept in the context of economic concerns with development. This thesis is concerned with these as well as those of political and social nature. The last two studies primarily dealt with the concept and the ways in which it should and should not be utilised. This thesis takes the concept as a 'given' and primarily seeks to gain a broader understanding of its effects rather than its content.

Another group of studies that would have a strong parallel to this thesis are those who have addressed the role of the *fa'aSamoa* in social, economic and political spheres. At least two are highly prominent in this regard. In 1970 David Pitt published a study, based on his PhD thesis, which looked at the effect that Samoan tradition had on economic progress in Samoa.<sup>30</sup> The study focussed predominantly on economic matters but closely associated these with important social elements. Pitt took issue with prevalent models of the time that explained the role of the *fa'aSamoa* vis-à-vis economic progress very negatively. He set out to identify the role of the *fa'aSamoa* in the context of a different and more favourable model. He concluded that the traditional values and institutions of Samoa, represented through the *fa'aSamoa*, facilitated rather than hindered local economic development. Pitt saw this as the result of the *fa'aSamoa*'s flexibility which allowed 'the Samoan' to participate in the European world while maintaining his traditional position and values. In essence, the *fa'aSamoa*

facilitated economic progress because its institutions could adapt to cash economy conditions, co-exist with new introduced institutions, be compatible with capital formation, and inhere a tradition of trade and specialisation.<sup>31</sup>

In a more recent study, Asofou So'o addressed the role that Samoan traditional institutions played vis-à-vis the implementation and functioning of western democracy in Samoa. In particular he looked at the role of a political grouping, comprised of some of Samoa's highest matai title holders, called the *tama-a-aiga*. In looking at traditional institutions, So'o focussed at their manifestations in institutions, and more specifically, national institutions. Additionally, his thesis focussed on the impact of such institutions, the *fa'amatai* included, on the political process, one crucial area being elections. In total he concluded that traditional institutions and values counteracted the proper functioning of western democratic institutions.<sup>32</sup>

Both these studies have similarities and differences with this analysis. On a general level, all three are concerned with the *fa'aSamoa*. Additionally, all have very similar intentions: to discover the effect and the implications of the *fa'aSamoa*. Their differences lie in the specifics of their analysis. First, they differ in their usage of the *fa'aSamoa* concept. Pitt and So'o both utilise the *fa'aSamoa* as representative of traditional Samoan institutions and values. This thesis utilises the *fa'aSamoa* as representative only of 'a system of affective ties'. Second, they differ in their selection of dependent variables. Pitt's study isolates 'economic progress' as the predominant dependent variable while for So'o, it is 'western democratic institutions'. While their analysis also addresses issues concerning the ability to accumulate capital and corruption they reflect on these only in the

context of the larger dependent variables on which their studies centre. The differences become manifest in the conclusions where Pitt's and So'o's are on a more general level than this thesis will seek to make. A final point of difference is found in the contexts of each study. The contexts of Pitt's study is economic development, while So'o's is democratic development. While these are pertinent this study will focus particularly on good governance and its liberal underpinnings.

### *The importance of this study*

This study should shed some light on the adoption of good governance initiatives in Samoa. The good governance programme is rapidly gaining prominence in the discourses of development and overseas development assistance (ODA). Major aid donors and international aid organisations are accommodating good governance initiatives in the hope that it will provide a better 'engine' for development. In the South Pacific this trend is very strong and may be perceived in the rhetoric of the New Zealand<sup>33</sup> and Australian<sup>34</sup> governments, and regional organisations such as the Asian Development Bank, the South Pacific Forum and the Pacific Community, formerly the South Pacific Commission. The developing countries of the South Pacific such as Samoa are increasingly adopting good governance measures. These measures however are universally applicable, particularly in the form in which they are espoused. If implemented the new initiatives must complement the contours of important indigenous systems and institutions. This can only be borne from an analysis of important foundations of these new initiatives and those cases in which they will be applied. This study seeks to provide this analysis.

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<sup>1</sup> Carol Lancaster, "Governance and Development: The Views From Washington", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 24, No. 1. 1993, p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 9 See also Stephen R. Weissman, "Structural Adjustment in Africa: Insights from the Experiences of Ghana and Senegal", *World Development*, Vol. 18, No. 12, 1990, pp-1621-1634. Weissman acknowledges the relative success of these two countries and provides a more in depth study of the structural adjustment programmes they adopted. G. K. Helleiner, "The IMF, The World Bank and Africa's Adjustment and External Debt Problems: An Unofficial View", *World Development*, Vol. 20, No. 6, 1992, pp. 779-792. Helleiner argues that the overall "miserable" economic performance by the African countries should be addressed by programmes that are configured for a longer rather than shorter time periods.

<sup>3</sup> Deborah Brautigam, *Governance and Economy*, Washington D.C., The World Bank, 1991, p. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Lancaster, p. 9.

<sup>5</sup> Brautigam, p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> World Bank, *Governance: The World Banks Experience*, Washington D.C., The World Bank, 1994, pp. 42-3. Pierre Landell-Mills and Ismail Serageldin, "Governance and the Development Process", *Finance and Development*, September 1991, p. 14.

<sup>7</sup> Ernest Gellner, "The Importance of Being Modular" in *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, (Ed.) by John Hall, Cambridge, UK., Polity Press, 1995. John A. Hall, "In Search of Civil Society", in *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, (Ed.) by John Hall, Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 1995.

<sup>8</sup> Gellner, 1995, pp. 32-33.

<sup>9</sup> Hall, 1995, p. 58. See also Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power; Volume II: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1790-1914*, US, Cambridge University Press, 1993. Mann used this term with specific reference to the way people were caged into classes, first by other, normally higher status classes and secondly by the nation-state, as it evolved.

<sup>10</sup> Government of Samoa, *Strengthening the Partnership: Statement of Economic Strategy, 1998-1999*, Economic Planning and Policy Division, Treasury Department, 1 March 1998.

<sup>11</sup> Royce A. Singleton Jr., et al, *Approaches to Social Research*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 69.

<sup>12</sup> From these preliminary interviews, it was ascertained that the best way to conduct the interviews would be in an unstructured, almost conversation-like manner. Although these prompted long and lengthy discussions, they almost always contained answers that were very complete; giving central as well as peripheral information concerning the question. The more structured and formal interviews tended to solicit only brief reply's. As an example of the two different approaches: the former would always begin with questions concerning the subjects welfare such O a mai oe? O mai le aiga? (How are you? How is your family?). Discussion would then continue to be centred on these topics. These would almost always reflect considerably on the fa'aSamoa. From this discussion, the author would find his leads. When the discussion touched on social, economic and political matters relevant to the thesis, the author would then ask more specific questions concerning the thesis. For instance, one interviewee stipulated that life (he was living in a rural village) was currently very hard. He was questioned why and it was found that there were several village occasion that his family were expected to contribute to. He was then asked specific details concerning such occasions and the ramifications of not contributing: whether it was just out of obligation that they were contributing or were there other measures which secured their participation?

<sup>13</sup> As aforementioned, there were no set questions but rather the questions. However, the fa'aSamoa was used as a central theme around which questions were formulated.

<sup>14</sup> It was decided unwise to interrupt the subject when this occurred. To cut someone off as they are talking is considered very rude in Samoan culture, especially considering the Samoan status of the author (equivalent to a *taule'ale'a*, young untitled man) in relation to those of the subjects (a substantial amount were matai). Despite the fact that the circumstance was an interview, this protocol had to be upheld. Since the author is ethnically of Samoan affinity, there is a higher expectation, as opposed to someone of non-Samoan affinity, for him to understand and adhere to

at least some of the important protocols of the Samoan way of life, inclusive of this: 'the value of silence.'

<sup>15</sup> Many of the subjects did not object to their true identity being revealed. However there were also a significant amount who gave the impression that they would prefer anonymity or by their circumstances, the author has considered that maintaining their anonymity would be best in order to uphold their honour and respect. The former will have their names posited while those in the latter two groups will not have their true names revealed. Instead they will be given a name that accurately reflects their background and character. As all interviewees are introduced in the course of this thesis, a brief background will be given concerning them.

<sup>16</sup> See a full discussion of this topic in Alessandro Duranti, *From Grammar to Politics*, University of California Press, Berkley, Los Angeles, US, 1994.

<sup>17</sup> Goran Hyden., *No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective*, London, Heinemann, 1983.

<sup>18</sup> David Williams and Tom Young, "Governance, the World Bank and Liberal Theory", *Political Studies*, 1994, Vol. 42, No. 1.

<sup>19</sup> Hyden., p. 6.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., pp. 20-22.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. p. 21 Hyden states, "It (the economy of affection) is impossible to exclude the role of the economy of affection from a discussion of this process of decay. It is an underestimated threat to the macro-economic ambitions of either capitalism or socialism in Africa. Derived from a mode of production in which the structural interdependence of the various production units is minimal or nil it has no provisions for a systemic superstructure to keep it together. Instead, the economy of affection is a myriad of invisible micro-economic networks which, if allowed to penetrate society, gradually wear down the macro-economic structures, and eventually the whole system."

<sup>24</sup> Goran Hyden, "Ethnicity and State Coherence in Africa", *Development*, Vol. 1, 1987, pp. 82-86.

<sup>25</sup> Michael Bamberger, *Support Networks and Survival Strategies of the Urban Poor*, Washington D.C., Urban and Regional Economics Division, Development Economics Department, World Bank, 1982.

<sup>26</sup> Mari Clark, *Female-Headed Households in Kenya: Coping with Rural and Urban Socio-Economic Change*, United States, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1981.

<sup>27</sup> Beat Sottas., "Aspects of a Peasant Mode of Production: Exchange and the Extent of Sufficiency Among Smallholders in West Laikipia, Kenya", *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 27, Nos. 3-4, July-Oct 1992, pp. 271-295

<sup>28</sup> Rene Lemarchand, 'Uncivil States and Civil Societies: How Illusion Became Reality', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1992, pp. 177-191.

<sup>29</sup> Tony Waters., "A Cultural Analysis of the Economy of Affection and the Uncaptured Peasantry in Tanzania", *Journal of Modern African Studies*; Vol. 30, No. 1, March 1992, pp. 163-175

<sup>30</sup> David Pitt, *Tradition and Economic Progress in Samoa*, Oxford, Great Britain, Clarendon Press, 1970.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., pp. 262-264

<sup>32</sup> Asofou So'o, *O Le Fuata Ma Lona Lou: Indigenous institutions and democracy in Western Samoa*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Canberra, Australian National University, 1996. This institution promoted traditional high ranking titles as the appropriate leaders for Samoa.

<sup>33</sup> New Zealand Government, *New Zealand Official Development Assistance Programme Annual Review 1996*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, 1996, p. 28. New Zealand Government, *Investing in a Common Future; Policy Framework for New Zealand Official Development Assistance*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 1996. New Zealand Government, *New Zealand Official Development Assistance Programme Profiles 1997-98*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997, pp. 6-10.

<sup>34</sup> Peter Larmour, "Making Sense of Good Governance", in *The Proceedings of the Aotearoa New Zealand International Development Studies Network Inaugural Conference; Linkages in Development Issues of Governance*, Aotearoa New Zealand International Development Studies

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Network and the Institute for Development Studies, The University of Auckland, Auckland, 1998, p. 3.

# C

## HAPTER 2: THE GOOD GOVERNANCE

### PROGRAMME

*This chapter explores the concept of good governance and its manifestation as a development programme. It begins by looking at the term governance and how this has been incorporated and used in the concept of 'good governance'. It then sets out to show the genealogical link between good governance and structural adjustment, and more importantly, it argues that the latter has not been replaced by, but in fact incorporated into, the former. The chapter then proceeds to posit two ways by which good governance may be understood. First, as a derivative of at least three paradigms; liberalism, neo-liberalism and neo-classical theory. Second, as a programme constructed and shaped by policy discourse between and within various agents that include major aid donors and international development organisations.*

#### **The origins of 'good governance'**

##### ***Governance***

The terms governance, good governance are not new on the world stage. Similar phrases, sometimes with parallel meanings have existed at least as far back as 1912. Larmour traces the history of the related phrase 'good government' to a 'Good Government League' founded in Louisiana in 1912.<sup>1</sup> As with its modern counterpart, 'good governance' it was also cogently associated with the "politics of corruption and reform". Similarly, post-war Britain witnessed 'good government' emerge as "a slogan in colonial affairs because it implied that 'self government' meant incompetent administration."<sup>2</sup>



In its contemporary usage, the term governance is predominantly associated with government action. In the 1992 World Bank publication, *Governance and Development*, governance is defined as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development.”<sup>3</sup> The connection is tacitly implied in this definition but is perhaps more obvious in the following statement from the same document;

“The Banks experience has shown that the programs and projects it helps finance may be technically sound, but fail to deliver anticipated results for reasons connected to the quality of government action.”<sup>4</sup>

Brautigam helps to further make this point:

“Governance itself is a neutral concept, meaning the “exercise of authority; control,” or, more broadly, “government.” As a synonym for government, governance can be further defined as “the political direction and control exercised over the actions of the members, citizens, or inhabitants of communities, societies and states.”<sup>5</sup>

While governance does not fully equate with government, the connection between the two is important to understanding the origins of ‘good governance’.

The concept of governance<sup>6</sup> made its first prominent mark on development discourse in the 1989 World Bank report, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Development*.<sup>7</sup> It was unveiled as a determining factor in successful development. In the case of Africa, governance was singled out as the primary cause of problems in development: “Underlying the litany of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of governance.” The report associated governance with key issues and problems involving government; leadership authority and legitimacy; absence of balance of power, lack of official accountability, control of information, failure to respect the rule of law. However, to understand the importance of this study, it is important to understand the

development paradigm that preceded good governance: structural adjustment reform.

### *Structural Adjustment Reform*

Structural adjustment reforms centre primarily on economic reforms. It is preceded by a range of 'stabilisation policies' such as fiscal restraint and currency devaluation. These are geared towards the creation of a stable macroeconomic environment.<sup>8</sup> Structural adjustment are based around the simple premise that "if sufficient economic incentives are provided to producers, they will expand existing production and invest in new productive activities."<sup>9</sup> This, it is hoped, will create an "engine for sustained economic growth."<sup>10</sup> The variety of economic reforms that comprise structural reform include, "monetary, fiscal, trade, regulatory policies and public sector management."<sup>11</sup>

Prior to good governance, structural adjustment reform programmes dominated development efforts. In the wake of the African economic crisis of the 1980's, international donors responded with various kinds of reform programmes. These centred on structural adjustment, but came under several different labels; "stabilisation," "adjustment," "economic policy reform," "structural adjustment," "sectoral adjustment," "adjustment with a human face," and so forth.<sup>12</sup> By 1988, structural adjustment was being pursued in approximately 25-30 sub-Saharan African countries.<sup>13</sup> Various international donors encouraged their adoption. Structural adjustment accounted for a considerable amount of the assistance from these donors. By 1988, structural adjustment loans constituted 35% of the World Bank's \$3 Billion in new lending to sub-Saharan Africa. The IMF, traditionally a fervent supporter of "stabilisation" policies, has since joined efforts with the

World Bank in formalising its “Structural Adjustment facilities”. Structural adjustment has also accounted for approximately 35% of US bilateral economic assistance and 30% of French Aid.<sup>14</sup> According to Weissman writing in 1990 these levels were increasing rapidly and expected to continue growing.

Structural adjustment soon proved incapable of comprehensively meeting development requirements. After nearly a decade of these reforms, the envisaged “engine for sustained economic growth” did not materialise.<sup>15</sup> In Ghana and Senegal, two African countries that sustained structural adjustment efforts for a long period, an improved framework for economic growth was developed. However, its success depended largely on variables such as good weather, beneficial terms of trade and continued international assistance.<sup>16</sup> With regards these two cases, Weismann states that the structural adjustment programmes that persisted towards the end of the 1980’s provided “little enduring poverty alleviation.”<sup>17</sup> Referring directly to Ghana, Lancaster (1993) noted that despite an expansion in the agricultural base, and increase in exports and growth rates, “significant private investment has not occurred.” In Ghana itself there was significant disinvestment as firms closed down.<sup>18</sup>

The problem with structural adjustment was that it defined too narrowly the factors affecting development. Its needed to add political and social considerations to its economic concerns. There is at least one key factor that makes political considerations crucial to economic development, policy sustainability. The case for placing primary emphasis on policy sustainability is made by Rodrik<sup>19</sup> who argues that the economically inclined “market oriented reforms’ that are prevalent in structural reform, are not as important to development as “policy

sustainability". The key components of policy sustainability include; "stable economic policies; a credible and predictable set of microeconomic incentives, widely expected to be sustained into the indefinite future; the absence of sharp distributional changes that would create political pressures to reverse course down the line." Policy sustainability provides investors with a framework in which they can confidently make investments. Because capital is partially irreversible, the lack of sustainability will leave private investment prone to devastation from sudden policy changes.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, without policy sustainability, private investment is significantly hindered. Policy sustainability is of course a function governments. Ultimately therefore, the disparities of these programmes have brought the focus onto issues of governance.

Governance concerns have been developed with the primary goal of better facilitating the economic initiatives of structural adjustment. Where the Bank delves into political matters, it is for the goal of furthering their economic objectives. The 1994 World Bank document, '*Governance: The World Bank's Experience*', stated that:

"...the Banks call for good governance and its concern with accountability, transparency, and the rule of law have to do exclusively with the contribution they make to social and economic development and to the Bank's fundamental objective of sustainable poverty reduction in the developing world."

It further stated that, "The World Bank's interest in governance derives from its concern for the sustainability of the programs and projects it helps finance."<sup>21</sup> As already mentioned, these programs and projects are comprised significantly of economically oriented-structural adjustment strategies. Williams and Young conclude this point well:

“...it became clear to the Bank that part of the reason for the limited (at least) success of structural adjustment were political considerations that went beyond the size of the public sector or increasing the technical capacities of states. Whether it was viewed as a success or a failure the experience of adjustment lending led the Bank to take account of political factors such as interest group pressure and government legitimacy as somehow important. ... This has led to the rather obvious conclusion that the state has an indispensable role in development.”<sup>22</sup>

Therefore, structural adjustment may be perceived as comprising the economic centred initiatives of the good governance programme.

### **Good Governance: What is it?**

There are at least three ways by which good governance may be understood. One is offered by Leftwich in *Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World*.<sup>23</sup> According to Leftwich, good governance is comprised of three main components or levels; “systemic, political and administrative.”<sup>24</sup> The systemic component refers to the relationships between different political, economic and social entities that exist in society and which, to a large extent, decide the kind of society that exists. He argues that in its current usage, it is best associated with, “a democratic capitalist regime, presided over by a minimal state.” The political component refers to a state whose legitimacy and authority is derived from a democratic mandate. Moreover, it is grounded on the traditional liberal notion of “a clear separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers.”<sup>25</sup> The administrative component refers to an “efficient, open, accountable and audited public service which has the bureaucratic competence to help design and implement appropriate policies and manage whatever public sector there is.” Moreover, there is a need for “an independent judicial system to uphold the law and resolve disputes arising in a largely free market economy.”<sup>26</sup>

Larmour offers two models which present an understanding of how good governance is linked to development and ways by which the good governance paradigm may be understood and perceived.<sup>27</sup> First, he distinguishes three ways by which good governance is linked to development; democratic governance, effective governance and governance as co-ordination.<sup>28</sup> Democratic governance',<sup>29</sup> revolves around traditional concerns of Western political theory, legitimacy, accountability, and human rights. It is argued that development depends significantly on the existence of these elements. Effective governance, focuses predominantly on the 'ability to govern' and to a lesser extent, the type of government that exists. Development is the function of a governments power to act and the efficiency with which it does. It thus emphasises areas such as policy implementation and the delivery of services. Governance as co-ordination emphasises the importance of various institutions and actors in fostering order. According to Larmour governance as co-ordination, "sees order as the resultant of the actions and interactions of formally constituted 'governments' and other private and voluntary associations." Order is the function of political authorities working through and with other actors to the extent that they cannot be sharply distinguished from them. There are three "distinct ordering principles" which can emerge from within the relationships pertaining to 'governance as co-ordination': hierarchical rules; market exchanges; and shared values.<sup>30</sup> For development purposes, the 'good governance' is significantly inclined towards market exchanges as the most preferred ordering principle.

Second, he delineates three levels, from which different manifestations of good governance are produced; theory, policy and practice. At the theory level,

good governance is perceived to be a product of various disciplines. At the practice level, good governance is constructed from discussions, negotiations and general discourse between and within governments and non-governmental organisations. At the practice level, good governance may be construed from its implementation. It manifests itself in the work of agents such as ombudsman, auditors, journalists, non-government organisation leaders and trade unionists in developing countries. It may also materialise from a “private good governance industry” where agents such as, “brokers that arrange privatisation’s, political risk insurers, and consultants on public sector reform”, operate.<sup>31</sup>

This second model provides a very useful guide for a more comprehensive exploration of the good governance concept. Although, Larmour stipulates that the boundaries between them overlap and at times are vague, it nevertheless provides a framework conducive to conceptualising its meaning. The analysis will only utilise the first two levels in this chapter. As it will be shown, the exact nature of the good governance programme will differ between its various exponents, and between the different contexts in and circumstances under which, it is applied. Although no country or state is unique, neither are they the same. Therefore, an uncertainty will arguably be more prevalent at the practice than at the policy level where a necessary fit must be found between ‘good governance’ and the specific contours of the case.<sup>32</sup> Although these will not change the essence of the programme or its main tenets, it is likely that it will affect the final product that is implemented. It is therefore much more difficult to even give a general outline of how good governance is represented at this level. It would require empirical studies carried out in several cases. Instead, and for the purposes of this thesis, it is

more desirable to carry out the analysis of the practice level with respect to the particular case study in question. The practice level will therefore be addressed in the third chapter concerning Samoa.

### *Good governance as a theoretical product*

At the theoretical level, good governance is the product of at least three paradigms; liberalism, neo-liberalism and neo classical theory. One of the central tenets of liberalism is individual freedom.<sup>33</sup> Around this basic concern revolves ideas and constructions regarding the role of groups, individuals and more importantly for this discussion the role of the state. The importance of freedom is such that any action which affects it detrimentally must be thoroughly justified. This holds for any action by the state which may infringe on the individuals freedom. As a consequence of this principle, liberal theory advocates that the government should play as minimal a role as possible. Such a level of is perceived as the maximum justifiably allowable: anything over will be difficult to justify. According to liberals, the government should concern itself simply with protecting the liberty of its citizens. It is presumed that the maximisation of the individuals liberty must be compatible with a like liberty for all.<sup>34</sup>

It is important here to distinguish between two types of liberty, each with a particular prescription for government involvement: negative and positive. Negative liberty, proposed by scholars such as Isaiah Berlin<sup>35</sup> advocates that at the core of liberty is the absence of coercion by others. The state therefore must ensure that citizens do not coerce each other without just reason. Positive liberty, associated with the likes of John Stuart Mills<sup>36</sup> and Rousseau<sup>37</sup> stresses the importance of autonomy. In this strand of liberty, freedom must be curbed when it



impinges on the freedom of others and when one's activities inhibit one's own freedom. This requires an entity, separate from those enjoying the freedom, to ensure that freedom is optimised for all rather than just for some. This calls for government to act in a paternalistic manner, playing a significant role in the affairs of people, making impositions on them for their own good.<sup>38</sup>

Liberalism has strong implications for private property and consequently on the mechanisms for co-ordination within society. Liberty is perceived lacking without the notion of private property. According to classical liberals, private property is required so that individuals' freedoms may be actualised by "allowing each to live their lives-including employing their labour and their capital- as they see fit."<sup>39</sup> A co-ordinating system must therefore be based on private property as the embodiment of freedom.

Unless people are free to make contracts and to sell their labour, or unless they are free to save their incomes and then invest them as they see fit, or unless they are free to run enterprises when they have obtained the capital, they are not really free.<sup>40</sup>

Private property is here justified on the fact that it embodies freedom. However, liberals also justify it on the grounds that it is a safeguard of that freedom. Their argument is predicated on the notion that private property protects the liberty of subjects from the encroachments of the state. According to F.A. Hayek;

"There can be no freedom of press if the instruments of printing are under government control, no freedom of assembly if the needed rooms are so controlled, no freedom of movement if the means of transport are a government monopoly"<sup>41</sup>

Neo liberalism is a derivative of this ideology. In the context of the distinction between positive and negative, it ideally leans towards the former. Surfacing in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, this form of liberalism was the result of at least three important factors. First there was significant doubt in the ability of the

market to sustain prosperity and maintain a strong foundation for producing a stable and free society. Second, the apparent success of government efforts at economic planning during World War I,<sup>42</sup> resulted in an increase of faith in the governments ability to effectively supervise economic life. More importantly however, was the perception at the time that elected officials were truly going to be 'representative of the people'.<sup>43</sup> The third and most decisive factor in the rise of neo-liberalism however was the 'growing conviction' that property rights produced a unjust inequality of power which led to a less-than-equal liberty (typically, 'positive liberty') for the working class.<sup>44</sup>

Neo-liberalism is predominantly an economic centred theory. The neo-liberal post war upsurge was led by a group of economists who sought to promote the "major tenets of economic liberalism in the analysis of development".<sup>45</sup> Neo-liberals assert that economic growth is the best way to reduce poverty. According to Colclough, the primary message of neo-liberals is that, "imperfect markets are better than imperfect states." Neo-liberals essentially seek to apply economic theories to politics: "At their most ambitious, the neo-liberals strive for the unification of economics and politics-both in normative and in positive modes-under the banner of rational choice theory."<sup>46</sup>

Neo-liberalism stems from another paradigm, neo-classical theory. According to Colclough, the economic liberalism so fervently proposed, stems from an intellectual foundation provided by

"orthodox neo-classical economic theory: they employ choice-theoretic analysis, and the overriding concern is to achieve efficiency in the distribution of resources."<sup>47</sup>

However, there is at least three significant differences between the two paradigms. First, neo-liberalism focuses predominantly on the governments role in market failure whereas neo-classical theory focuses on 'market failure' in general. Second, it takes a more minimalist view of government than neo-classical theory. Adam Smith, one of the most influential proponents of neo-classical theory conceded a strong requirement for the state to provide the regulatory framework within which capitalism would function: "Smith's 'invisible hand' could work only in the presence of a not-so-invisible state."<sup>48</sup> This, according to Colclough, concedes much more to the state than what is proposed by the neo-liberals. Finally, neo-classical theory does not seek to apply the economic centred initiatives to politics, at least not as fervently as neo-liberalism.

The good governance programme that emerges in this theoretical level therefore advocates market principles but more importantly centres on creating the appropriate political framework in which the market can thrive. In normative terms it promotes individual economic and political freedom as the "essence of the good life".<sup>49</sup> It emphasises individual rights and a minimal state. In the same vein, it is hostile towards all forms of official discrimination on the grounds of race, sex or creed. Neo liberals argue for the elimination of political and social discrimination. This is done to remove the constraints on the individuals rights and liberties, ensure that there is no interference with freedom of choice and that markets are allowed to operate freely. In functional terms, neo-liberalism links its concern with markets and economic growth to its concern with democracy. Democratic politics are perceived as preconditions for a buoyant free market economy and vice versa. Regimes with insufficient democratic initiatives and

excessive involvement in the economy are accused of stifling economic growth. The need for democratisation in the context of a free economy is considered crucial in attaining an accountable, less corrupt, and more efficient government.<sup>50</sup>

### *Governance at the Policy Level*

As the section concerning structural adjustment has served to inform how the market oriented policies are a continuation of the policies and initiatives promoted under structural adjustment, the focus here is predominantly on political aspects defined by policy discourse. Historically, there have been two separate movements to promote liberal democracy, each of which are associated and have played an important part in the political agenda of the good governance programme. These two movements may be demarcated by their sources. First, the major Western governments and second, the major international organisations and in particular the 'Bretton Woods' institutions.

Good governance has enjoyed significant support from the major Western governments such as Britain, France, Germany the United States and the Nordic countries, since its inception into development discourse in 1989.<sup>51</sup> In particular, the support has focussed significantly on its promotion of liberal democracy. The French, a major contributor of overseas development assistance (ODA)<sup>52</sup>, have associated the good governance programme very strongly with democracy. France, in recent years has been second only to Japan in the amount of development assistance it provides.<sup>53</sup> In its foreign policy statement on "Aid to Development", it is stated that "France has maintained that its goal of commitment to democracy and human rights is inseparable from the struggle for development."<sup>54</sup> This is consistent with a statement by former French President,

Francois Mitterand: that France would link its aid contributions to efforts designed to lead to greater liberty and democracy.<sup>55</sup>

Amongst these countries, the United States has also been a prominent supporter of initiatives that are contained in the good governance programme.<sup>56</sup> The United States was a strong supporter of liberal democracy long before it became an integral part of the good governance programme. The promotion of democracy, was a prevalent feature of United States foreign policy during the cold war era.<sup>57</sup> Countries such as the Philippines, Japan, Germany, and a variety of countries in Central America all had democratic frameworks imposed as a consequence. The rationale behind this support for democracy however was different from that associated with the development aims of the good governance programme. Democracy was perceived as an end in itself. More importantly, it was looked upon as a halting influence to the spread of communism.<sup>58</sup> However, the support for democracy was not always consistent with US foreign policy. They often provided significant support for authoritarian regimes such as Argentina, Chile under Pinochet, Iran and South Korea.<sup>59</sup> This should not be construed as a lack of support for democracy, but instead reflects the complexity of foreign policy decisions and formulae.

It was not until the late 1980s that democracy has become an integral part of development efforts. Several reasons have been put forward to explain this: the experience with structural adjustment lending, the resurgence of neo-liberalism in the West, the collapse of official communist regimes and the rise of pro-democracy movements in the developing world and elsewhere.<sup>60</sup> As discussed above, the first two provided the theoretical underpinnings for the good

governance. The latter two however, played a more facilitative role, being “the political events which allowed” the expression of support for economic and political liberalism. The collapse of the Eastern European communist regimes in the late 1980’s served to lessen the constraints of international influence on the major Western governments. As Leftwich states;

“the collapse of communist regimes...enabled Western governments to exercise not only economic conditionality, but also direct political leverage without fear of giving advantage to the soviet union and their allies.”<sup>61</sup>

The communist disintegration coincided with the rise of indigenous pro-democracy movements. These were evident in various parts of the globe such as; Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe and more recently the South Pacific. These movements gave the pro-democracy policies of the West substantial legitimacy:

“The West...can thus claim to be supporting genuinely popular and intellectual demands in those societies.”<sup>62</sup>

The major international development institutions have a more recent record of association with liberal democracy, but one that is more closely associated with the good governance programme. As discussed above, the role of the World Bank, and in particular its LTPS is central to this association. Although the LTPS was the first major public document to discuss the importance of democratic aspects vis-à-vis development, the World Bank had dealt with such issues prior. According to the 1992 World Bank report, *Governance and Development*,

“As a development institution, the Bank has grappled with these issues from its inception”.<sup>63</sup>

However, these issues were addressed in a very vague and almost hesitant manner. According to Herbst, in the reform programmes that dominated the 1970s and 1980s, the Bank was very reluctant to “explicitly outline the role of the state...”.<sup>64</sup>

In 1983, the World Bank attempted to outline the role of the state in the context of its development programmes.<sup>65</sup> Of this attempt, Herbst writes,

“Indeed, all the Bank seems to suggest is that the trajectory of state growth should be negative, but no desired vision of the proper economic role of the state is expressed. Without an understanding of the economic role of the state, it is impossible to set the parameters of its political functioning in the future and, in particular, how it will related to important constituencies.”<sup>66</sup>

There are at least two reasons why such an approach to governance was taken. First, the Banks Articles of Agreement specifically limit the Banks involvement, in member countries, to non-political matters. These stipulate that “the Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member”.<sup>67</sup> According to Williams & Young,

“Officially the Bank is constrained by its Articles of Agreement which expressly forbid taking non-economic considerations into account. The authors of the early drafts of the Articles, including Keynes, were at pains to emphasize the neutrality of the institution when it came to political ideologies and interests.”<sup>68</sup>

Second, the developing countries in which the programmes were implemented, showed considerable success. These cases helped to conceal problems that directly related to governance issues:

“the relatively good growth performance of developing countries between 1965 and 1980 helped conceal the deep-seated problems of governance which affected their efficient use of resources and retarded their efforts to adjust in response to a changing external environment.”<sup>69</sup>

This rationale is consistent with the changes that were later made in the main arena of development orthodoxy. Governance issues came to the fore of development discourse in the mid to late eighties. By this time, growth had decelerated sharply, the developing world was suffering from unfavourable terms

of trade, and a climate of relative scarcity set in on many countries, particularly the developing ones.<sup>70</sup>

The World Bank has predominantly linked governance to economic and political issues. The 1989 LTPS specifically lined governance with “independence for the judiciary, scrupulous respect for the law and human rights at all levels of government, transparent accountability of public monies and independent public auditors responsible to a representative legislature, not to an executive”.<sup>71</sup> Three years later, they made clear their objectives for the good governance programme: as a complementary, in fact necessary, framework to facilitate sound economic policies.<sup>72</sup> They particularly highlighted three dimensions as crucial determinants of sustainable development: public sector, the market and government. The Bank stated that, “Efficient and accountable management by the public sector and a predictable and transparent policy framework are critical to the efficiency of markets and governments, and hence to economic development”.<sup>73</sup>

Although the Bank is arguably the most prominent advocate of good governance, it is certainly not the only advocate. Good governance has featured on the agenda of other international development organisations. Some of the more prominent names associated with governance from these organisations include, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).<sup>74</sup> These international development organisations have emphasised similar dimensions of good governance. The IMF has discussed good governance in the relations to military issues. It highlighted military spending as a major absorbent of “scarce monies that could be used to maintain social services or



finance investment in times of fiscal austerity.”<sup>75</sup> It has also discussed good governance in terms of ensuring transparency of government accounts, effective public resource management, and most notably, a stable and transparent “economic and regulatory environment for private sector activity.”<sup>76</sup> The UNDP has also reflected the Banks concerns with good governance. It has associated good governance with participation, transparency, accountability and the rule of law.<sup>77</sup> More notably, it stresses the point that good governance is not just the function of the state, but also agencies outside it. It has placed significant emphasis on the role of civil society in facilitating good governance. In total, the UNDP has identified five priority areas in governance that they will target as avenues to achieve sustainable development; governing institutions, public and private sector management, decentralisation and support to local governance, civil society organisations and governance in special circumstance.<sup>78</sup>

The various discussions concerning good governance at this level produces a programme that emphasises several elements. The democratic mandate promoted through good governance is one which combines both political and administrative concerns. It includes; “an efficient public service; an independent judicial system and legal framework to enforce contracts; the accountable administration of public funds, an independent public auditor, responsible to a representative legislature; respect for the law and human rights at all levels of government; a pluralistic institutional structure, and a free press.”<sup>79</sup> The good governance programme which surfaces is therefore a combination of economic, political including social and administrative concerns. In relation to the neo-liberal and neo-classical paradigms, the emphasis on these four elements illustrates the programmes highly political

orientation. It is evident from these elements that more closely related to the neo-liberal paradigm than the neo-classical paradigm. It seeks to influence politics so as to create a framework for market oriented economic initiatives. In relation to structural adjustment, these elements are perceived as the solutions to the problems that adjustment programmes experienced.

This is readily seen in the good governance programmes of several developing countries. In Africa, at least two countries serve to illustrate the character of the good governance programme as manifested in policies. In a UNDP study of Mozambique's governance programme, many of the aforementioned elements are highlighted.<sup>80</sup> In addition to those initiatives peculiar to the country's background, there are several subsumed under the initiative to promote "good governance". Governance is seen to comprise of "mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, perform their obligations as citizens, and mediate their differences."<sup>81</sup> More importantly, it is perceived as the "exercise of economic, political administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels". It associates governance with factors such as transparency, participation, accountability, the rule of law and recognises that it has "three legs", economic, political and administrative.<sup>82</sup>

A similar representation of these elements may be seen in a UN study of 'good governance' in Mauritius.<sup>83</sup> The report states that, Mauritius is committed to a democratic form of Government, in which the dominant features were; legitimacy, the rule of law and an independent judiciary and the separation of powers, transparency and accountability and respect for human rights. Moreover,

it promotes free and fair elections, provides a constitutional safeguard for political participation by all groups in society, relies on the Westminster model as a basis for its written constitution, has formally implemented a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary. In terms of transparency and accountability, there are no parliamentary barriers to questions executive decisions.<sup>84</sup> Public finance is scrutinised by a Public Accounts Committee that includes members of the Opposition. In terms of judicial control, the executive and administrative actions of government or constitutional bodies may be subject to judicial review or constitutional redress.

The discourse that has evolved between and within governments, non-governmental organisations, international development institutions and developing countries has thus shaped the good governance programme into a recognisable set of initiatives. Although it is overly simplistic, the programme may be formulated into a checklist or a template. A good example of the programme manifested in this manner is provided by Macdonald.<sup>85</sup> The table Macdonald constructs, provides a good example of the kind of initiatives that would comprise a good governance programme.

### **Problems associated with the good governance programme**

The good governance programme is not without its problems. First, while there is a consensus on what the main elements of good governance are, there is still ambiguity concerning its breadth.<sup>86</sup> Furthermore, while factors such as transparency, legitimacy, accountability are posited as core elements, there is significant ambiguity as to what avenues by which these may be attained and whether any avenue is acceptable so long as they achieve their end result. Second,

the content of the good governance programme is riddled with political elements. This jeopardises the role of the World Bank, perhaps the strongest and most active proponent of the good governance programme. Its involvement in political matters would contravene its own regulations as set out in its Articles of Agreement.<sup>87</sup>

There are also several indirect problems that may be drawn from its association with liberalism, neo-liberalism and the concept of democracy. According to Leftwich,<sup>88</sup> the good governance desirability for democracy as a prelude to development is ignorant of the fact that democracy itself requires certain preconditions in order to exist. He argues that good governance fails to recognise and accept that there are tensions between the various goals of development-such as growth, democracy, stability, equity and autonomy. That democracy is a concomitant of modernity was widely assumed in comparative politics in the 1960s. Moreover, there have also been arguments that “the premature introduction of democracy may actually hamper development in its early stages”.<sup>89</sup> All of this would suggest therefore that is no necessary relationship between democracy and development.

According to Beetham,<sup>90</sup> there are certain key assumptions and institutions characteristic of classical liberalism that are indispensable to the maintenance of democracy. However, at the same time, liberalism also poses a constraint upon the process of democratisation. On the one hand, liberals principles such as securing individual rights, separation of powers, having a representative parliament, a limited state with a separation of public and private spheres, and plurality concerning what is ‘good’, have provided a fundamental basis for democracy. On the other hand, liberal democracy has “a history of successive struggles between

liberals and various types of democrats over the extent and form of democratisation.”<sup>91</sup>

There have also been significant concerns over the inconsistencies within the liberal paradigm that are reproduced in the good governance programme. One of the most prominent concerns the notion of ‘good’. A central theme in liberal theory is that it is “philosophically impossible to choose between notions of the good and to establish an overriding notion of the good, will only end in conflict and violence”.<sup>92</sup> This theme determines several prescriptions posited in liberal theory. For instance, modern liberals argue that the State should be a neutral framework within which competing conceptions of the good can be equally pursued. The problem with this is that the principle of neutrality has been revoked because the definition of ‘good’ has already been predetermined. According to Bellamy, in all constructions of neutrality in contemporary liberal theory, heavily loaded assumptions about what are valuable ways of life are in fact smuggled in.<sup>93</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Although the good governance programme is relatively new, it has a history in its broader sense and with its genealogical origins that stretches back much further than 1989. Governance as a term and similar notions of good government can be dated to at least the early part of this century. However, it has not been until recent times that the concerns with governance and in particular the promotion of good governance has come into, and accelerated in prominence. The need to rectify the failures of structural adjustment reform has played a significant role in this trend. However, several other factors have also played significant roles in imbuing good governance with the notoriety it now enjoys. The collapse of

communism has resulted in a perceived superiority of democracy. Additionally, the proliferation of pro-democracy movements has lent weight to the long held advocacy, by many Western governments, for political systems to be democratically inclined. More importantly however, the resurgence of neo-liberalism and the growing popularity of neo-classical economic principles, especially amongst development economists, has provided the necessary theoretical foundations for good governance initiatives. Thus, the programme that has been made manifest is characterised by its strong inclination towards policies that promote a market oriented economy with a complementary liberal democratic framework.

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<sup>1</sup> Larmour, "Making Sense of Good Governance".

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 3

<sup>3</sup> World Bank, 1992. *Governance and Development*, Washington, D.C., The International Bank For Reconstruction and Development/ World Bank. p. 1

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Deborah Brautigam, *Governance and Economy*, Washington, D.C., Policy and Review Department, The World Bank, 1991. pp. 3-4

<sup>6</sup> World Bank, *From Crisis to Sustainable Development: The Long Term Perspective Study on Sub-Saharan Africa* (The "LPTS"). Washington, DC, 1989.. as cited in Deborah Brautigam, 1991. *Governance and Economy*. Washington, D.C., Policy and Review Department, World Bank. p. 2

<sup>7</sup> Lancaster, p. 9.

<sup>8</sup> Dani Rodrik, 'How Should Structural Adjustment Programs be Designed?', *World Development*, Vol. 18, No. 7, 1990, p. 933. See also J. Barry Riddell, 'Things Fall Apart Again: Structural Adjustment Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp-53-68, 1992. Riddell critiques the Structural Adjustment Programmes, stipulating that they focus too strongly on economics. He argues that the African continent have not always, presented an accommodating environment to econo-centric policies of structural adjustment. As a result of disparities between a more facilitating environment and the environment to be found on the African continent, there has been a significant amount of suffering.

<sup>9</sup> Lancaster, p. 9

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Stephen R. Weissman, 'Structural Adjustment in Africa: Insights From the Experiences of Ghana and Senegal', *World Development*, Vol. 18, No. 12, 1990, p. 1622

<sup>13</sup> World Bank, 1988. *Report On Adjustment Lending*. World Bank, Washington, DC, August 1, as cited in Weissman, p. 1623

<sup>14</sup> Weissman, p. 1623

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- <sup>15</sup> Lancaster, p. 9
- <sup>16</sup> Weissman, p. 1621
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>18</sup> Lancaster, p. 9
- <sup>19</sup> Rodrik, p. 933
- <sup>20</sup> Rodrik, pp. 934-5
- <sup>21</sup> World Bank, *Governance: The World Bank's Experience*, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, D.C., 1994, p. vii
- <sup>22</sup> Williams & Young, 1994, pp. 89-90
- <sup>23</sup> Adrian Leftwich, "Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World", *Third World Quarterly*, V. 14. No. 3, 1993.
- <sup>24</sup> Leftwich, p. 611
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid., According to Leftwich, Regardless the type of democratic polity, it is presumed to include a "pluralist polity with a freely elected representative legislature, subject to regular elections, with the capacity to check executive power and protect human rights."
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>27</sup> Larmour, "Making Sense of Good Governance", p. 3.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid., These three bear a strikingly close parallel with those offered by Leftwich.
- <sup>29</sup> This is referred to in the earlier model as 'good governance'. See Peter Larmour, 'Governance, Governmentality and South Pacific Aid', in *Governance and Good Government: Policy and Implementation in the South Pacific*. (Ed.) Maree Tait & Michaela Forster. National Centre for Development Studies, Australia, 1995.
- <sup>30</sup> Larmour, 1998, p. 3
- <sup>31</sup> Larmour, 1998, p. 4
- <sup>32</sup> Larmour, 1998. P. 8 quotes the Asian Development Bank's newspaper *Emerging Markets* as follows, "To impose conformity irrespective of the country difference and the willingness of developing members is not likely to work."
- <sup>33</sup> Gerald F. Gaus, *Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 162-166.
- <sup>34</sup> John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 302.
- <sup>35</sup> Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty" in his *Four Essays on Liberty*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 122.
- <sup>36</sup> John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty and Other Essays*, (Ed.) by John Gray, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991 (1859), pp. 471-582.
- <sup>37</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourses*, G.D.H. Cole, trans. New York, Dutton, 1973 (1762).
- <sup>38</sup> Rousseau, p. 177.
- <sup>39</sup> L. Robbins, *The Theory of Economic Policy in English Classical Political Economy*, London, Macmillan, 1961, p. 104
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>41</sup> F.A. Hayek, *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics, and the History of Ideas*, London, Routledge and K. Paul, 1978, p. 149.
- <sup>42</sup> John Dewey, *Characters and Events: popular essays in social and political philosophy*, (Ed.) by Joseph Ratner, New York, Henry Holt, 1929, pp. 551-60.
- <sup>43</sup> J.A. Hobson, *The Economics of Unemployment*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1922, p. 49.
- <sup>44</sup> Mills, p. 105.
- <sup>45</sup> Christopher Colclough, "Structuralism versus Neo-liberalism: An Introduction", in *States or Markets? Neo-Liberalism and the Development Policy Debate*, (Ed.) by Christopher Colclough and James Manor, Institute of Development Studies, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991. pp. 5-6 According to Colclough, the most influential of these critics have been Balassa, Bauer, Krueger, Lal, and Little. It is important to note that although these authors comprised the main nexus of the neo-liberal movement, they did not agree on all of its aspects.
- <sup>46</sup> John Toye, "Is There a Neo Political Economy of Development?", in *States or Markets? Neo-Liberalism and the Development Policy Debate*, (Ed.) by Christopher Colclough and James Manor, Institute of Development Studies, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991. p. 321

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid. p. 20

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. p. 21

<sup>49</sup> Leftwich, 1993. p. 608

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 611

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 611

<sup>53</sup> G8 Research Group, *Compliance Study: France*, University of Toronto Library, 1997.

Internet Address <http://www.library.utoronto.ca/g7/evaluations/fradev.htm> p. 1

<sup>54</sup> Ministère Des Affaires Etrangères, *France's Foreign Policy: Aid to Development*, La Documentation Française, Paris, France, 1995.

Internet Address <http://www.diplomatie.fr/france/politiq/poletr.gb.html> This Website does not reveal 'La Documentation Française' as the publisher. This fact is revealed in the following internet address

<http://www.diplomatie.fr/index/politiq/poletr.gb.html> The information provided at these addresses are exerts from, Ministère Des Affaires Etrangères, 1995. *France*, La Documentation Française, Paris, France.

<sup>55</sup> Williams & Young, p. 85.

<sup>56</sup> Adrian Leftwich, *Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World*, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1993. p. 611

<sup>57</sup> Lancaster, 1993. pp. 12-14

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., The latter was a particularly cogent rationale for the expansion of United States ODA.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., The United States, in the Cold War period, has provided funds to non-democratic regimes who could help consolidate their power overseas. Some of these include; Zaire and Kenya.

<sup>60</sup> Leftwich, 1993. pp. 606-610

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., pp. 609-10

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 610.

<sup>63</sup> World Bank, 1992. p. 3

<sup>64</sup> Jeffrey Herbst, 'The Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa', *World Development*, Vol. 18, No. 7, 1990. pp. 949-958.

<sup>65</sup> World Bank, *World Development Report*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1983. as cited in Herbst, p. 953. The Bank stated, "Markets may not perform perfectly because of insufficient information or because they do not take adequate account of indirect losses and benefits (the so-called externalities such as pollution or worker training). Nor can free markets handle public goods (such as national defence), where the cost of supply is independent of the number of beneficiaries, or natural monopolies. Finally, markets do not act to correct inequalities in income wealth. Some market failures are so evident that they cannot be ignored; in addition, governments will always have legitimate non-economic objectives that can be pursued only by intervention.

<sup>66</sup> Herbst, p. 953

<sup>67</sup> International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Articles of Agreement*, Article IV, Section 10., as cited in Carol Lancaster, 'Governance and Development: The Views From Washington', *IDS Bulletin*, v24, no. 1. 1993. p. 12

<sup>68</sup> David Williams and Tom Young, Governance, the World Bank and Liberal Theory, *Political Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 1, 1994. p. 85.

<sup>69</sup> World Bank, 1992. p. 3

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> World Bank, 1989. "From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: The Long Term Perspective Study on Sub-Saharan Africa", as cited in Brautigam, 1991. p. 2

<sup>72</sup> World Bank, 1992. p. v

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Participatory Development and Good Governance*, <http://www.oecd.org/dac>

<sup>75</sup> Lancaster, p. 12

<sup>76</sup> International Monetary Fund, 1997. *Good Governance: The IMF's Role*, International Monetary Fund, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govindex.htm>



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<sup>77</sup> UNDP, *Good Governance – and Sustainable Human Development*, UNDP Governance Policy Paper, 1994. <http://magnet.undp.org/policy/chapter1.htm>

<sup>78</sup> UNDP, *UNDP Priorities in Support of Good Governance*, UNDP Governance Policy Paper, 1995. <http://magnet.undp.org/policy/chapter2.htm> p. 1

<sup>79</sup> Leftwich, 1993, p. 610.

<sup>80</sup> UNDP, *The Governance Programme: Mozambique. 1997, 1997.*  
<http://www.undp.org/undp/rba/special/forumeng/mozambiq.htm>

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> UNDP, (No date given). *The Mauritian Experience*,  
<http://www.undp.org/undp/rba/special/forumeng/mauriti.htm>

<sup>84</sup> The report in fact claims that, “the executive is often subjected to gruelling questions both by the Opposition and backbenchers.”

<sup>85</sup> Barrie Macdonald, “Governance in Oceania”, in *Governance and Good Government: Policy and Implementation in the South Pacific*, (Ed.) by Maree Tait, National Centre for Development Studies, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, 1995. pp. 23-24

<sup>86</sup> Carol Lancaster., ‘Governance and Development: The Views From Wellington’, *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 24, No. 1., 1993. p. 10

<sup>87</sup> Lancaster, pp. 9-11.

<sup>88</sup> Leftwich, 1993, p. 613

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> David Beetham, “Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Democratization”, in *Prospects for Democracy*, (Ed.) by David Held., Polity Press, UK, 1992.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., pp. 55-60

<sup>92</sup> Williams and Young, 1994, pp. 92-93

<sup>93</sup> R.Bellamy., *Liberalism and Modern Society.*, Polity Press, Cambridge, England, 1992. ch. 5

# C

## HAPTER 3: THE GOOD GOVERNANCE

### AGENDA FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

*The overall aim of this chapter is to identify and posit the good governance agenda for civil society. In addition, it argues that this agenda is related to a liberal prescription for civil society. First, it addresses the importance of civil society to governance issues and in particular its normative prescriptions for the individual and society. Second, it explores the normative role of civil society as it is utilised in the good governance programme. Third, it extrapolates and then posits the good governance agenda for civil society. Fourth, the chapter posits a construct of an association between the good governance agenda and the liberal prescription for civil society. The latter is based significantly on the writings of Ernest Gellner and John Hall, and supplemented by works from other 'liberals'. Finally, several problems are highlighted with respect to both paradigms.*

#### Civil society

Civil society is a term that incites debate and discussion, arouses passions and serves as a banner for freedom and solidarity. Yet despite its popular usage, it remains one of the most difficult terms to conceptualise. After wrestling with this problem, Nielson concluded that, "There is no discovering what the concept means, let alone what it really means."<sup>1</sup> The vast number of institutions that are classed as civil society provides a testimony of the lack of unanimity concerning its meaning. According to Camilleri,

"The diverse associations that fall under this category include extended families, clans, villages, local communities, unions, craft guilds or firms, groups for leisure or charity, and religions organisations; indeed, the whole gamut of voluntary associations formed to advance particular interests or objectives."<sup>2</sup>

Rowley stipulates that,

“it (the term ‘civil society’) offers a very broad tent capable of sheltering a multitude of diverse political systems. So broad indeed is this tent that it may be defined more appropriately as an empty shell.”<sup>3</sup>

The concept has a long history and one that reveals a dichotomous definitional divergence into two camps which have very strong prescriptions concerning the role of individual vis-à-vis society. The genealogy of civil society extends back to the Greeks and a term they employed called *civilis societas*.<sup>4</sup> This referred to a civilised political community endowed with a legal code, cities, commercial arts, and the refinements of living. John Locke embraced this notion in his conceptualisation of the term, albeit subtracting the need for ‘refinement of living’. When it reached the intellects of Marx and Hegel, it underwent significant change and a distinction was made between civil and political society.<sup>5</sup> Up to this period it may be argued that the definition centred on a communitarian stance. It may also be argued that since Marx and Hegel, the term has also inherited a liberal interpretation. The two approaches are not necessarily conflicting. According to Walzer,

The words civil society name the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks - formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology - that fill this space.<sup>6</sup>

He goes on to say that it is liberal in asserting “uncoerced human association” and communitarian in the proposition that it is a “set of relational networks.”<sup>7</sup> Nardin stipulates that;

The idea of civil society, then, can receive both liberal and communitarian interpretation, depending on whether one emphasises individual liberty or associational solidarity.<sup>8</sup>

The liberal interpretation is of particular importance here because, as discussed earlier, liberalism has a very strong bearing on the good governance programme. Gellner defines civil society as:

“that set of diverse non-governmental institutions, which is strong enough to counterbalance the state, and, whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent the state from dominating and atomising the rest of society.”<sup>9</sup>

The definition encapsulates several of the defining principles thus far discussed; separation from the state and tolerance for and pluralism in a diverse set of institutions. Despite this, Gellner discounts the definition as being too broad: susceptible to accommodating “many forms of social order which in fact would not satisfy us, or those who have in recent years felt inspired by this slogan.”<sup>10</sup>

One particular type of institution that Gellner does not want included in the meaning of civil society, is that which constrains individual liberty. In the liberal prescription, individual society is a paramount feature of civil society institutions. Turning his discussion to traditional agrarian times, he argues that despite the dominance of highly centralised despotic systems, partly or highly structured communities did exist autonomously apart from them. The centralised systems of the time did not always assimilate into themselves every subject. Although these communities satisfy the criteria of separation from the state, Gellner argues against defining them as civil society institutions because they maintained cohesion and solidarity through; “a heavy ritual underscoring of social roles and obligations.” They were “generally conceived and defined in kin terms.... their visibility and authority strengthened by a plethora of ritual reminders:...discipline is enforced by a proliferation of minor punishable transgressions, the avoidance of

which puts a burden on each individual and keeps him in awe of the social order as a whole.” Civil society was not to include these “segmentary communities, cousin-ridden and ritual ridden”<sup>11</sup> that although may have been free of central tyranny, were not free of a “demanding culture which modern man would find intolerably stifling.”<sup>12</sup>

Hall clarified Gellner’s position by terming the constraints Gellner refers to as ‘social cages’.<sup>13</sup> The term ‘social cage’ was first coined by Michael Mann in his extensive thesis on the development of nation states.<sup>14</sup> As used by Gellner and Hall, these refer to rites, rituals and obligations perpetuated along kinship ties and serving to subdue the individual to the social order.<sup>15</sup> Hall, in a similar vein to Gellner, argues that classical agrarian civilisations should not be included in the term civil society, despite their ability to evade and avoid state penetration. He contends that in order to distinguish civil society from other forms of societal organisations, the enemies of it must be identified. He argues that there are at least five; despotism, republican civil virtue, nationalistic sentiments determined to attain state autonomy, the need for massive developments in a short time frame, and culture.<sup>16</sup> It is his discussion of culture that is relevant here.

In his discussion of culture, Hall does not posit a concise definition of what culture is or the way in which he utilises it. However, a clue to his usage of the term may be found in an earlier work where he refers to cultural ‘legacies’ as an important determinant of state-society relationships.<sup>17</sup> His association of culture with legacies implies some kind of an association with tradition. This is to some extent confirmed by the example he offers of how culture can stifle ‘true civil society’: In discussing culture as an enemy of civil society, he refers specifically

to India's 'traditional' caste system as an example.<sup>18</sup> Hall argues for the exclusion of Indian civil society from the ambit of the term because; "The emphasis on caste in Indian civilisation emphatically condemns people to a status order."<sup>19</sup> He argues that culture inhibits individual liberty and because of this, it prevents the existence of what he terms a true civil society. He argues that civil society requires

"an ability to escape any particular cage (and that) membership of autonomous groups needs to be voluntary if society is to become civil."<sup>20</sup>

Culture binds the individual to a certain order and particular groups through its rites and rituals.

Kukathas & Petit note the importance accredited to individuals by one of the most ardent liberals of modern times, John Rawls. With reference to that part of Rawls theory which deals with 'the individualistic character', they note the important distinction between the metaphysical individual and the moral individual. The metaphysical individual is characterised as the principal agent for social change, free willed and unbound by tradition and 'any other social reality.' Additionally, whatever part of themselves that is determined by their environment, it is so only because the individual allows it to occur. Regardless of this state or because of it, the individual in the moral sense must be the ultimate determinant of socio-political arrangements:

"He [Rawls] says that what ever their metaphysical status, it is only individual agents who matter in the design of socio-political institutions and it is only the interests of individuals that we ought to take into account in devising such arrangements ...his approach is based on the assumption that only the interests of individuals are of concern in the evaluation of socio-political arrangements;"<sup>21</sup>

Therefore, civil society is concerned with how rules concerning individuals and the society relate to governing mechanisms such as the state. The liberal

interpretation of civil society is highly relevant to the good governance programme because the latter has a specific role for civil society to play in its emphasis of a market led economy with minimal state interference.

### **The good governance agenda for civil society**

Good governance has a several initiatives for which civil society serves very important roles. Civil society plays an integral part in sustaining democratic politics. According to Landell Mills,

if a democracy is underpinned by a strong and responsible civil society, it is likely to result in more accountable government.<sup>22</sup>

He goes on to say that,

By empowering groups throughout society to both voice their concerns and take direct action to achieve their ends, the trend is strongly in favour of more participatory politics, greater public accountability, and hence basic democracy.<sup>23</sup>

Civil society serves to fill a vacuum which is left in the efforts to minimise state involvement in the economy.<sup>24</sup> It is imperative therefore to foster a strong civil society which must perform several tasks that the state relinquishes in its retreat. First, it must provide protection for citizen rights. Through its organisations, people participation in economic and social activities are channelled. It can facilitate the organisation of groups, especially the poor, to influence public policies and gain access to public resources. Its organisations may also provide checks and balances on government power and monitor social abuses. Furthermore, they present people with the opportunity to develop their capacities and improve their standards of living by monitoring the environment, assisting the disadvantaged, developing human resources and helping

communication among business people. Most importantly however, civic networks facilitate collective action 'by institutionalising social interaction, reducing opportunism, fostering trust and making political and economic transactions easier. All of this should then form the foundation for "reliable political, economic and social collaboration and public participation of civil society members."<sup>25</sup>

This stems to large degree from the fact that civil society is an important governing mechanism. Perez-Diaz<sup>26</sup> offers several relevant points to consider. The contemplation of civil society is about theorising about historical experiences which has an institutional core consisting of several political and economic arrangements. These include;

"a government which is limited and accountable and is subject to the rule of law; a market economy (implying regime of private property); an array of free and voluntary associations (political, economic, social and cultural); and a sphere of free public debate."<sup>27</sup>

Civil society therefore has a particular place in schemes which attempt to change social, political and economic relations as well as within the schemes which are changed. Furthermore, a particular kind of civil society will be more complementary to one type of scheme than another.

The good governance programme promotes a particular kind of civil society. According to Williams & Young, good governance promotes a civil society comprised of "contractual, non-community, non-affective groups, such as professional associations, chambers of commerce and industry, trade unions and NGOs. Such a state is referred to by Lemarchand as, "the institutionalisation of solitary reciprocities."<sup>28</sup> More importantly this kind of civil society is to be instituted vis-à-vis one based on "ethnic or other affective or community



groups.”<sup>29</sup> They further note that; “The transformation suggested...implicitly by the Bank, is the destruction of those affective or community ties which hinder development.”<sup>30</sup>

It is argued that civil society institutions based on affective ties foster corruption. Corruption is perceived as a function of ties between the public and private sector. Civil society institution based on affective ties will bridge the gap between the public and private sector with such ties. The World Bank claims, in the case of Africa, that “African managers cannot easily set aside their loyalties to their community ...[and thus they] cannot easily escape the heavy social obligations that take up a large proportion of their time.”<sup>31</sup> The Bank further stated that “family and ethnic ties that strengthen communal actions have no place in central government agencies where staff must be selected on merit, and public and private monies must not be confused.”<sup>32</sup> Compounding the case against these ties is that their antithesis, ties based on contracts, are seen as conducive to a market centred economy with a state that plays a minimal role. It is stipulated that,

Although in all societies a range of informal mechanisms exists to resolve conflicts and enduring business relationships are based on trust, market economies require a framework of clear laws and efficient legal institutions within which the interaction between economic agents and the state can take place.”<sup>33</sup>

Stiglitz specifies the importance of contracts to such an economy:

“Contracts become important, and interesting, precisely because information is imperfect and markets are incomplete.”<sup>34</sup>

The preference for a contractual based civil society over one based on ties of affection may be seen in at least one tenet of the good governance programme, respect for the rule of law. The rule of law has two main dimensions: the instrumental which, concerns the “formal elements necessary for a system of law

to exist”, and the substantive which, refers to the “content of the law”.<sup>35</sup> At the most basic level, the legal system envisaged contains five critical elements: a set of rules known in advance, mechanisms to ensure that the rules are actually in force, mechanisms ensuring application of the rules, binding decisions of an independent judicial body, and procedures for amending the rules when they no longer serve their purpose.<sup>36</sup> All of these elements reflect contractual related concerns. In the context of good governance, contracts are a tool to ensure that agreements are enforced.

“It is evident that confidence in the enforceability of agreements is required for the proper functioning of an economy and for conducting efficient private economic activities. Unreasonable delays, uncertainty, and high costs in enforcing agreements between private parties all tax economic actors inequitably and damage economic efficiency.”<sup>37</sup>

### **The tie between the good governance agenda and the liberal prescription.**

Both the good governance agenda for and the liberal interpretation of civil society seek individual autonomy and liberty. Such a civil society promotes the efficiency that is desired in the good governance agenda. The efficiency goal of good governance is intertwined with the freedom of the individual. In good governance plans, an individual, allowed to choose freely between competing options will demand the technical reforms required by modernisation. With a market system based on the law of supply and demand, a central feature of good governance, the individual will uphold the invisible hand of the market, and aid in the attainment of efficiency. Individual autonomy is strongly advocated through constitutional and legal issues such as; protection of property rights, and human

rights propositions for freedom from discrimination, and freedom of speech and association.<sup>38</sup> Economic efficiency is predicated on individual choices as the basis to decide what, how and for whom, goods and services are produced.<sup>39</sup> Political and administrative efficiency relies on individuals to register their preferences for those who are to serve them through avenues such as elections and public participation through submissions to government.

The liberal prescription and the good governance agenda are both concerned with eliminating the same phenomena, although different aspects of it. Affective ties are bonds between people, forming a relationship of networks between them. These relationships have their own values and principles that need to be protected and upheld. Consequently institutions based on affective ties also have their own rules and regulations that safeguard these principles. These guiding rules and regulations, as the good governance programme correctly alludes to, are pervasive and thereby foster uncertainty. They are maintained by what is referred in the liberal prescription, a 'social cage': rites, rituals, obligations, and it may be presumed that within these are contained certain forms of punishment. The 'social cage' makes known the rules and regulations that govern the relationships to those in the affective network. The goal of the good governance agenda, to eliminate affective ties, will also have the effect of and indeed require the elimination of 'social cages'.

However, while their motives are similar, the manner in which they pursue them are different. The liberal prescription seeks it because it considers this to be a fundamental aspect of a 'good' civil society. The good governance agenda does so in order to foster 'efficiency' or in other terms, eliminate inefficiency. A more

important distinction can be made concerning the area they seek to influence in order to achieve their goals. Where the good governance agenda seeks to eliminate the institutional manifestations of affective ties, the liberal interpretation prescribes for the elimination of those mechanisms that construct and maintain the system of affective ties.

### **Problems with the good governance agenda**

As already mentioned, one of the most important pitfalls associated with the good governance is that it has a very narrow conception of what is 'good'. This very narrow conception results in initiatives that will neglect other notions or definitions of what 'good' is or may otherwise mean. When a predetermined notion of 'good' is utilised as a basis for initiatives, such as those posited under the good governance programme, the initiatives become averse to others related to other notions of 'good'. The 'good' for that the good governance programme, is significantly tied with liberalism and its prescription civil society and the individual.

According to Williams & Young, the construction of governance in part at least from liberal theory, "reproduces some important ambiguities and tensions that exist in that liberal theory." Noting the pervasive and evolving nature of liberalism, they are concerned with a particular central feature of "modern liberalism": "the distinction between the 'right' and the 'good' and the apparent prioritisation of the first over the second." Central to this branch of the ideology is the distinction between "the 'right' and the 'good' and the apparent prioritisation of the first over the second." It is argued that establishing an overriding notion of good will cause conflict as it is "philosophically impossible to choose between

notions of the good,”. With reference to the state therefore, liberals of this mindset argue that “the State should be a neutral framework within which competing conceptions of the good can be equally pursued.” This requires a civil society: a realm of freedom where “individuals engage in formally uncoerced transactions.” Finally, in order for such a functioning to occur, there needs to be “a certain notion of the ‘self’, a free choosing individual who is the best, indeed the only judge, of his own interests.

The reproduction of the faults within liberal theory can be seen in good governance in several ways. Resting on the principle of neutrality, elite discourse in liberal capitalist societies advocates the separation of ‘technical’ issues from ‘politics’. Likewise, good governance (as proposed by the World Bank) promotes proposals that the state remain neutral between competing conceptions of the good. Within liberal discourse, such a proposition is marred by several problems. At least one is that is particularly significant concerns preconceptions that accompany it. As Williams and Young point out;

“Even if neutrality is taken as a guiding principle rather than a foundational one, it generates neutralist conclusions only with respect to those who already accept liberal principles. In all the construction of neutrality in contemporary liberal theory, heavily loaded assumptions about what are valuable ways of life are in fact smuggled in.”<sup>40</sup>

Acknowledgement of these theoretical problems underlying good governance, leads to a specific critique of the liberal interpretation of and the good governance agenda for civil society and in particular the methodology underlying them. In Africa, much has been said concerning the inefficiency that has plagued its various countries. This inefficiency has been used to highlight the shortcomings of institutions based on ethnic, family and other affective ties.

However, the discussion has weighed very heavily on the negative aspects and less on the utility that such systems serve. In their disdain of 'social cages', Gellner and Hall failed to give a full appraisal of the functions that 'social cages' served. Admittedly, the 'social cages' at the centre of their enquiry concerned particular case studies they were privileged to reflect on. However, their normative prescriptions for civil society extends beyond their experience and speaks in a general tone: their stipulations arguably concern civil society in general, without bias to particular state boundaries.

Consideration must be had however, for the fact that Gellner and Halls assertions are posited only in the theoretical domain. In this arena, their contentions are merely held aloft for further discussion and debate, and no immediate practical danger emanates from them should they be found wanting. Theoretically, there is little harm in making normative statements concerning the nature of civil society. However, when such theories traverse into the realm of reality and practice, or are simply paralleled in practice, the danger of failure becomes imminent. When a programme such as good governance seeks to institute initiatives of the kind discussed here, an immediate threat is posed for those subjects on whom the initiatives will impact. It becomes imperative that the right questions be asked, presuppositions carefully addressed and implications meticulously analysed. Arguably, good governance has failed to satisfy such requirements.

The general application of assertions by theorists and good governance proponents must be made particular to individual case studies. Admittedly there is significant and global appeal in the propositions for individual liberty and

efficiency. However, these cannot serve as sufficient rationales for change, in all cases. Each case must individually be examined, and specificity's explicated. Such a task will not negate the value of such ends, but improve their applicability by contextualising them in the relevant elements of the specific cases. Striking a balance is the key, and this can only be attained when considerations of general contentions are consolidated with those from specific case studies.

Arguably the better avenue to traverse is one that does not begin with the *a priori* that the cultural status quo is bad, and there is an inevitable need to move to a new ideal. Instead, there must be recognition and attention given to the possibility that the cultural status quo may have merits that require careful consideration and where appropriate, incorporation into development plans. History reveals several cases of 'caging' that are indeed evil and proponents of change have utilised these well and justifiably to rationalise change. But this should not lead to a wild crusade on everything that *prima facie* appears to be of such a nature. First and foremost, it must, with surety, be confirmed that the situation in question is in fact in need of rectification. Then, should the response be in the affirmative, there should be a careful construction of a remedial plan. It may be argued that the first step has consistently, and sadly on many occasions to the detriment of those involved, been overlooked and discarded. Colonisation and the cultural genocide that accompanied it serves to highlight to some degree, ignorance of this first step.

## Conclusion

The term civil society has a history that is marked by ambiguity, conflict and compromise. Its definition has been marked by a dichotomy between a liberal and

communitarian oriented definition. Ernest Gellner and John Hall strongly contend that civil society institutions which achieve solidarity by subduing individual freedom and autonomy cannot be labelled as such. The particular type of subjugation that they focus on is that fostered by rites, rituals and obligations, termed by Hall as 'social cages'. Gellner and Hall that 'social cages' must be eliminated from civil society institutions.

Their prescriptions have a strong association with the agenda for civil society set out in the good governance programme. The good governance programme sets out an agenda for civil society which seeks to eliminate 'affective ties' as a foundation for their institutions. These affective ties are fostered to a significant rites, rituals, and other informal means that are very similar to social cages. The elimination of affective ties inevitably requires the elimination of social cages. Conversely, the elimination of social cages will result in the elimination of affective ties. This association between the two paradigms makes it imperative to study them in the same context.

There are at least two questions concerning what both of these propose that are very important. First, are affective ties guilty of the charges made concerning them? Second, if 'social cages' inhibit individual freedom and autonomy, why? The following chapters explore these questions in the context of the Samoa. The first concern is with 'social cages'. The second is with 'affective ties'. The latter deals specifically with one area of private sector development; capital accumulation and with public sector inefficiency in terms of corruption.



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<sup>1</sup> Kai Nielson, "Reconceptualising Civil Society for Now: Some Somewhat Gramscian Turnings", in *Toward Global Civil Society*, (Ed.) by Michael Walzer, Berghahn Books, Providence, USA, 1995. p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph A. Camilleri, "State, Civil Society, and Economy", in *The State in Transition: Reimagining Political Space*, (Ed.) by Joseph A. Camilleri, Anthony P. Jarvis, & Alber J. Paolini, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, US. 1995. p. 216

<sup>3</sup> Charles K. Rowley, "Introduction", in *Classical Liberalism and Civil Society*, (Ed.) by Charles K. Rowley, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., UK, 1997. p. 1 Words in brackets are mine.

<sup>4</sup> Kai Nielson, "Reconceptualising Civil Society for Now: Some Somewhat Gramscian Turnings", in *Toward Global Civil Society* (Ed.) by Michael Walzer Providence, USA, Berghahn Books, 1995. p. 41.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 41-2.

<sup>6</sup> Michael Walzer, "The Concept of Civil Society", in *Toward Global Civil Society* (Ed.), by Michael Walzer Providence, USA, Berghahn Books, 1995, p. 7.

<sup>7</sup> Terry Nardin, "Private and Public Roles in Civil Society", in *Toward Global Civil Society*, (Ed.) by Michael Walzer Providence, USA, Berghahn Books, 1995, p. 29.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ernest Gellner, "The Importance of Being Modular" in John A. Hall (ed.) *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, (Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 1995), 32. See also Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals*, (England, Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1994). The former is comprised of ideas from the latter. Although the chapter is an excellent condensed version, the Book version should be read for a more comprehensive account of civil society development.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>13</sup> John A. Hall, "In Search of Civil Society", in John A. Hall (ed.) *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, (Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 1995), 15.

<sup>14</sup> Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power; Volume II: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914*, (U.S, Cambridge University Press, 1993. Mann used this term with specific reference to the way people were caged into classes, first by other, normally higher status classes and secondly by the nation-state as it evolved.

<sup>15</sup> Gellner, 32-33.

<sup>16</sup> Hall, 22.

<sup>17</sup> John A. Hall, *Liberalism*,

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 14. In his praise of how the 'cultural ideal' is changing for the better, he discusses the work of Serif Mardin which concerns changes in Turkish traditional concepts of rule. See Serif Mardin, "Civil Society and Islam", John A. Hall (ed.) *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, (Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 1995)

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Hall, p. 14. Words in brackets are mine.

<sup>21</sup> Chandran Kukathas & Philip Pettit., 1990. *Rawls: A Theory of Justice and Its Critics*, Polity Press, Cambridge. pp. 11-2

<sup>22</sup> Pierre Landell-Mills, (1992). Governance, Cultural Change and Empowerment, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4, p. 552.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 563

<sup>24</sup> UNDP, 1995. *Opp. Cit.*

<sup>25</sup> UNDP Policy Document, *1994 Initiatives for Social Change*.

<sup>26</sup> Perez-Diaz, 1995, p. 81.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Rene Lemarchand, 1992. 'Uncivil States and Civil Societies: How Illusion Became Reality', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2, p. 191

<sup>29</sup> Stiglitz, (1992)., p 96.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. pp. 96-7.

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<sup>31</sup> David Williams and Tom Young, "Governance, the World Bank and Liberal Theory", *Political Studies*, v42, 95: Words in brackets are mine.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> The World Bank, "*Governance: The World Banks Experience*", Washington D.C., World Bank Publication, 1994. P. 22-3.

<sup>34</sup> Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Contracts and Macroeconomic Fluctuations", in Lans Werin and Hans Wijkander (ed.), *Contract Economics*, (Cambridge, USA, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1992), 293.

<sup>35</sup> World Bank, 1992, 30.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> World Bank, 1992, 30.

<sup>38</sup> T.K. Jayaraman; Table given out at a lecture; Sept. 1997.

<sup>39</sup> Michael Parkin, *Economics*, Reading, Mass, Addison-Wesley Pub Co., 1990. p. 15.

<sup>40</sup> Williams & Young, p. 94.

## C HAPTER 4: THE CASE OF SAMOA

*Samoa presents an ideal case in which to study the propositions of this thesis. However it would be an oversimplification to use it without making a strong case regarding its relevance to the propositions. This chapter thus seeks to predicate the relevance of Samoa on four factors. First, that it inheres the exact type of political system which is advocated in the good governance programme, liberal democracy. Second, that it has for a considerable amount of time up to the present promoted economic development as the key to overall development. Third, it has a system of values, protocols and practices, the fa'asamoa which parallels key elements in 'a system of affective ties' as that term bears meaning in good governance discourse. Finally, this system is manifested in a visible and powerful institution that is central to Samoan society, the fa'amatai.*

### Background

Samoa is an archipelago comprised of approximately nine islands; Savai'i, Upolu, Apolima, Manono, Fanuatapu, Namua, Nu'utele, Nu'ulua and Nu'usafe'e. Samoa has a land areas of approximately 3000 square kilometres with Savai'i and Upolu having land areas of 1820 square kilometres and 1114 square kilometres respectively. Although Savai'i is the largest of the two main islands, Upolu has the larger population. The population is ethnically diverse. The majority are Samoan with varied percentages of different ethnic heritages, the two most significant being Chinese and German. Other minority groups include, Europeans, Chinese, and other Pacific Islanders.

Samoa comprised a larger group of islands prior to 1899. In that year it was partitioned between Germany and the United States. These were not the only two

great powers of the time that sought to acquire Samoa. In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, a fierce rivalry existed between Germany, the United States and Great Britain over who would colonise Samoa. This climaxed in 1889 when the three came very close to utilising military means to resolve their conflict.<sup>1</sup> The partition of 1899 resulted in the division of Samoa between an eastern and a western group. The eastern group; Tutuila and Aunu'u; Ta'u, Olosega and Ofu in the Manu'a group; and Rose Island and Swains Island, came to be known as American Samoa.<sup>2</sup> The Western Group, comprising of the islands mentioned earlier formed what was called for most of this century 'Western Samoa'. Although American Samoan and Samoa are two sovereign states, they continue to share important commonalities such as language, culture, and traditional political structures.

The German annexation of Samoa was significantly motivated by economic concerns. However, it must be noted that political support in Germany for expansion of its interests in the South Pacific did not manifest in any significant amount until the mid 1870s. In fact, up until this time, there was a significant amount of reluctance to expand German interests to this part of the World.<sup>3</sup> When political backing did emerge, it was largely in support of German economic endeavours, of which the company, D.H.P.G (Deutsche Handels and Plantagen Gesellschaft) represented a significant amount of in Samoa. According to Meleisea, the annexation was motivated by the interests of plantation company D.H.P.G formerly Godeffroy and Sohn.<sup>4</sup> The first administration gave the interests of this company a high priority. Land acquisition was made easy for D.H.P.G by the colonial government:

The company had control of the largest amount of alienated land, including some of the best agricultural land. When further

land was required, or if dealings with the Samoans on land matters were necessary, the colonial Administration was able to conduct negotiations.<sup>5</sup>

The German administration of Samoa lasted until 31 August 1914 when New Zealand occupied Samoa on behalf of Great Britain. When war was declared between Great Britain and Germany, New Zealand and Australia undertook to relieve Germany of her possessions in the South Pacific. On 14 August, the *Moeraki* and *Monowai* set off from Wellington as an invading force. The two were later bolstered by other battle cruisers, notably the *Australia* and the *Montcalm*. The official lowering of the German flag was carried out under Admiral Patey on 30 August. The German Governor, Dr Schultz was not present during the event. His deputy, while refusing to surrender nevertheless offered no resistance to the resistance. Dr Schulz made the surrender the following day.<sup>6</sup> Germany officially renounced all her rights over her overseas possessions, including German Samoa in Article 119 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany signed at Versailles on 28 June, 1919.<sup>7</sup>

The 1919 Treaty of Versailles made Samoa a 'League of Nations' mandate that was to be administered by New Zealand.<sup>8</sup> The New Zealand administration of Samoa was marred by several incidents and conflicts that would eventually contribute to Samoa gaining its independence. Prior to the signing of the Treaty, it had damaged its credibility as a governing body when it grossly mismanaged an influenza epidemic in 1918. After a failure to quarantine a ship in Apia that was carrying infected passengers, the administration neglected important remedial steps to rectify the situation, even refusing medical assistance from neighbouring American Samoa. The end result was that the disease rapidly spread throughout

Samoa accounting for approximately one fifth of the population.<sup>9</sup> The severity of the disaster contributed significantly to a rising discontentment with the New Zealand administration and in particular its head, Colonel Robert Logan. This was further compounded by the attitude of the Logan in the aftermath of the disaster.<sup>10</sup> Largely as a consequence of Logan's attitude, a petition was drawn up which requested that the control of Samoa be transferred from New Zealand to the United States. The petition was withdrawn when the new administrator, Colonel Robert Tate found favour with the Samoans.<sup>11</sup>

One of the first acts by the New Zealand administration was to prohibit liquor in Samoa. This caused a significant amount of resentment, particularly from the non-Samoan residents. While the German administration had banned liquor from the Samoans, the administration under Tate broadened the prohibition to include the Europeans.<sup>12</sup> Rowe suggests that a petition by the *Fono of Faipules* or the Samoan Native Advisory Council in 1921, to transfer the administration of their territory from New Zealand to Britain was directly related to this prohibition. It was perceived or perhaps hoped that the British would take a more lenient approach to liquor prohibition. It is argued that the petition was significantly influenced by the non-Samoans minority.<sup>13</sup> This helped the movement for independence by fostering an attitude amongst Samoans that they were equal with the white European population. According to Field, this,

“has a “curious effect” on Samoans: they saw themselves as equal to whites in law....(It) created a desire in their minds for equality of treatment with the white man in everything,...”.<sup>14</sup>

The paternalistic treatment of Samoans by the New Zealand administration caused further discontent.<sup>15</sup> One of the administrations first priorities was village

development. While taking it upon themselves to see this happen, the administration alienated the native people from the process of development:

The native administration, had no power in policy making,. Its main function was to carry out the policies and enforce the rules laid down by the New Zealand authorities.<sup>16</sup>

This caused a lot of resentment amongst the Samoans who,

felt strongly that they should have a voice in planning and policy making. Village authorities throughout Samoa deeply resented the imposition of rules and regulations to which they had been unable to make any contribution.<sup>17</sup>

In an ordinance passed by the New Zealand administration in 1921, Samoans lost a lost a substantial amount of their power. According to Meleisea (1987) it,

forbade Samoan councils of matai their customary right to banish or exile law-breakers and trouble-makers from the village. This power, one of the strongest sanction of Samoan customary law, was transferred to the New Zealand Administrator, authorising him to banish or exile any Samoan to any place which the Administrator decreed. The Ordinance also authorised the Administrator to take away the matai titles of Samoa, as a punishment.<sup>18</sup>

This, in addition to an apparent unequal treatment of Samoans and Europeans<sup>19</sup>, the deportation of Samoans, including some very high ranking matai who were suspected of plotting against the administration, and the removal of matai names from some holders, resulted in the growth of a very strong anti-New Zealand feeling throughout Samoa.

On 19 March, 1927, "The Samoan League" was formed, a product of dissatisfactions caused by the various factors, some of which are discussed above.<sup>20</sup> It came to be known most popularly by its Samoan name, the *Mau*. The *Mau* was largely the product of two public meetings held late in 1926. The *Mau* primarily sought to assert the rights of the Samoan people in the running of the country.<sup>21</sup> However, it soon transformed into a vehicle that pressed for a "Samoa

without the New Zealanders.” The *Mau* movement promoted a campaign on non-compliance with the administrations rules, orders and regulations.<sup>22</sup> Although it fiercely opposed the administration, the *Mau* nevertheless promoted peaceful means in their defiance.

This approach however failed to prevent a violent incident on Saturday 28 December 1929, which would later be called “Black Saturday”. A peaceful march by *Mau* supporters was met by an attempt by New Zealand police to arrest the *Mau* secretary, Mata’utia Karauna.<sup>23</sup> Karauna’s friend attempted to protect him and a general scuffle ensued. When a European policeman fell, members of the arresting party opened fire and within minutes were supported by machine-gun fire from the near by police station.<sup>24</sup> The conflict resulted in the deaths of a New Zealand policeman and eleven members of the ‘*Mau*’, including their leader Tupua Tamasese.<sup>25</sup> The “Black Saturday” incident added significantly to the resentment against the administration and further committed Samoa on the road towards independence.<sup>26</sup>

The deciding factor in setting Samoa on the road towards independence came in the form of resolutions the administration attempted to pass that contravened Samoan custom. In 1924 the Fono of Faipule enacted legislation whereby a Samoan could take up a lifetime lease on ten acres of land for a rent of a shilling an acre. In 1926 the administration went further and proposed that upon death, land could be bequeathed by the former occupier to his next of kin, or near relative. The Fono of Faipule did not sanction this as it directly contradicted Samoan custom, undermining the authority of a family group to name one of its



members as matai. These attempts further strengthened the desire for independence, which was secured in 1962.<sup>27</sup>

### **Good governance in Samoa**

#### ***Democracy***

Since its independence in 1962, Samoa has upheld at least one central tenet of the good governance programme, a liberal democratic political framework. Independence imbued Samoa with a political framework modelled after the Westminster style of democracy. In January of that year, article 42 of the Western Samoan constitution effected the establishment of a Parliament comprised of the Head of State and the Legislative Assembly. Although the legislature was unicameral, there was a provision that no bill was to be passed as law until it received the assent of the Head of State, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister<sup>28</sup>. Although in practice the Head of State would rarely refuse assent, this article provided, at least on paper, a check on the power of the Legislative Assembly. The constitution required that a time period of 12 months should not pass between any two sittings of parliament. Another similarity was the requirement for elections to be held at regular intervals, three years.<sup>29</sup>

There was at least one significant divergence between the political system established in 1962 and the Westminster style of democracy. This was found in the voting franchise. The franchise established under the 1962 constitution sought to maintain the importance of the Samoa's cultural traditions. It demarcated voters into two groups; electors and voters. Electors voted the electoral roll while 'voters' voted under the 'individual voters' roll. The electoral roll accounted for

forty-five of the forty-seven Members in the Legislative Assembly. The other two Members were voted in under the 'individual voters' roll. The Samoa Electoral Act 1963 only allowed matai to vote. An additional qualification was that the elector had to be 21 years or age or over.<sup>30</sup> The 'individual voters' roll predominantly served those of non-Samoan ethnicity. Additionally, only those that were registered on either of these rolls could qualify as a Member of Parliament. This meant that 45 of the Members had to have Matai status. This divergence was rectified somewhat in October 1990, when a plebiscite was found in favour of a change to the voting franchise. The status quo however did not change the requirement that candidates be a matai. However, those that qualified to be electors was no longer restricted to *matai*.<sup>31</sup> In total, although a moderated form of democracy was formally instituted in Samoa in 1962, it has since evolved to a system that is closer to the liberal democratic ideal.

### *Private Sector Development*

The Samoan economy is, like other South Pacific Island countries several constraints to economic development. Major geographical impediments include isolation, smallness, and fragmentation. Additionally, Samoa is constrained more than other South Pacific Islands by the Law of the Sea which has provided the country with the smallest Economic Exclusive Zone of 120, 000 sq km.<sup>32</sup> The country is also very vulnerable to natural disasters, in particular cyclones. In terms of trade, Samoa has very few stable export items. This has been reduced even further in recent years with the 'taro blight' which has destroyed the country's taro stocks.

Since independence, the government of Samoa has recognised the importance of economic development as the engine for growth. To this end it has promoted market oriented strategies and the need to develop the private sector. In the early 1970's the government, "took steps to investigate the possibility of enlarging the scale of production for import substitution and export promotion in a number of commodities...".<sup>33</sup> Samoa maintained its export and imports in line with the principle of external orientation. It left its then main export products, cocoa and copra, open to the changing world market prices.<sup>34</sup> It was further stated that the public sector would seek to develop the private sector: "the public sector will support the development of the private sector ... by offering i) Incentives, ii) Research and advisory services, iii) Credit at reasonable terms" and so forth.<sup>35</sup>

In the early to mid 1980's the Government of Samoa emphasised stabilisation in its economic development. However it continued to promote private sector development and market oriented strategies. Western Samoa suffered a period of economic instability and decline in the 1970s. Compounded by a world wide depression in the 1980-1981 period, the Samoan economy suffered dramatically in the early 1980s. While Western Samoa's import prices continued to increase, its export prices fell substantially. Between 1979 and 1982, the export unit price per ton of copra fell nearly 50% from \$473 to \$248.<sup>36</sup> The export price of cocoa did not diminish as drastically, but still suffered a significant drop of approximately 35% from \$2355 to \$1519. In its Development Plan released in 1984, it stated a determination to persevere with a stabilisation programme.<sup>37</sup> More importantly, it listed one of its priority objectives as "Expanding opportunities for Western Samoans to participate more actively in the

development process...". It clarified this to mean providing further encouragement than before, for Samoans to, "participate in business ventures..."<sup>38</sup>

With particular reference to the private sector, it stipulated that

it will be strongly encouraged in recognition of its vital and dynamic role in economic development. Government will continue its effort to foster a favourable socio-economic climate for private sector investment through the pursuit of appropriate fiscal and monetary policies and the strengthening of basic support infrastructure.

The report went on to state that,

Government is considering the possibility of withdrawing from certain line of activity, currently handled by public enterprises so as to provide further scope for private sector expansion.<sup>39</sup>

### *The era of Good Governance*

In the era of good governance, Samoa has implemented, or at least is planning to implement significantly more initiatives that accord with the good governance programme. In the latest Statement of Economic Strategy released by the Government of Samoa, a major emphasis has been placed on developing the private sector and the market system. The initiatives stress financial sector liberalisation by relaxing the direct controls on commercial bank lending and interest rates. The greater freedom is aimed at expanding credit to the private sector and allowing the market forces to play a central role in determining interest rates; a key variable affecting savings, investments and economic growth. Another key part of the new reforms are moves to increase privatisation. The priorities are delineated into three main areas; full corporatisation and restructuring of PTD; the divestment of Government equity in nine state owned enterprises (SOEs); and review of the legal and regulatory framework that governs the supervision and control of SOEs.<sup>40</sup>

### **Samoaan civil society as ‘separate from state’**

Identifying a civil society in Samoa prior to 1873 would fail if the most common criterion for a civil society, separation from the state, were utilised. Administering the following definition of a state, “an impersonal and privileged legal or constitutional order with the capability of administering and controlling a given territory”<sup>41</sup>, it would be difficult to claim that a state existed in Samoa prior to 1873. In 1873 German Samoa had its first taste of a constitution and a national state framework: the constitution established “the first nation-wide administration comprising judges, clerks and police to be appointed for districts and sub-districts, and rules were made for their guidance.”<sup>42</sup> In 1875 the constitution was amended with the main changes being the increase in the number of representatives from Samoa’s divisions, the establishment of a single holder of the kinship office, and allowing an American envoy, Albert Steinberger, to assume the role of premier.<sup>43</sup> Despite these, a formal state apparatus did not really materialise until the turn of the century when the German, and later the New Zealand administration consolidated themselves in Samoa and began administering the country. As the Samoan state apparatus is a relatively modern invention, one which accompanied colonisation, it is difficult to imagine a different genealogy for what could be termed a Samoan civil society.

### **The Fa’aSamoa**

To understand the *fa’aSamoa*, it is a pre-requisite to understand or at least comprehend the essential features of Samoan society such as the *aiga*, the *nu’u*, the *matai* and the *fono*. The term *aiga* refers to immediate as well as the extended

family. It may include all members of a large clan comprising all descendants of a common ancestor either male or female.<sup>44</sup> Moreover, it may even be taken to include, “descent groups which identify themselves in relation to an extremely important ancestor or ancestress ...”<sup>45</sup>. The nu’u is comprised of groups of *aiga*. Village would be an adequate concept to translate this. A more complex understanding of it however is that it is “a group of extended families with a shared history which is summarised in the fa’alupega which, gives the village its identity.”<sup>46</sup> The matai is the head of the family: the decision maker. He or she is “the owner of the *aiga* land” as well as the carrier of its verbal traditions and heritage, especially pertaining to their particular titles.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, he or she, “controls all the affairs of the family, who look to him for guidance and assistance in their time of need.”<sup>48</sup> An important function of the matai is to represent the *aiga* in the fono a le nu’u or the village council.<sup>49</sup> The fono usually exercises authority in matters concerning the village, which consequently means that it also encroaches on the sphere of the family. Its power is derived from its right to exercise its’ authority on all members of the village.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, it has the right to impose fines according to Samoan customs for breach of village laws.<sup>51</sup> According to Meleisea, the *fa’aSamoa* is a framework for action based upon the social structure of these four elements.<sup>52</sup>

The *fa’aSamoa* system and its associated elements is very resilient. Although it has incurred changes, the basic tenets of the system have survived. At least two forces which could have but did not change the system were the onset of Christianity and the institutionalising of the Land and Titles Act. Christianity affected two important areas of the *fa’aSamoa* through its renunciation of

polygamy. Polygamy had been a common practice in Samoan society, and served, for the matai at least, as an important political instrument. Its elimination meant that marriages carried out for political convenience were limited. The *tulafale*, who served an important function as king-makers, through arranging marriages, had their power base mitigated.<sup>53</sup> Even with the marginalisation and extinction of these factors, the fa'aSamoa continued to function with its basic form intact.

The institutionalising of the Land and Titles Court impacted significantly on the power held by the matai. Established in 1900 by the German administration it sought to resolve disputes concerning lands and matai titles. Cases heard in the courts were aired publicly. This has a special significance for a key element in the arsenal of a matai, knowledge. Knowledge is considered in Samoa, as an instrument of power. Meleisea states,

There is the idea, both among Samoans and foreign scholars that large amounts of esoteric information are possessed by elderly chiefs who are guarding it for their heirs. This body of information is mainly genealogical; stories which validate pedigrees and rights to particular pieces of land. Such information is only supposed to be related to the likely heirs to the chiefly title.<sup>54</sup>

Whereas disputes resolved outside the court limit the intake of knowledge to the few select parties involved, using the courts means that even outsiders who attend the hearings may ascertain such knowledge.<sup>55</sup>

Similarly, whereas matai had been trusted to decide amongst themselves the fate of disputes, such a role was now taken by the court. The fact that matai decided such cases means that they are the formulators of the rules for social, economic and political interaction. Essentially, these types of decisions concerned an integral part of what comprised the fa'asamoa. That the court has now usurped this role, means that they are also definitive arbiters of what this system embodies:

“The Court, ironically, is now the only institution of the central government with the specific role of guarding and defining fa’asamoa.”<sup>56</sup>

However, despite all this the fa’asamoa and its components remain. Powles concluded that contact with Western ideas ‘did no imply an overall lessening of chiefly influence’.<sup>57</sup> Meleisea alluded to the same thing, arguing that although the

*“fa’aSamoa has changed tremendously over some two hundred years of contact with the west, it has maintained its basic structures.”*<sup>58</sup>

One reason for this is that the fa’asamoa is highly adaptable. It is not static, nor is there a clear criteria of what it should consist of. Mackay noted and applauded this feature:

“There have been suggestions at times that custom, particularly regarding rights to land and matai titles, should be codified. Fortunately this has been impossible, because custom on these matters differs from village to village and often within a single village. I say it is fortunate there has been no codification for two reasons:...ii) Codification would imply inflexibility, but custom can only be vigorous if it is exposed to and susceptible to change.”<sup>59</sup>

As used by individual families, villages, districts and so forth, the fa’asamoa takes on many different forms. Fa’avae a le aganu’u or aga i fanua, refers to the different ways each village applies the fa’asamoa. The application may differ from village to village. Davidson sums up this point adequately;

“Samoa...possessed a social structure in which responsibility rested with members of privileged groups, rather than with individuals, and in which decisions were therefore reached though discussion, negotiation, and compromise. Samoan society...was thus capable of progressive adaptation, rather than susceptible to disintegration, in the face of changes resulting from contact with the Western world.”<sup>60</sup>

Another more pertinent reason is that the fa’asamoa is essentially a governance system fostered by Samoans to serve the particular needs of society at a certain time. It is a total system that accounts for all social, economic and



political functions. Meleisea refers to it as the modern Samoan political system.<sup>61</sup> Lawson states that it is a “socio-political organisation”.<sup>62</sup> As a governing system, it manifests itself in an institution called the *fa’amatai*.

### *The fa’aSamoa manifested in the fa’amatai institution*

According to Aiono, “the *fa’amatai* is a social organisation of matai titles and the heirs of the matai titles, both male and female.”<sup>63</sup> She goes on to say that the *fa’amatai* is reflected in a Samoa social organisation known as the *aiga potopoto*. Within this social organisation all members of society have a place with associated roles and functions. Tamaiti (young children), Faletua ma tausī (wives of matai), Tama’ita’i (young women) Aumaga (young men) and the matai themselves interact in a particular way.<sup>64</sup> This is not the only way to demarcate society. According to Avalogo,<sup>65</sup> a public sector servant who works in the tourism department, Samoan society may be demarcated based on ‘fales’ or houses:

1. The fale of ali’i and faipule (House of non-speaking and speaking matai)
2. The fale of faletua ma tausī (House of the wives of matai)
3. The fale of sa’oao and tamaiti (House of unmarried women)
4. The fale of taule’ale’a (House of untitled men)
5. The fale of autalavou (House of the youth, would include young children)

In both these constructions, the system is governed by very informal instruments similar to a system of affective ties. In the model posited by Aiono, one of the key determinants of how the system functions is the belief in the unity or holistic way of life. Diagrammatically, this may be represented in the form of a “socio-metric wheel”.<sup>66</sup> Essentially, the socio-metric wheel illustrates the fact that

the fa'amatai "recognises everyone and everything".<sup>67</sup> The matai, at the centre is charged with administering all matters concerning his or her family or *aiga potopoto*. Similarly, all other groups act in accordance to his or her instructions. These instructions are arrived at however, after a long process of *soalaupule*. This effectively promotes decision making on a consultative basis between all the parties involved. The consultation is based on good faith and trust that each group is promoting the interests of everyone.<sup>68</sup> The majority of these interactions have no formal foundations such as written rules or contracts. Instead, they are done by instinct with regard for kin and their well being, being a crucial determinant. The informal instruments are perpetuated through ties of kin and affection.

The model of the five houses may be used to illustrate that these informal instruments also have associated punishments for deviance from established norms and rules. The fale of the *ali'i* and *faipule* is paramount in that they are the final decision-making body. This should not be construed to mean that they are the only decision makers. Each fale has an area of affairs that they govern. However, if decisions cannot be finalised in the other fales apart from that of the *ali'i* and *faipule*, then the outstanding matters are referred to them. Avalogo pointed to the imposition of fines as an example. The right to impose fines and set penalties is not exclusively that of *ali'i* and *faipule*. *Faletua ma taus*i may also exact fines for certain offences of dissident behaviour. The difference between the two is found in the degree of punishment that each may discharge within the limits of their powers. Fines and penalties dealt out in the *fale* of *faletua ma taus*i is generally much less severe than that exacted by the *fale* of *ali'i* and *faipule*. If the

offender does not pay their fines in the fale of faletua ma tausī then the matter is referred to the fale of ali'i and faipule to handle. Avalogo stated:

When the faletua and tausī impose the fine, they might only say two pusa apa but when the matter is referred to the house of ali'i and faipule, expect nothing less than ten. So might as well do whatever the fine is imposed by faletua ma tausī...do it there because its lighter. ... When ali'i and faipule handle the matter, its always a heavy penalty.... Sometimes their penalty is very severe.

Again, the penalties are administered in an informal manner with no set level for particular offences.

## Conclusion

Samoa provides an ideal case in which to study various aspects of the good governance programme. Imbued with a traditional system that has various democratic aspects, it became the first South Pacific state to adopt a democratic framework in the form of the Westminster framework for liberal democracy. Since colonial times, Samoa has placed a significant emphasis on private sector development. Both of these emphasis in the country's development continue in contemporary times. The current strategic programmes posited by the government readily testify to the prevalence of good governance initiatives within its current programmes as well as future plans.

Aside from these, Samoa inheres a system of affective ties that closely parallels that which the good governance agenda seeks to do away with, the fa'aSamoa. A traditional system of governance, the fa'aSamoa comprises various protocols, rites, rituals, obligations and so forth. All of these centre on principles of kinship and are built on a network of affective ties that transcend kin to include village, district, ethnic, nation and so forth. The fa'aSamoa is manifested in a

visible and working institution, the fa'amatai. This has its own governing structure which is prevalent in the villages in contemporary times. The next chapter will explicate the several rites, rituals and obligations associated with the fa'amatai, and the particular ends they promote.

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<sup>1</sup> J. Tim O'meara, 1990. *Samoa Planters: Tradition and Economic Development in Polynesia*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., US. p. 2. According to O'meara, had it not been for a sudden tremendous hurricane, this would certainly have been the outcome. Prior to the onset of the hurricane, ships from all three powers assembled at Apia Harbour, each jockeying for position in what was most likely a stand off. Even during the course of the hurricane, the crews each sought to outlast the other. As the hurricane became stronger, efforts were finally made to escape. However, only the British steamship Callipe managed this. By the next day, 150 sailors had lost their lives.

<sup>2</sup> Malama Meleisea, 1987. *Lagaga, A Short History of Western Samoa*, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji. p. 1

<sup>3</sup> Sylvia Masterton, M.A. *The Origins of International Rivalry in Samoa*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., Great Britain. p. 79

<sup>4</sup> Meleisea, 1987. p.1

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. pp. 110-111

<sup>6</sup> James Jeffrey, 1914. *Samoa: the pearl of the Pacific, where everything is different. A souvenir from New Zealand, commemorating the occupation of German Samoa by a New Zealand Expeditionary Force on August, 1914*, J. Wilkie & Co., Dunedin, NZ.

<sup>7</sup> Administration of Western Samoa, 1925. *Handbook of Western Samoa*, W.A.G. Skinner, Government Printer, Wellington, NZ. p. 71

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Michael J. Field, 1991. *Mau: Samoa's Struggle for Freedom*, Polynesian Press, Auckland New Zealand. pp. 34-51.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. p. 47. Field says that, "As the full extent of the disaster became clear, Logan met with a group of leading Samoan chiefs and orators at Mulinu'u, but stormed out of the meeting in a rage when the questions were not to his liking. Among those present were Toelupe, the senior surviving faipule, and Afamasaga, described by Logan as "some minor Samoan chiefs".

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. See also Meleisea 1987, p. 130.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. p.52

<sup>13</sup> N.A. Rowe, 1930. *Samoa Under the Sailing Gods*, Putman, Great Britain. p. 103 In the First Annual Report to the League of Nations on the mandated territory of Western Samoa (May 1, 1920, to March 31, 1921) the matter of Prohibition is referred to in the following terms: "In 1919, after the Covenant of the League of Nations had been published, and in anticipation of the issue of the Mandate, a proclamation was issued prohibiting the further importation of intoxicating liquor, and shortly afterwards total prohibition became a fundamental portion of the constitution. Prohibition was imposed in what was considered to be the best interest of the community, but it was received with great dissatisfaction by a considerable portion of the community other than Native." See in particular, pp. 105-109

<sup>14</sup> Tate to Allen 20/11/21 IT 1/20 as cited in Field, p. 52

<sup>15</sup> J.W. Davidson, 1967. *Samoa mo Samoa*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia. p. 127. Here Davidson alludes to the paternalistic attitude by noting that Sir George Spafford Richardson, the New Zealand Administrator from 1923, thought he knew what was best for Samoans.

<sup>16</sup> Meleisea, (1987). p. 132

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. p. 133

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid. See also Field, pp58-59. Field notes the severity of the punishment or taking a title away quoting Sir George Richardson as saying that, "If I find any of the natives intriguing against the Government, I shall remove their titles, which, I have discovered, is the greatest punishment one can give..." p63.

<sup>19</sup> Field. pp. 68-69

<sup>20</sup> See C. G. R. Mckay, 1968. *Samoaana: A Personal Story of the Samoa Islands*, A.H. & A. W. Reed, Wellington, NZ., for a concise list of the factors that contributed to the opposition to the New Zealand administration that was to manifest itself in the "The Samoan League" (Mau movement).

<sup>21</sup> Davidson. pp. 118-119

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. p122

<sup>23</sup> Karauna had ignored a court summons to appear on a charge of non-payment of taxes and so a warrant for his arrest on court charges had been filed. Field. p. 149

<sup>24</sup> Davidson. p. 138

<sup>25</sup> Mackay. p. 52

<sup>26</sup> Davidson. p. 138

<sup>27</sup> Fox & Cumberland. pp. 194-195

<sup>28</sup> Article 60 of the *Western Samoa Constitution*

<sup>29</sup> Falefatu M. Sapelu. "The Composition of the Parliament of Western Samoa", *Pacific Perspective*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 31 March 1992.

<sup>30</sup> See Samoa *Electoral Act 1963*, p. 14

<sup>31</sup> Stephanie Lawson, 1996. *Tradition versus Democracy in the South Pacific*, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne. pp. 117-118

<sup>32</sup> Christel Fensterseiffer, 1993. 'Western Samoa's Economic Development: Contemporary Constraints, Historical Conflicts and New Opportunities', *New Zealand Journal of Geography*, April, p. 14

<sup>33</sup> Government of Western Samoa, 1970. *Second Five Year Development Plan 1971-1975*, Department of Economic Development, Apia, Western Samoa. p. 4 See also p. 6 where this is stated as a Government priority.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. p. 15

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. p. 18

<sup>36</sup> Government of Western Samoa, 1984. *Fifth Development Plan 1985-1997*, Department of Economic Development, Apia, Western Samoa. p. 6

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. p. 7

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. p. 12

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. p. 15

<sup>40</sup> Government of Samoa; *Statement of Economic Strategy*; Treasury Department, Economic Planning and Policy Division

<sup>41</sup> David Held, 1983. *States and Societies*, Robertson, in association with the Open University, Oxford. p. 1

<sup>42</sup> Asofou So'o, 1996. *O Le Fuata Ma Lona Lou: indigenous institutions and democracy in Samoa*, PhD Thesis, The Australian National University, Canberra. p. 105. The constitution provided for representatives from the seven sections Samoa was divided into at that time to participate in government decision making. This enabled districts and villages to have a say in government policy. At the same time, it maintained its autonomy given the specific provision that the national government was to maintain distinct separation from village government and matai authority.

<sup>43</sup> Soo, 107. See also F.J.H. Grattan, *An Introduction To Samoan Custom*, (Papakura, NZ, R.Macmillan, 1948 (Reprinted in 1985)), 7. For interest, Steinberger held the premier position only until the following year.

<sup>44</sup> Meleisea, *Changes and Adaptations*, 13.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Meleisea, *A Short History of Western Samoa*, 28.

<sup>47</sup> Aiono Dr: Fana'afi Le Tagaloa, 1992. "The Samoan Culture and Government", in *Culture and Democracy in the South Pacific*, (Ed.) by Ron Crocombe, Institute of Pacific Studies, University of South Pacific, Suva, Fiji. p. 120.

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<sup>48</sup> Gratton, 17.

<sup>49</sup> Aiono, 120.

<sup>50</sup> In certain circumstances, it may even go beyond the village population and boundaries. An example would be those that utilise village land for growing crops, even though they have no immediate ties with the village. This usually happens when a male uses the land of his wives family even though they reside at his village or elsewhere such as in the town villages.

<sup>51</sup> Gratton, 17.

<sup>52</sup> Meleisea, *Seeds of Change*, 21.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 21-22.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>55</sup> Malama Meleisea, "We Want the Forest, Yet Fear the Spirits: Culture and Change in Western Samoa", *Pacific Perspective*, v9(1), 21 June 1991, 26.

<sup>56</sup> Malama Meleisea, *The Making of Modern Samoa*, (Suva, Institute of Pacific Studies, 1987), 207.

<sup>57</sup> Powles, C. G., 1979. "*The persistence of Chiefly Power in Western Polynesia*", unpublished PhD. Thesis, The Australian National University. As quoted by So'o, 4.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> C.G.R. McKay, "An Introduction to Samoan Custom, *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, v66(1), March 1957, 40.

<sup>60</sup> J.W.Davidson., Lauaki Namulauulu Mamoe: a traditionalist in Samoan politics in J.W.Davidson and D.Scarr, eds., *Pacific Islands Portraits*. Canberra: Australian National University Press. As quoted in So'o, 379.

<sup>61</sup> Meleisea, *Change and Adaptations*, 70.

<sup>62</sup> Lawson, 119.

<sup>63</sup> Aiono. p. 117

<sup>64</sup> See Aiono; 1992; Meleisea; 1991, for a broader description of these different members

<sup>65</sup> Avalogo Ripley is widely recognised in Samoa as one of the most well informed person concerning Samoan culture and traditions.

<sup>66</sup> Aiono, p. 117

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 122

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.* Also, according to Avalogo, an example may be found in the *matai's* role as distributor of food and wealth. Placed in charge of these items, the matai is encouraged under the system to follow the tenets of the system that call for him or her to give more to his kin than to himself. Contrastingly, kin appreciate the giving spirit and return to the same, although usually it is more, of the goods involved.

## **C**HAPTER 5: THE FA’ASAMOA’S ROLE VIS- À-VIS THE INDIVIDUAL

*This chapter seeks to show that as a ‘social cage’, the fa’aSamoa has a very strong impact on individual autonomy and freedom. Moreover, it explicates some of the rites and rituals by which the fa’aSamoa controls individual behaviour. While it concedes the fact that the fa’aSamoa does inhibit individual freedom and autonomy, it reveals that it does in order to promote at two things for society. First, to provide a social support network that caters for the welfare of all members in society. Second, to promote an orderly society by seeking to curb dissident behaviour.*

### **The fa’aSamoa as a ‘social cage’**

The fa’aSamoa is a system of affective ties that is perpetuated and sustained to a substantial degree by various rites, rituals, obligations and various punishments. An important sanction that maintains the discipline of the group is physical punishment. In the adolescent stage punishment is complemented with emotional and psychological pressure. This may be illustrated by an incident observed by the author, involving the discipline of a youth. In response to a beating at the hands of his grandfather, for not attending to certain duties in the preparation of food, the youth rebelled by kicking over a bucket of pegs. Because of these actions, his grandfather proceeded to beat him again. After this incident the youth ran away from home. He father pursued him and eventually convinced him to return home. Upon his return however, one of his uncles proceeded to beat him for the open defiance he displayed after the first beating. When it ended, the

youth was told to leave and never to return. In compliance with the order, the youth left home. When he was discovered the next day by his parents, he was convinced to return home. However, the parents had to beg the forgiveness of the grandfather for their son in order for the latter to remain. On hands and knees, their pleadings lasted several hours, joined also by their son for some part of it. When, the incident was finally resolved, a family member professed that the parents of the youth knew that the future well being of their son lay in the hands of his grandfather.

This relates to another form of control, strongly held beliefs that determine behaviour. With specific reference to the above example, there is a common belief amongst Samoans that parents are the source of ones blessings and also the source of their curses. The Samoan saying that describes this is; *o matua e maua ai le manuia, o matua fo’i e malaia ai*. Such beliefs act on the psyche to create very subservient attitudes, especially to ones seniors. So’o noted this process in his own upbringing of which he implies that the fa’asamoa was a central part of. He states,

I was brought up in a ‘traditional’ family, in a rural village, which teaches and enforces traditional values such as respect for parents, elders and those in authority, knowing one’s place in one’s family, village, etc. which – as children, non-matai, etc. – often means to be seen and not heard.<sup>1</sup>

Lazar posits this in a different context with a study concerning a Samoan migrant community in Los Angeles. Lazar found that Samoan in post migration phase were still applying and following traditional curing methods and patterns. A primary reason for this was to serve as “bases for community social control.”<sup>2</sup> The extended family organisation, a cogent part of the fa’asamoa, was maintained through in part the perpetuation of such patterns. Another ritual that influences individual behaviour may be found in beliefs that accredit certain illnesses to *aitu*



or ghosts and spirits. A sickness is said to be derived from such a source because of a neglect in the performance of certain duties. In another paper Lazar stated that;

“The traditional Samoan as a social being receives and maintains his/her identity through continuous participation in the family. Dominant Samoan values demand that the individual conform to group ideals. Aitu illnesses are highly instrumental in maintaining group cohesion...”<sup>3</sup>

Even at the *matai* level there are various punishments that controls their behaviour. For instance, a *matai* that does not accept or comply with a decision of the *fono* may be subjected to fines, verbal condemnation and even ostracism. “Fiatagata” is a *matai* from a rural village on the island of Upolu. He has a large family which he supports through working his plantation. He revealed that a neglect to meet the demands of the *fono* resulted in financial penalties. If these were not heeded, punishment would take the form of public condemnation in the *fono* setting, and ultimately to ostracism from the village itself.<sup>4</sup> The punishments however can be taken to a much more brutal level. A case that, although rare, lucidly highlights the extent that punishments can be taken to was the killing of Nu'utai Mafulu in Western Samoa in late September, 1993. Mafulu was executed because he refused to abide by certain regulations and protocols of his village. His crime was that he refused to contribute to village affairs, resisted council decision, and played cricket for, and transported players of, another village. His penalty was the destruction of his possessions including shop, bus and jeep. Ultimately, the price he paid was his own life.<sup>5</sup> This case highlighted to a great degree the importance of social roles and the expectations associated with them. As a village member, Mafulu was expected to render his services first and foremost to his

village and its matai. The punishment suffered by Mafulu had the dual effect of reminding others of the consequences for failing to meet certain expectations.

Another aspect of Samoan social practice that serves to promote control is the *lauga*. A simple translation of this term is speech. However, depending on the context in which it is being used, it may have very different meanings. It may in a *fono* or a meeting, constitute traditional oratorical performances and yet in a church setting refers to a sermon. Within the *fono*, the *lauga* celebrates amongst other things, “eternal values, and immutable hierarchies.”<sup>6</sup> One of the recurrent lines of some *lauga* is *e le’i liua*, or it “has not changed”.<sup>7</sup> Thus Duranti suggests that; “The world represented is a place of harmony, where social hierarchies are immutable.” Furthermore, “the Samoan speechmakers present to their audience a model of the universe in which the traditional social order, with its hierarchies and values, is given historical and philosophical justification.”<sup>8</sup> After the *fono*, the matai will return with the *fono*’s resolutions to their families and the information is thereby diffused to other members.

Control is promoted in this forum by clarifying the order and ranking of matai and villages. Utilised for this task is a set of ceremonial greetings known as the fa’alupega. The fa’alupega is “a kind of un-written constitutions against which village people check un-conventional practices by some of their members and outsiders. According to Duranti,

the existence of a fa’alupega and the constant recitation of it in all ceremonial occasions, whether involving village members only or with outsiders, maintains the original foundation of a village, as embodied in its fa’alupega. Every matai in a village knows where he/she fits in the socio-political hierarchy. To try and climb to the top of the socio-political ladder (whether in reality or through verbalisation) when one’s matai title dictates (on the basis of where one fits in the hierarchy of the

fa’alupega) that one should not, can be punished severely by one’s fellow villagers.”<sup>9</sup>

He noted the ease with which this is imbued on an individual. He states,

“One needs only a few days, sometimes only a few hours, in a village to be told where it is appropriate to sit, when it is appropriate to talk, and what is appropriate to say to whoever is present.”<sup>10</sup>

When there is common knowledge of one’s place in society, those at the top and higher echelons can easily assert their influence.<sup>11</sup>

However, speech is only one form of rite that perpetuates a control mechanism over the populace. Duranti noted that in entering the realm of Samoan politics, referring to the traditional style politics as held in the village fono, he found that speech was only one of various forms of communication and interaction that was involved in such a process. He stated, “as soon as I left the domain of grammar to adventure in the domain of social action, I realised there was a lot more than speech to keep track of. Before speeches could be exchanged or a linguistic sound produced, there were conventional acts performed by human bodies. And before human bodies, there was space, not just empty space, but culturally meaningful space, that is, space always ready to be occupied by social personae engaged in specific activities.”<sup>12</sup>

One of the most common values that these rites and rituals seek to impress upon people is *fa’aaloalo* or respect. *Fa’aaloalo* is an integral part of the system that aids in the promotion of order, imbuing individuals to a particular status. Acknowledging a particular status is then followed with a execution of the roles and commitments according to it. Although simply understood as respect, *fa’aaloalo* has a broader meaning. Mageo alludes to this as well as the kind of order that results from it;

it (fa’aaloalo) specifically connotes listening to the dictates of elders and, in response, rendering them humble service.<sup>13</sup>

Such a beginning prepares the child for a future of subservience to their elders. It also is the first step and crucial step to a life where they are constantly directed and exercised a restraining influence over. Mageo also alludes to this, stating that “the result of Samoan punishment is an inhibiting feeling that encourages children to assume both the physical and the psychological elements of that submissive bearing earlier exacted by force.”<sup>14</sup> Avalogo argues that fa’aaloalo is an integral part of Samoan life, imbued upon the individual from very on in life:

the moment you start walking around (with food) your father says *aua e te ai savali* (don’t eat whilst walking. It can also refer to eating while standing up.)<sup>15</sup> Its within our system the word fa’aaloalo or respect... you must respect (your) elders. That’s within our system. Its always there, and that is the backbone of almost everything.

### **Curbing Dissident Behaviour**

Such rites and rituals are visible in maintaining order and peace in Samoan society and its effects may be seen in its deterrence of deviant behaviour. The fa’aSamoa seeks to maintain the sanctity of the village through a ritual called the *sa* which is similar to a curfew. The rules concerning the *sa* are set by the village *fono*. It commands the respect of all members of the village, old and young, male and female and so forth. The predominant times when these are imposed are in the evenings and after a particular time at night. During evenings, the *sa* is held to emphasise, in fact compel village members to partake or at least recognise the importance of evening worship ceremonies. At night, the *sa* prohibits people from walking around the village. Those that are mainly targeted however are drunks and other people who threaten the sanctity of the village with vagrant and

disorderly behaviour. Shon alluded to the growing significance of the *sa* by pointing to the fact that an increasing number of villages were announcing the times of their *sa* on national radio. This served as a warning for outsiders passing by that there can be no walking through the village at this time.<sup>16</sup> She stipulated that the use of the *sa* was increasingly being utilised and was increasingly being resorted to as an instrument to maintain the sanctity or and respect for the village at those time.

The fa’aSamoa through its family ties seeks to curb all kinds of crimes. An important part of the fa’aSamoa holds that the party accountable for any crime is the *matai* and the family of the offender, regardless of whether they are guilty of the offence or not.<sup>17</sup> In contemporary times, this has obviously changed with the implementation of a formal legal system based on the rule of law. However, the *matai* and the family are still subject to the demands of the *fa’aSamoa*, regardless of whether the offender has been punished under the formal legal system or not. This aspect of the *fa’aSamoa* acts as a deterrent for various types of crime. The fa’aSamoa belief that one’s actions affect not just one’s self but also his or her family, serves on many occasions to deter potential offenders from offending.

A traditional form of punishment in the fa’aSamoa that best illustrates the impact of offending on the family as a whole is, *ati ma le lau*. This literally means, “everything in the plantation must be uprooted with leaves.”<sup>18</sup> It refers to a punishment whereby all possessions of the offender, i.e. his plantation, pig farms, poultry farms and so forth are destroyed or confiscated by the village. The primary purpose of this punishment is to demean the offender and his family. Without anything, the offender and his family must rely for their survival on help of others,

both from their village and from relatives elsewhere. In Samoa, status is of immense importance and the position of one's family is a paramount consideration. This form of punishment therefore serves to humble and place the offender and his or her family in an insignificant position relative to other villagers:

They are lowering the status of the family within the village community...In the olden days, if your family begs for food, it's a very low, low down situation.<sup>19</sup>

Although this punishment is rarely if at all practised in contemporary times, the mentality it works upon to deter offending is still prevalent. The forms may be less severe, but the same lever of implicating one's family and matai in the offence still exists.

Avalogo proceeded to give a hypothetical situation that is a contemporary parallel of this process. Discussing an offence by a Matai's son he stated,

“The worst part of it in our fa'asamoa is that if you are my son, you're not going to sit in the fale of the ali'i and faipule. Because I am your father, they are going to give me all sorts of dirty words,...(things such as) can't you control your son and who the hell do you think you are, and they hammer me. Yet I was not responsible for the crimes my son committed.

The whole aim of such a ritual is to demoralise the matai of the family. It's the matai that will carry all the abuse and punishments. It was a common event in the village, once an offence was uncovered for the village to call a meeting of the matai. When a bell or call that signalled such a meeting was sounded, matai would usually call together their family to inquire if the offence was committed by one of them. This at least allows him or her some time to prepare in case his or her family is involved. When the matai is made to undergo such condemnation he or she is morally demoralised. Although it is less economically severe, this form of punishment acts upon the status of a person which Avalogo stipulates is

fundamental in Samoa society. He states, "Its always that ego and its always that pride of the society that is very important."<sup>20</sup>

The fa'aSamoa controls society, through such punishments in a pyramid like manner. Although the punishment system targets the matai, the punishments always filter down through the family. The matai and the family will impose his or her own fines and condemnation of the offender from the family in due time. The matai and the family may impose a financial fine on the offender. They may also resort to physical punishment. However, one of the most effective forms of punishment is not to offer the individual a family title. There is a strong sense of awareness among Samoan youth, in particular taule'ale'a, that if you serve your matai and family well, you will be rewarded with a family title.<sup>21</sup> The threat of losing or diminishing ones right to these titles, plays a significant part in deterring people from actions that may diminish family status.

According to the editor of the Pacific Islands Monthly;

Matai councils play a large part in keeping villages orderly and villagers respect their authority.<sup>22</sup>

The Commissioner of Police, Galuvao Tanielu, also asserted that matai perform the vital task of keeping order in the country. A task that

"saves the country the expense of increasing the size of the relatively small police force."<sup>23</sup>.

In addition to fono sanctions, crime is to a certain degree curbed by the fear of staining ones family name. The act of individuals are not exclusively attributed to them, by has significant bearings of the family. According to Mackay;

"Pride of family, and of its good name, is a strong deterrent to anything that would cause the family shame. The young of course have their moments, but dignity and manners and public behaviour are always important, and the quiet obedience of small children is the more pleasing as it becomes increasingly

rare in this world. Pride of family has produced codes of social behaviour so strongly recognised that every village is largely self governing.”<sup>24</sup>

Through its network of kin and other affective ties, the *fa’aSamoa* offers other powerful mechanisms for ensuring ‘societal order and control’. According to Toleafoa, the speaker for parliament, the small size of the police force which is less than 400, and a manageable level of crime, is indicative of the strength of the *fa’aSamoa* in maintaining order. He pointed to one recent dispute for which the *fa’aSamoa* rather than the legal system provided the solution. The dispute occurred in 1997, between the government and the police on one hand and the village of Toga’imatu on the other. Both claimed to have the rights over the use of a section of land. The dispute eventually resulted in a confrontation involving armed fire., Toleafoa stipulates that in attempts to resolve the conflict, both sides resorted to traditional principles of *aganu’u*. Both sides recognised the rank of the faipule (highest ranking chiefs of a village) that were present and resolved to let them find peace. According to Toleafoa, the lineage of the title holders is traced to common origins, which is then elucidated and impressed upon the participants. This common origin is utilised to promote a ‘kindred spirit’ between the parties involved and from this a process of finding a peaceful resolution is begun.

### **Serving Welfare Needs**

In addition to maintaining order, the *fa’aSamoa* also places significant importance on providing for the needs of all members of society. In the *fa’aSamoa*, everyone is accounted for: from the youngest to the eldest, all needs are serviced, particularly by kin relations.<sup>25</sup> Thomas Trood, who spent almost 50



years in Samoa, and was a British consul during the German administration stipulated that;

“Communism is the foundation on which all Samoan Customs and social privileges are built: they are expected to divide what they have among their relatives and friend...”<sup>26</sup>

In contemporary times, the welfare element stressed in the fa’aSamoa may be perceived in a very strong ‘system of remittances’ that exists between Samoans within Samoans and their relatives abroad. Macpherson defines this as

“The reciprocal enactment and fulfilment and obligations to those related through blood, marriage and adoption as a function of both duty and love.”<sup>27</sup>

According to Fitzgerald and Howard, this system is part of the larger system of kinship obligations.<sup>28</sup> According to figures provided by Alburg the level of remittances in real Samoan tala terms nearly doubled between 1980 and 1989. This suggests that the system is very strong. The 1989 real figures placed the total of remittance’s at \$Tala33.5 million.<sup>29</sup> According to Thomas; “remittances now provide the largest single source of income for many Samoan families.”<sup>30</sup>

Remittances play an important social role that impacts beyond the primary recipients. They provide an important income for families and the benefits are usually accrued by other members of the village or district as the sharing process is perpetuated. Economically, the additional money increases the demand for goods and services, resulting in the dual effect of increasing revenue from duty and excise. The latter is likely to also result in an increase in commercial activity and wages, thereby providing more tax revenue. Politically, the government is provided an important aid as the burden of social welfare costs is lightened. National resources may be saved if the population are dependent on their kin for

financial support rather than government. The government allowed more resources for the management of the country.<sup>31</sup>

In total, remittances and the need for social welfare promotion is a cogent part of the fa'aSamoa. The perpetuation of can be attributed to a socialisation process that keeps family members committed to each other. Macpherson claims that,

Migrant commitments to their communities of origin may rest on complex emotional and social foundations.<sup>32</sup>

These emotional and social foundations arguably originate from the fa'aSamoa and are heavily imbued on the individual. Auva'a, Head of the Methodist church in Samoa, argues that remittances are a part of Samoan identity. This expectation of Samoans, is at least one reason why the government has only minimal social welfare provision.<sup>33</sup> According to Auva'a, without the remittances that exist, the government arguably would have to spend a significantly higher amount of their budget on welfare. Remittances are simply one part of the family obligations that are expected of Samoans. It is something that is not exclusive to Samoans but it certainly is a defining feature of them.

The strength of the fa'aSamoa as a welfare system is exhibited by the fact that poverty is rare if it exists at all in Samoa. Laupua Fiti, the Government of Samoa Head of Department for statistics, states confidently that poverty in the villages is non-existent: "There is no poor in terms of possession of basic necessities."<sup>34</sup> This he attributed directly to the strength of the network of affective ties.

## Conclusion

Important values, protocols and guidelines for interaction between those that are captured within the *fa'asamoa's* network of affective ties are maintained by a strict set of rites and rituals. Rites and rituals acts as a strong socialisation mechanism that imbue on individuals, from a very young age, their place in society. Additionally, it impresses upon them certain roles and expectations they must fulfil and meet. This set is not fixed and there are various forums in which it manifests itself. These range from punishments to myths perpetuated in times of illnesses. Despite the variety, they show a consistency in the values and protocols they foster.

One of the most outstanding is the notion of respect and consequently order. Respect is fundamental in Samoan society. The most common expectation is that the young respect their elders. Children must respect their parents and older siblings. They must also respect their elder relations and this may extend to elders who are not relatives. Even older people have a hierarchy by which those of a lower status must show respect for those of a higher status. This is evident in the fono, where the norm is for lower ranking matai to respect higher ranking matai. This is at least one reason why the rites and rituals stress the importance of knowing ones place in society. This respect is an important part of promoting a particular kind of order in Samoan society. This order serves at least two functions. First, it controls dissident behaviour and promotes a welfare system. In realisation of these two functions, affective ties play a significant role.

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<sup>1</sup> So'o, Opp. Cit., p. 9

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Frank Lazar, *Oceania*, LV(4) June 1985., pp. 300-01

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- <sup>3</sup> Thomas Frank Lazar, *Oceania*, v55(3), March, 1985., p. 177
- <sup>4</sup> Grattan discusses this same process., pp. 17-18.
- <sup>5</sup> Editor, "Law and tradition", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, Nov, 1993, 4
- <sup>6</sup> Alessandro Duranti, "Heteroglossia in Samoan Oratory", *Pacific Studies*, v15(4), 160.
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid., 161.
- <sup>9</sup> So'o, 76.
- <sup>10</sup> Alessandro Duranti, *From Grammar to Politics*, (Berkley, Los Angeles; University of California Press, 1994), 48.
- <sup>11</sup> This is the type of thing Gellner pointed to as keeping the individual in awe of the social order and thus renders his or her subservience to it and keeps him or her in line with its precepts.
- <sup>12</sup> Duranti., p. 49.
- <sup>13</sup> Jeannette Marie Mageo, "Inhibitions and Compensations: A Study of the Effects of Negative Sanctions in Three Pacific Cultures", *Pacific Studies*, v14(3), July 1991, 18.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>15</sup> This is considered very rude in Samoan society.
- <sup>16</sup> The sa does not apply to driving. However, drivers are expected to drive slowly through the village at the time that the sa is in effect.
- <sup>17</sup> Unasa Felise Va'a
- <sup>18</sup> Avalogo Ripley
- <sup>19</sup> Ibid. This form of punishment has devastating effects upon a family. In pre-contact times where this practice was most prevalent, people lived of the land. The plantations and farms that were destroyed would take months in not years reach their former levels of production.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>21</sup> Paul Wallwork
- <sup>22</sup> Editor, "Law and tradition", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, Nov, 1993
- <sup>23</sup> PIM, Nov, 1993, 4. Alan Ah Mu, another PIM journalist suggested similar notions in the same edition, p. 17.
- <sup>24</sup> Mackay. p. 40.
- <sup>25</sup> Mackay, p. 39
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid., 6.
- <sup>27</sup> Machperson, 1994, 83.
- <sup>28</sup> Maureen H. Fitzgerald and Alan Howard, "Aspects of Social Organisation in Three Samoan Communities, *Pacific Studies* v14(1), November 1990, 43.
- <sup>29</sup> Dennis Alburg, *Remittances and Impact: A Study of Tongan and Western Samoa*, (Canberra, Australian National University, 1991), 18.
- <sup>30</sup> Pam Thomas, "Western Samoa", in Peter Larmour and Ropate Qalo (ed.) *Decentralisation in the South Pacific*, (Suva, University of the South Pacific, 1985), 221.
- <sup>31</sup> Cluny Macpherson, "Economic and Political Restructuring and the Sustainability of Migrant Remittances: The Case of Western Samoa", *The Contemporary Pacific*, v4(1), Spring 1992, 109-110.
- <sup>32</sup> Cluny Macpherson, "Changing patterns of commitment to Island Homelands: A Case Study of Western Samoa", *Pacific Studies*, v17(3), September 1994, 83.
- <sup>33</sup> Auva'a
- <sup>34</sup> Laupua Fiti

# C

## HAPTER 6: FA’ASAMOA VIS-À-VIS CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

*This chapter addresses the impact of the fa’aSamoa on the capacity to accumulate capital?’ The chapter looks specifically at occasions of gift giving, donations, contributions, and making credit transactions. These tend to significantly diminish the savings of Samoan people. In some instances, the desire to save stems directly from the desire as well the perceived obligation to take part in such occasions. It is argued here that while the aforementioned occasions are a constant source of depletion on savings, they may in the long aid in capital accumulation. Significant contributions are usually reciprocated with matai titles which are almost always tied to land. The current trend in the land tenure system looks set to reward those with large land holdings.*

### Capital: A Source of Problems

One of the most serious problems facing economic development in Samoa is associated with capital. According to Pitt

Capital is regarded by many Europeans as the heart of the problem is Samoa.<sup>1</sup>

This is widely recognised as the product of Samoans lifestyle. This is heavily influenced by Samoan traditions that centre on obligations to family as well as other groups such as church, village, and even district.

One of the major aspects of the Samoan lifestyle which counteracts the ability to accumulate capital is an inclination towards consumption vis-à-vis production. According to Fairbairn “villagers has a high leisure preference”. He credits this to a lack of aspiration and wants:

villagers are satisfied with their traditional standard of living - that is, they have a fixed or limited wants or aspirations.<sup>2</sup>

Pitt states that,

The Samoan, either because of some hedonistic trait or fatalistic belief in divine providence, or because of the absence of interest in long-term economic goals, prefers consumption to future production.<sup>3</sup>

### **The impact of affective ties on capital accumulation**

In Samoan society, there is strong tradition of gift giving for special occasions as well as for everyday interactions which significantly reduces the capacity to accumulate capital.

sharing and ceremonial gift-giving levels incomes between households, thus reducing the incentive to produce for those who give and for those who receive, and limiting the farmer's ability to save and invest;<sup>4</sup>

Pitt recognises this,

It is also argued that since generosity is a prime virtue, because of the constant demands of kin and chiefs, there is little chance of capital accumulation in the cash economy.<sup>5</sup>

Two reflections, nearly a century apart specifically suggest the permanence of this system and its impact on saving and investment. In 1884, George Turner, an early Protestant missionary stated that Samoa's

communistic system is a sad hindrance to the industrious, and eats like a canker worm at the roots of individual or national progress<sup>6</sup>

He went on to say that,

No matter how hard a young man may be disposed to work, he cannot keep his earnings, all soon passes out of his hands into the common circulating currency of the clan.<sup>7</sup>

In 1962, Ward commented that:

In Samoa, the traditional communal pattern of life inhibits private saving and investment, and ...privilege, status and

respect require the dissipation of capital on churches, weddings, and other ceremonial purposes.<sup>8</sup>

One of the earliest studies, looking into the economic development of Western Samoa was undertaken by V.D. Stace, on behalf of the South Pacific Commission.<sup>9</sup> His findings attested to the fact the fa’aSamoa was a significant hindrance on economic development and in particular capital formation. Stace noted that the majority of Samoans were poor despite being well nourished. His definition of poor specifically related to the Samoan peoples material possessions. Of this poverty he stated that,

To some extent their poverty is self-inflicted because of collective decision through the years to spend a high proportion of accruing cash incomes on celebrations and luxuries that add nothing to the general standard of living.<sup>10</sup>

A deeper search into these habits reveals that they stem directly from the values and attitudes held by Samoan people. One of the most important things to a Samoan is a *matai* title. Continuing with Stace’s analysis, he states that,

Considerations of prestige continue to dominate thinking and actions in Samoa society. Authority, or “pule”, as the Samoans call it, comes mainly from the acquisition of matai titles; not wealth.

While Stace’s analysis was carried out forty three years ago, the interviews confirm that his findings are largely relevant today.

According to Unasa Felise Va’a<sup>11</sup>, the most important things to a Samoan are those found in the *fa’aSamoa*.

“What’s the use of money if I can’t be a deacon, if I can’t buy the position of deacon? What’s the use of money if I don’t gain status in my community? What’s the use of money if I don’t use it to get a new title in Samoa?”

He strongly believes that for most Samoans, the purpose for accumulating money is to maximise goals that are directly related to the *fa’aSamoa*. While economic

gain is an important consideration for Samoans, they are predominantly means to ends are fundamentally associated with status, prestige and authority in the *fa’aSamoa*.

Money is merely a means for reaching their goals, providing the *tautua* (guidance) to their *aiga*, getting their *matai* titles and then later on coming back and going into parliament....To Samoans- what’s the use if I have a million dollars in the bank, it means nothing to me, what’s the use if I can get more steaks because I already have enough to eat- all steaks are the same. They (Samoans) are already affluent and money is just a means for gaining other ends.<sup>12</sup>

This situation is not a new revelation. Norton undertaking a study on Samoan village politics stipulated that there was already a significant literature on

how entrepreneurs in traditional rural communities translate their commercial success into status in the local political domain.<sup>13</sup>

Samoans also place a high priority on the interests of the community rather than an individual. According to Stace,

As a rule, Samoans want progress for themselves and their country, but it must be in the form of community progress, not individual.<sup>14</sup>

In the past this tendency was perceived as a significant drawback in Samoan society. In a letter to a *faipule* (a district representative in parliament), Solf wrote,

...you know certainly that one of the drawbacks in this country is the prevailing communism but how can the sound idea of individual property be cultivated if local authorities presume that they must dictate what may and what may not be done by people under their jurisdiction in matters which concern their personal welfare and economical advancement<sup>15</sup>

A similar view was taken by, Thomas Trood, who lived in Samoa for almost 50 years and was British consul during the German administration. He stipulated that,

Communism is the foundation on which all Samoan Customs and social privileges are built; they are expected to divide what they have among their relatives and friends...All industry is checked, stifled and turned into ridicule by the pernicious system of communism: lying, hypocrisy and their kindred vices



are fostered by it, every Samoan thinking himself at perfect liberty to conceal his food or property in any possible way, if by so doing the giving away of it can be avoided<sup>16</sup>

According to Pitt, several other non-Samoans have taken very similar perspectives. In their perception and consequent construction of Samoa society, they stipulate that Samoans have few wants, though, despite the contradiction, many luxury wants, and to prefer leisure to constructive work.<sup>17</sup> One reason why they were able to do this is because they lived in a

“Garden-of-Eden- environment. ...A more important reason for hedonism and laziness is that Samoans are not offered any encouragement within Samoan society. They are constrained by despotic hereditary chiefs and overbearing communal demands so that there could be no private property on individual incentives. ...Communal demands are equally incompatible with economic progress.”<sup>18</sup>

These assertions concerning Samoan society are not without foundation in contemporary society and the experience of one of the interviews is testament of this. “Fa’auoafagofie” is a married woman who lives on the island of Savai’i. Her husband holds more than one matai title and they regularly, although reluctantly at times, participate in ceremonial and family affairs as well as other obligations and occasions where they give gifts and credit. “Fa’auoafagofie’s” sister and her husband once ran a local village store trading in items normally found in a dairy. The dairy is now closed and “Fa’auoafagofie”, her husband and their three children live on the property where the dairy is situated. The dairy is well kept, and “Fa’auoafagofie” was questioned as to why it was no longer operating. She stated that several relatives and friends had constantly bought goods from there on credit and never made any repayments. This resulted in very low profits which soon turned into losses. She stipulated that it was very hard for her sister and husband to refuse the requests and the end result was that the store could not be

sustained. She did state however that she was planning to open the store herself and that unlike her sister, she would be more frugal. On a separate occasion, the author witnessed some people asking “Fa’auofaigofie” for money, she did not refuse.

According to Toleafoa, on many occasions people do not even have to ask for things, it is either expected of someone or that persons simply feels obligated to give. He stated that it would be shameful for Samoans to neglect giving aid to relations, even if they did not know how they were related. This same point was also noted by Toleafoa who explained that it was part of being a Samoan to give. The majority of the time, this was to relatives, however, non-relatives sometimes also benefited from the generosity of others. He notes that on several occasions, people would give to total strangers who came to them for help. This was simply part of what the Samoan culture taught and fostered. It is imperative in the fa’aSamoa to know ones obligations thereby rendering correct and timely service when required. Toleafoa, points to the example of an *ali’i* matai catching a bus with anther tulafale matai. Of this he states, that it would be considered rude of the *ali’i* not to pay for the fares of the *tulafale*. Since the tulafale always acts in service to the *ali’i*, the *ali’i* in reciprocating the action takes care of the tulafale.

Obligations are met by most members of society regardless their financial status or material wealth. “Taumafai Pea” is a elderly woman who lives in a rural village on the Island of Upolu. She lives with her daughter, “Oleaealemeaefai”, and her daughters children. “Taumafai”, “Oleaealemeaefai” and the latter’s children are without paid employment.<sup>19</sup> “Oleaealemeaefai” and her four eldest children, whose ages range from thirteen to twenty two, are the main providers for

the family, cultivating a small piece of land at the back of their house as well as their plantation. During the time when the author held discussions with them the village was making preparations for the *fa’amati*.<sup>20</sup> As both “Taumafai” and “Oleaealemeaefai” are members of the LMS faith, they are expected to provide certain goods for their minister that included, double sheets with matching pillow sheets, *falalili’i* (mats), and dinner sets. Schools had already begun, but “Oleaealemeaefai’s” children had not enrolled. Asked why, she replied that they had no money. During dinner times, they consumed mainly *ulu*(breadfruit) and *miti* (a kind of soup comprised mainly of coconut cream). They admitted that they could not afford much else. Despite all this, “Taumafai” readily admitted that they were busy organising the purchase of the goods for the *fa’amati*. She was asked if there would be any punishment for not providing these goods. She replied that there were not, but that they had to do it as it was expected of them and if they did not, the village would know their poverty. The case of “Taumafai” and “Oleaealemeaefai” highlighted, that at least another important factor in the peoples desire to meet obligations, was shame.

This shame is at times purposely exploited to force people to meet obligations. The author attended a LMS church ceremony with “Fa’auofaigofie”, her husband, “Filemu” and their children. On this particular occasion, church members had donated various amounts of money for the upkeep of the ministers house. Before the minister delivered his sermon, a member of the church gave thanks to all those that made contributions. He then read aloud all those that had made contributions along with the exact amount of money they gave. With a grin

on his face, "Filemu" quietly whispered how fortunate it was that he gave a considerable amount of money.

In addition to 'shame', there are penalties which may be exacted if obligations are not met. "Fiatagata" and his wife, "Taumulimuli" revealed that at the time of their discussions with the author, they were seeking money to finance their share of a village contribution to the minister for the *fa'amati*. They had been notified earlier that month that the ministers wife was requesting, as part of the *fa'amati*, a double cab truck. The village fono therefore required that all females, regardless of whether they were in paid employment or not,<sup>21</sup> to contribute \$500 towards meeting the request. The village fono did not discriminate between those households with more females who were affected and those with fewer. Regardless the number of females who were affected by the resolution, each had to pay the same amount. "Fiatagata" commented that he felt sorry for the family across the road who had several daughters in paid employment. In his own family, "Taumulimuli" was the only female affected. In addition to this, "Fiatagata" stipulated that there were several ordinances that were regularly passed which required each 'matai' to give money to the fono or where it directed that money to go. At the time, he as well as other matai of the village were making regular fortnightly payments of \$20 to help pay for a recently built church hall.

"Fiatagata" was questioned about the possibility of refusing payments or admitting to having insufficient funds to make the payments. Shaking his head he replied that, that was impossible if one was to maintain his residency in the village. He stated that a failure to make a payment may at first be ignored by the *fono*, if one was lucky. However, a second failure would usually result in a

message from the *fono* that the payment had to be paid soon. If non-compliance occurred too often, then the offender would be called before the *fono*. In this forum, the offender, nearly always the matai, would be given a very stern lecture concerning his failures as well as a warning that non-compliance would no longer be tolerated. Should the offender still fail to comply then an appearance before the *fono* would again be required. If failures continued after this, the offender would be told to leave the village. If there is a positive in all this, it is that the offenders family are allowed to stay.<sup>22</sup> As a result of such demands, “Fiatagata” admitted that all the money he saved was specifically for the purpose of meeting the village *fono*'s demands. He stated that at times, he felt significant frustration, because while he had money in the bank, he could not spend too much in order to be prepared for new resolutions to make payments .

These three cases highlight an important fact concerning the obligations that exist. Many stem from 'the church', which will be used from this point on as referring to the main established churches in Samoa. While it would be inaccurate to state that the LMS religion was the only one which obligated their members in such a way. However, it would also be inaccurate to stipulate that all religions in Samoa operate in such a manner. What can be stated is that, in all the interviews and discussions carried out, the LMS was the only religion that was associated by the interviewees with such practices. Furthermore, such practices were not condoned by all members of the LMS faith. According to Fiu Mataese, who holds a high position in his own LMS congregation, his congregation has attempted to diminish the heavy sense of obligations felt by members of the church to give above their means. He stated,

all (the) families are not equal, some of them are earning more than others. To divide the requirements equally among the villagers, (would) put a lot of pressure on people.... Our policy now is 'whatever you can afford'.

However, there is a very strong perception amongst those interviewed that the church, in particular the LMS, demands significantly from their members. Given that these members are strongly imbued with a sense of obligation, the demands and requests of the church are constantly being satisfied.

Tolefoa notes that the obligations associated with the *fa'asamoa* are particularly acute in the case of businesses. He noted that businesses come under several strains that are associated with the *fa'aSamoa*, its ties of affection and the associated obligations. A business considered good in the *fa'asamoa* is one where late or insufficient payments are tolerated. The opposite would be one where everything ran according to business practices which denounced things such as late or incomplete payments. Working according to the former would detract from good business practice that would enhance the ability to save and invest capital. On the good side however, one would be looked upon with favour as a good Samoan. The latter, which would promote better business would be condemned for its capitalistic and non-Samoan nature. In summation, he admitted that,

Either way the business decides to follow, there are significant downfalls which are fostered by expectations associated with the *fa'asamoa*.

This was confirmed by Su'a, a businesswoman operating in Apia.. In addition to owning one of the largest businesses in Apia, Su'a also holds one of the highest titles in Lefaga, a rural village in Upolu. In her experience, there has been a significant amount of obligations placed upon her by *matai* she is related to and associated with through various village ties. Additionally, many people

specifically sought help from her. These directly stemmed from her capacity as a business-owner and operator. She admitted that this affected business, and while she did not reveal any numerical figures, she was quick to affirm the proposition put forward by the author, that her obligations were an inhibition to business growth. She specifically stated that her own personal finances had been drained significantly by obligations that were directly related to the title she held.

In total, obligations associated with the fa'aSamoa play a significant in inhibiting the ability to accumulate capital. However, there are significant benefits that are and may be accrued through meeting such obligations. The most significant is being rewarded with a matai title and the authority over the lands associated with that title. The attainment of such lands may accrue for the holder benefits that are more than a just return for his or her earlier contributions. Before explicating a case where this was evident, it is useful to first obtain a brief understanding of the land tenure system and in particular how it has evolved and continues to evolve from a communal system to one that is individually based.

### **Land tenure**

Land and the land tenure system is a fundamental part of Samoa and the fa'aSamoa. Fox and Cumberland stipulate that,

The Samoan village is intimately related to the land. Land-use practices cannot be understood without knowledge of Samoan social structure, custom, values and aspirations - all important considerations in appreciating the present character of the occupied land. ...To consider separately the village where people live and the land on which they work would be unrealistic, and would not assist the description of the contemporary Samoan scene. By the same token, Samoan agriculture cannot be adequately understood without a knowledge of the character and role of village life.<sup>23</sup>

Land tenure is a substantial impediment to capital accumulation. In his book, *Island Economies: Studies from the South Pacific*, Te'o I. J. Fairbairn lists the land tenure system in Samoa as a major impediment to development. He stipulates that,

communal land tenure causes insecurity of tenure for the producer and a consequent reluctance to develop the land (and that) non-producers [i.e., chiefs] control agricultural incomes, so that producers do not gain the full benefit of their labour<sup>24</sup>

*The changing land tenure system*

The land tenure system in Samoa has undergone significant change which has seen it evolve from a communally based system to one that is more individually inclined. This process is still taking place, so that the land, while still predominantly communally owned, is increasingly being cultivated and utilised on an individual or individual family basis. The inclination towards individualism was lucidly recognised by Keesing in the early part of this century. While noting the strength of traditional attitudes, and forms of organisations Keesing also stipulated that there were disintegrating forces that were slowly breaking these down:

Here a sub-district, there a village section, and again a family branch or individual household asserts a greater autonomy than was allowed under the traditional system. In Western Samoa, to give one instance here, a large family with eight branches decided recently to disband "for ever," each choosing its own holders of the family names and dividing up the common land holding. Such changes are produced partly through a stirring of the individualistic spirit, partly through the blurring of the old lore and knowledge...<sup>25</sup>

In a 'communally based system of land tenure' land is owned by groups rather than individuals. These groups are usually in the form of *aiga* although there is also land that belongs to an entire village as a group<sup>26</sup>. Land that belongs to



an *aiga* is governed by a *matai* or *matai's* of that *aiga*. In a case where there are several *matai* in an *aiga*, each have authority over a specific portion of that land. O'meara who refers to this the communally based land tenure system, as the 'traditional land tenure system', states that pieces of land were owned by the extended family whose members first cleared and planted it.<sup>27</sup> These members are part of a family who have a corresponding *matai* title. The land that is cleared and planted is placed under the ownership of that title. The authority over that land lies in the hand of that title and subsequently the persons who holds it.<sup>28</sup>

A system of individual tenure was strongly promoted between 1924 and 1926 by the New Zealand administration. However, after much resistance from the Samoans, it failed. The traditional communal based tenure system was confirmed by the Samoan and Titles Protection Ordinance 1934.<sup>29</sup> While the new system of land tenure failed to be legislated, it nevertheless evolved in common practice. When O'meara carried out his studies in the 1980s, several villages were adopting both land tenure systems.<sup>30</sup> Although the change appears sure, it is nevertheless still in progress and remains incomplete.<sup>31</sup> While there are individual land holding, the majority of the land, around 85 percent,<sup>32</sup> is governed by the *matai* of the *aiga* on behalf of the *aiga*.

The new system allows individuals that first clear and plant the land to own that land but also to pass the ownership directly to their children regardless of the *matai* titles involved. Its regular adoption is largely due to its perceived advantages. Firstly, it eliminates the uncertainty that the old system inhered. Second, it allows parents to provide security for their children. Since the extended

family no longer operates under one *matai*, “parents want to assure that each of their children will inherit land for the support of his or her own nuclear family.”<sup>33</sup>

Today it is more common for individuals or individual households within the *aiga* to work a particular piece of land themselves for themselves.<sup>34</sup> O'meara, who undertook studies in three villages in Samoa concluded that all three accepted and used the new land tenure system. Two of the three were rural villages in Savai'i, arguably the more traditional of the two islands. O'meara revealed that after conducting eighty interviews from the various villages, individuals claimed nearly two-thirds of these plots under the new tenure system.<sup>35</sup> In a follow-up study to his original, O'meara revealed that the move towards individual land tenure had taken even further steps. At least one area that revealed this lucidly was the attitude towards the rights of untitled people to claim authority over land. In the first study, there was no claim for untitled people to legitimately exercise *pule* (authority) over land in their own name. In the latter study however, he found that

many people freely asserted that untitled people can, should, or do have legitimate authority over individually owned land.

Moreover, a further sign of change lay in the fact that

The great majority of those expressing this view were themselves *matai*.<sup>36</sup>

### **Benefits from fulfilling obligations**

“Malosi” is a prominent businessman who lives in an urban village in Upolu. “Malosi” used to operate several businesses in Samoa. Although he is currently focussing on just one, it is one of the largest and most well established in Samoa. In addition to this, he is venturing into other businesses and will soon be operating several businesses again. He also has a very prominent background in

Politics. During the 1980’s “Malosi” has featured prominently on the Samoan political scene and was a prominent figure in the election campaigns of the 1980s. He has very close ties with many of the political figureheads in the current Samoan parliament, and owing to his connections the author was able to secure some very important interviewees.

“Malosi” has partaken and contributed significantly to family matters. Contributing to special occasions, and generally taking care of his family has utilised a significant amount of his resources. This was recognised and rewarded by one side of his *aiga*, who reside in a rural village in Upolu. In return for his service, they granted him one of the highest titles in the village. The prominence of this title extends beyond the village to the district in which it is situated. Through the title, “Malosi” was also given authority over a vast amount of land. The land is effectively for “Malosi” to use at his disposal. While it is traditional land that is associated with the high title he now holds, “Malosi” is planning to utilise and develop the land for further business adventures. With the change that is occurring in Samoa’s land tenure system, the work “Malosi” is planning to undertake on the land will effectively secure him permanent ownership of it. The contributions made by “Malosi” have thus been rewarded significantly.

In such a case, the diminishing effect that obligations through the affective ties system is counterbalanced by a significant gain. Whether or not “Malosi” expected such a reward for his efforts or not, he has significantly increased his acquisitions and his worth. Since, traditional land can now be used as security for loans,<sup>37</sup> investment opportunities have increased markedly for “Malosi” in terms of securing loans due to the land under his authority. In contemporary times

therefore, the initial years or service that are paid to the family may be perceived to be a wise investment. While savings are diminished, people may reap the harvest of their investment in the future. Capital may be diminished, but it should not be perceived as only a loss and consequently a drain on reserves. It would be more accurate to perceive such contributions as wise business investments. While not all that contribute will see it as such, it is something that is increasingly being realised in Samoa.<sup>38</sup>

The rewards of making contributions also reaps benefits in other ways. A discussion was held with “Malosi’s” son, “Onosa’i”, who has worked for his father for several years, on the topic of advertising. The author, after spending a considerable time with “Malosi” and studying his business realised that it did not carry out any advertising. “Onosa’i” was asked why his father did not promote his business more fiercely by way of advertising. His response was that advertising does not really work in Samoa. While for some it may, for the majority it was not a significant factor in attracting customers. He stipulated that ‘reputation’ was the key factor in attracting customers. This was built on many things that included, quality or service, easy finance terms (willingness to give credit), and the manner of the owner. More importantly however, was the standing of the owner in the community. This relied significantly on the owners participation in *fa'aSamoa* occasions. This tended to build loyalty from family members and others to whom the network of affective ties reached.

Affective ties can aid and has aided capital accumulation in other ways. Tate Simi, revealed that one of the biggest stores in Samoa employed mainly family members. This stemmed from at least two factors. First, the owner had more trust

in family members. Second, family members offered easier terms of employment. These included taking pay cuts when the business was struggling and working extra hours for free when required. Workers who were related to the owner or manager would at times work for low and sometimes even no wages. Such terms were easy to secure with them, with the understanding that they were all one family and needed to work as a family.

### Conclusion

The ability to accumulate capital has been perceived as a fundamental weakness of Samoa society. The apparent inability of the Samoans to accumulate capital has been attributed to factors such as; their lifestyle which has a high preference for leisure, a limited number of wants and aspirations, a preference for consumption over production and so forth. Additionally, the fa'aSamoa places a significant amount of obligation on people to give, especially to 'special occasions'. These obligations, at times are enforced by threats of as well as actual penalties.

With specific reference to 'affective ties', one of the most widely cited barriers to the accumulation of capital is the systems communal focus which prioritises giving and sharing vis-à-vis saving. This is not limited to special occasions but also refers also to extending credit with little assurance of repayment. However, these transactions, which are carried out through the network of affective ties comprise only section of the *fa'aSamoa*. Moreover, while a drain on resources is occasioned through these affective ties they reciprocate the contributions in terms of a bestowal of prestigious titles and lands. This, provides an avenue by which a bigger capacity for amassing capital may be obtained.

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- <sup>1</sup> David Pitt, 1970. *Tradition and Economic Progress in Samoa*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 4
- <sup>2</sup> Te’o I. J. Fairbairn., 1985. *Island Economies: Studies from the South Pacific*, Suva: University of the South Pacific.
- <sup>3</sup> Pitt, 1970, p. 4
- <sup>4</sup> Farrell, Bryan H., and R. Gerard Ward, 1962., ‘The Village and its Agriculture.’ in *Western Samoa: Land, Life, and Agriculture in Tropical Polynesia*, ed. by Fox, J. W., and K. B. Cumberland, Whitcombe and Tombs, Ltd., Christchurch, pp. 177-238
- <sup>5</sup> Pitt, (1970). p. 4
- <sup>6</sup> George Turner, 1984. *Samoa, A Hundred Years Ago and Long Before*. Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji.
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>8</sup> Roger Ward, 1962., ‘Agriculture Outside the Village and Commercial Systems.’ in *Western Samoa: Land, Life, and Agriculture in Tropical Polynesia*, ed. by Fox, J. W., and K. B. Cumberland, Whitcombe and Tombs, Ltd., Christchurch, pp. 266-289.
- <sup>9</sup> V.D.Stace, *Western Samoa-An Economic Survey*, SPCTP, No.91, 1956. p. 54
- <sup>10</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>11</sup> Unasa Felise Va’a is a matai and a Professor of Anthropology at the University of Samoa. His work has centred significantly on Samoans, the migratory patterns and lifestyles.
- <sup>12</sup> Words in brackets are mine.
- <sup>13</sup> Robert Norton, 1984. ‘Titles, Wealth and Faction: Electoral Political in a Samoan Village’ *Oceania*, Vol. 55, No. 2, December 1984., p. 100
- <sup>14</sup> Stace, (1956). p. 56
- <sup>15</sup> Solf to Alipia 31.8.1900. PMB479, XVII, B5, Vol. 1 cited in Malama Meleisea, 1987. *The Making of Modern Samoa*, Institute of Pacific Studies of the University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji. p. 4
- <sup>16</sup> T. Trood, 1912. *Island Reminiscences: A graphic detailed romance of a life spent in the South Sea Islands.*, McCarron, Stewart and Company, Sydney. pp. 3-4 cited in Meleisea (1987) *The Making of Modern Samoa.*, p. 4
- <sup>17</sup> Monfat, P.A., (a) *Les Samoa ou Archipel des Navigateurs*, Etude Historique et Religieuse-E.Vitte, Lyon, 1890. (b) *Le Missionnaire des Samoa* Mgr.L.Elloy, vicaire apotoligue des Navigateurs et de l’Ocieanie centrale, Vitte, Lyon, T, 1890. cited in Pitt
- <sup>18</sup> David Pitt; 6-7
- <sup>19</sup> It would be inaccurate to describe them as unemployed. They have a small piece of land at the back of their house which they cultivate to provide food for their family. In Samoa, this is work, just not paid work as it may be understood in Western societies.
- <sup>20</sup> The fa’amati is an occasion when members of the LMS faith provide various goods for their minister(s). It occurs once a year during March and the goods range from mats to cars.
- <sup>21</sup> This included all females that had reached a ‘working age’. Although the particular age was specified, Fiatagata and Taumulimuli alluded to those females who had left school. This gave the impression that teenage females were included so long as they were no longer at school.
- <sup>22</sup> The offender may at a later date request to be allowed back into the village. As explained earlier, this involves making several gift offering to the village fono as well as an assurance that the failure to comply with the fono’s resolution will not occur again.
- <sup>23</sup> J. W. Fox, and K. B. Cumberland 1962., ‘The Village and its Agriculture.’ in *Western Samoa: Land, Life, and Agriculture in Tropical Polynesia*, Whitcombe and Tombs, Ltd., Christchurch. p. 177
- <sup>24</sup> Te’o I. J. Fairbairn., 1985. *Island Economies: Studies from the South Pacific*, Suva: University of the South Pacific.
- <sup>25</sup> Felix M. Keesing, 1978. *Modern Samoa: Its Government and Changing Life*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., US. p. 142
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid. p. 270. Keesing states that these village owned properties are carefully guarded against encroachment by other communities.

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<sup>27</sup> J. Tim O'meara, 1990. *Samoa Planters: Tradition and Economic Development in Polynesia*, Hold, Rhinehart and Winston, Inc. US. p. 138

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Fox & Cumberland. pp. 194-195

<sup>30</sup> O'meara, (1990). p. 143

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. (1990)., p. 145

<sup>32</sup> This estimate is that of a prominent lawyer in Samoa, Anae Tony Pereira, who specialises in lands and titles cases and that of Fiu Mataese who heads the UNDP and undertakes a considerable amount of development work with villages. A significant focus of Mataese's work focuses on land development.

<sup>33</sup> O'meara, (1990)., p. 145

<sup>34</sup> Pam Thomas, 1985. 'Western Samoa', in *Decentralisation in the South Pacific*, (Ed.) by Peter Larmour and Ropate Qalo, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji. p. 222

<sup>35</sup> O'meara, 1990., *Samoa Planters*., p. 149

<sup>36</sup> Tim O'meara, 199?. 'From Corporate to Individual Land Tenure in Western Samoa, in *Land, Custom and Practice in the South Pacific*, (Ed.) by ., p. 133

<sup>37</sup> Malosi.

<sup>38</sup> Lernalu Tate Simi, Head of the Labour Department. Simi has worked considerably with businesses in the capacity of his work.

# C

## HAPTER 7: THE FA’ASAMOA VIS-À-VIS CORRUPTION

*The most significant charge laid against ‘a system of affective ties’ is that it gives rise to public sector corruption. This chapter seeks to discover the extent to which this is true in the case of the fa’aSamoa. This objective is demarcated into three specific aims. First it sets out to discover some of the functions that the fa’aSamoa serves in this sector. Second, it looks specifically at the relationship between the fa’aSamoa and cases of public sector corruption in Samoa. The aim is to highlight the cause of corruption in each case. In doing so, it will be shown that there are several factors which may account for corruption. Third, it is argued that the fa’aSamoa can only be implicated in corrupt activities as a ‘mean’s rather than a ‘cause’ of corruption.*

### **Corruption is not a foreign flower**

Allegation of and actual cases of corruption are a well known feature of Samoan politics. The definition of corruption, as used here, follows that posited by Peter Larmour . “The use of public office for private gain” is well documented in Samoa.<sup>1</sup> Before proceeding however, it is useful to add to the definition of corruption a clarification of what is meant by ‘private gain’. Here it is taken to mean personal gain for the offender and or those he is affectively tied to. In the case of Samoa, this may refer to relatives who are immediate as well as distant, friends, village associates and constituents.

One of the most well publicised cases of corruption in Samoa involved the auditor general, Su’a Rimoni Ah Chong. In the capacity of his position as the



chief auditor, Ah Chong had reported several incriminating matters concerning government operations. Among these, the commissioner for Inland Revenue faced a conflict of interest between his public sector position and his private business activities, a timber company controlled by three ministers made unauthorised use of two government bulldozers for seven months, and a works director approved payments for false services to another official, who was his brother.<sup>2</sup> As a result of publishing such matters, Ah Chong was suspended. Following this, a government appointed commission of Inquiry confirmed “in the main” the irregularities he identified, but cleared the ministers involved and accused the chief auditor of exceeding his brief by criticising government mismanagement.<sup>3</sup>

### **The political role of the fa’aSamoa**

#### ***A parliamentary tool to promote order and peace?***

A important feature of the *fa’asamoa* that was pointed out in the interviews was that it was as a tool for mediation in and bringing order to parliament. Toleafoa contended that the *aganu’u* brought peace and conciliation at the end of parliamentary meetings. He noted that not all in parliament would be happy with all the resolutions passed all the time. However, as consensus and in particular peace was an end that was stressed in Samoan society, the *aganu’u* became a powerful tool by which order and stability could be accomplished. Foisaga Shon, Head of Women’s Affairs in Samoa, supported these assertions. With regards the manner in which parliament operated during meetings and debates, she stipulated that there was always a desire, in fact a prerogative that all the members were left

appeased and peace and order was maintained. Verbal fights sometimes become very spiteful with name calling a distinct feature.<sup>4</sup> However, despite the harsh words traded, and the bitter arguments that materialised, relationships were always consolidated.<sup>5</sup> She attributed this to the strength of family ties and the family mentality. The attitude that is prevalent in smaller family groups is transposed to other larger groupings and national forums such as parliament. The need to maintain peace, promote conciliation is fundamental in both spheres.

This is very much in the mould of the *fono a matai* or village council. A defining feature of these council meetings is the consensus that is reached at the end of meetings.<sup>6</sup> The role of the family is two fold in ensuring this. First, within the family circle, there is an emphasis on working together. This is of course born out in the structure of the *fa’asamoa* whereby all in society has a particular role to play and functions to fulfil. This emphasis is transposed to other forums such as meetings. Second, the family acts to enforce these values. Parliamentarians whose behaviour became disruptive and language was about to stir trouble would be reminded that they were not just parliamentarians but also *matai* of their respective constituencies and in particular their families. This was sufficient to stimulate a reconsideration of actions and language which, helped maintain order and tranquillity.

Although this may be the case, it is evident that it is not one which holds for all occasions. When these comments were raised with former Prime Minister and current leader of the opposition, TuiAtua Tupua Tamasese, he highlighted evidence to the contrary. He agreed that family ties did play an important role in parliamentary debates. However, he noted that the *fa’asamoa* was not always

operative. Moreover, when it was utilised, it was not always consistent with its application in other more traditional forums such as the *fono a matai*. TuiAtua, a *tama-a-aiga* (one who holds a matai title that is considered one the highest in the hierarchy of titles (*fa’alupega*) in the *fa’asamoa*) had in the months preceding the interview, been expounded from parliament for questioning the political correctness of some parliamentary proceedings. This, as he made clear, is well beyond the boundaries of the fa'aSamoa. He stated,

“Well, I was kicked out of parliament in the last session, and the reason is because I challenged the speaker by saying, where in the world do you have a referee, who when he blows the whistle, only one side is penalised. Well, you don’t kick out *tama-a-aiga*, that is culture.”

### ***Overlapping terms: Fa’aSamoa and Corruption***

A common response to questions concerning corruption from the majority of the interviews was that it was a term that is difficult to apply in Samoa. The primary reason being that many obligations incurred as part of the fa’aSamoa appeared very similar to acts of corruption. Toleafoa argued that you cannot measure or define the role that the *aganu’u*<sup>7</sup> (tradition) had in bringing about inefficiency or corruption. This stems from the fact that the *aganu’u* has no definable boundaries. Claims that corruption and inefficiency are caused by the *aganu’u* drastically oversimplifies the fact that the *aganu’u* stands apart from the political sphere. It is tacitly implied from his words that the *aganu’u* is a higher ideal that guides political but yet transcends it.

“The *aganu’u* works on the simple notion of giving, receiving and being grateful for what you receive. Your appreciation is shown with a thank you. It’s a system of reciprocity.”

The *aganu'u* is not limited to time or space. There is not particular time it is applicable; for Samoans it is applicable all the time. Similarly, it is applicable everywhere. "It doesn't work in the morning and end at night, it works all the time."<sup>8</sup>

To use an example, Toleafoa referred to the relationship between children and parents.

The *aganu'u* stresses that children can never pay off their debt to their parents. Until their parents pass away, the child is always indebted to them. This means that all and any time, the child must look after, obey and fulfil the request of their parents. This should be the natural course of action given the care that the parents provided for their children in their lives. Regardless of where the child is in life; what occupation he or she undertakes, he (or she) will always be indebted to his parents. Regardless if he (or she) holds the highest positions in the country, he or she must always be subservient to his or her parents.

The same type of reciprocal relationships may be transposed to other levels of societal relationships. Toleafoa provided the following hypothetical situation:

Taking the example of an *ali'i* (arguably the highest ranking type of chief) catching a bus with other *tulafale* (chiefs who serve the *ali'i*) he states that it would be considered rude of the *ali'i* not to pay for the fares of the others. Since the *tulafale* always acts in service to the *ali'i*, the *ali'i* in reciprocating the action takes care of the *tulafale*.

The primary message Toleafoa tried to get across was that there are numerous obligations expected of Samoans. There are important responsibilities that individuals are faced with. These may sometimes be mistaken for instances of corruption. A public servant with these additional roles to play and expectations to fulfil may at times appear to be acting in an unprofessional manner. He provided another hypothetical situation as an example:

a minister of parliament is asked by one of his or her constituency members for goods or services. In accordance with

the aganu’u the ministers responds to the request and gives what the constituent asked for.

In the reciprocal nature of such practices and ways however, that constituent member is indebted to that minister and would be expected to give him or her their vote. Taken in this respect, the practice seems very harmless and in fact it may even seem beneficial to both parties. However, it may be construed differently to appear as if corruption underlay such a transaction. It may be perceived that the minister gave goods to the constituent member in order to secure his or her vote.

In total, it is very difficult to judge whether the actions in question are corruption or simply fulfilling duty. However, this is related more to the reasons that lie behind the actions rather than the actions themselves. Whatever the reasons if public office was used for private gain then arguably this must be corruption.

### *Favouritism*

It was pointed out by several of the interviewees that favouritism was an common practice in public sector. This was directed predominantly by public sector workers at members of their family or even those associated through other avenues such as village or even friendship. Ah Chong offered the following account of his experience as a public servant with favouritism. Family ties contributed to protection and enhancement of families. Because of family ties, often public positions were compromised. According to Ah Chong, the level of the impact of family ties on politics was significant. Family obligations usually involved “protecting your own.” There was a mentality, in fact an obligation to protect ones family and this usually meant giving them special favours. He

stipulated that the cases of nepotism that are present in the public sector stem from the perception that one had to “protect their own”.

Two other subjects alluded to this in their discussion of corruption in the public sector. Malifa, editor for the Samoan Newspaper, the Observer explained that he has experienced what might be regarded as mismanagement, disorderly behaviour, improper management of the public service. From this experience, he has witnessed a significant amount of problems which have arise from nepotism in the public service.

All the way, as far back as I can remember, family ties leading to nepotism has been an accepted practice in public offices, where big executives/public servants end up bringing in their own relatives when there are vacancies and openings in the service. People have been sacked because of this. Thus there have been serious complications in the service because of it.

Despite a strong disapproval of such activities, he did profess to understand why it occurred in Samoa, in the context of the *fa’aSamoa*.

“In a small society like Samoa, where the Samoan family traditional ties are strong, you get the feeling that you have to be protective of your own family members. Its natural for you to think that way where everybody knows everybody. In your village you are respected if you are able to give some of your family employment. You are up there in a responsible (position) of government and you can give your family members jobs. I can’t speak about how efficiency may be hampered when family members are working together in one department, but I do know that sometimes people neglect their jobs because some of their family are in the supervising positions.”<sup>9</sup>

He went to say that

“if you gain a job of high status, and you are able, through that job to give employment to your family, both immediate and extended, and even the village, you gain a lot of respect”.

This tended to make nepotism and favouritism more acceptable:

“Its part of family life, tradition. When you progress upwards, you are expected to help out with other members of your family.”

He concluded that,

“ its very hard for a Samoan, brought up in the Samoan way, to not give preference to the members of his or her family. You are talking about living in the village where the opportunities are not that many. In the village, you will usually have two or three guys who will land really big jobs in the city. You might have two, three, four or five people who work for the government. When you have those jobs, people look up to you to provide jobs for the rest of the family and people in the village. When their are *matai* titles, the one with the ‘big job’ is usually made to feel the most important person because of it. They give you prominence and respect, even though you might not have the highest *matai* title. All this is done simply because you have been able to land a big job in government. They (the *matai*) don’t even have to say it or make the request for such favouritism; its unspoken. Its an unspoken expectation that you are to help out the rest of the village. Usually, the person who has landed such a job, feels obligated to reciprocate the special treatment and give his family and fellow village members the preference for jobs.”<sup>10</sup>

However what appears to be corruption does not always arise out of duty to ones family or associations. There are occasions when it is perpetuated for much more personal reasons. In the early part of 1999, revelations that hinted of corruption, concerning Polynesian Airlines came to light. The stipulations made was that a high ranking officer of the company began a scheme of advancements, to himself and other workers, for work not yet undertaken. A list of names involved in this scandal was privately given to a member of the press. The ‘high ranking officer’ concerned was questioned and confessed to these activities. He stipulated that it was well within the rights of his and the others involved to make these advancements. When he was informed by the media group that interviewed him, that the list was to be publicly released, he immediately applied for and obtained a court injunction to stop the publication. Malifa admits that the reaction of this ‘high ranking officer’, does not necessarily mean the activities which transpired were illegal. However, it is suggestive of that conclusion.

TuiAtua stipulated that this case highlighted an important reason about how people get involved. When a large number of people are involved in a case such as this, it may be presumed that family connections are involved – family members inducing other members into what appears to be a prosperous venture. However, according to TuiAtua, the case simply highlighted an attempt to consolidate ones position. According to TuiAtua the ‘high ranking official’ “roped in” the other members to keep them silent. He made the following statement concerning the case:

These advances were not taxable, and they were interest free. When the advances come up to as much as \$400,000 for one individual, well...this is no mean figure. I mean if I can get \$400,000 tax free (and) interest free,...that would be a tremendous bonus. This is one particular fellow I am talking about. What this fellow did was he roped in about 20 people, into the scheme, the principal scheme....when you rope in your whole professional people in there with a scheme like this, it shuts them up. And all of a sudden they play monkey; don’t see, don’t talk, don’t hear.”

TuiAtua stipulated that this practice was prevalent also in politics.

“people are working, placing people strategically, so they will be used...come elections. Or they will be useful...in the way of enforcing their authority outside the confines of the political structure, cabinet, departments and so forth. If you want to exert influence outside, you draw your friends and family (into strategic areas you so desire).”<sup>11</sup>

Corruption in the form of nepotism may sometimes be explained through such a practice. While family ties are not to be discounted as a reason for the presence of a large contingent of one family in the public sector or an area of it, it is not the only reason. The consolidation of position also explains why public sector servants may give preference to kin relations and other associates.

Simi stipulated that from his experience as a public sector worker, it was sometimes difficult to avoid having so many members form the same family in a



small scale society such as Samoa. The size of Samoan society and the fact that far reaching family ties are easily recognisable means that public sector workers may easily be identified as heralding from the same family. Moreover, he stated that it is not unusual to find that a good education usually runs through an entire families. A well educated family will naturally offer more prospective employees to the work force. Added to the fact that the job pool in a small society is relative to its size, it is hard to avoid having family members employed together. Thus, while acknowledging that nepotism does not occur, he emphasised that its appearance may be explained by other factors.

#### *A culture of silence*

The principles of the fa’aSamoa have at times clashed with the those of the ‘rule of law’, and often, the former have prevailed. According to Ah Chong the rule of law was often forced to bend because of the pressure asserted by family ties and the culture of *fa’aaloalo*. Although the rule of law was an established part of Samoans legal system, its proper application was often lacking. He stated that when some leaders break the law and want it concealed, they will use *fa’aaloalo* as a tool to ensure that their desires are met. He recounted that when he had tabled the auditor generals report and its contents were brought to the attention of the then Prime Minister, Tofilau Eti, the latter asked him personally to suppress certain information, and conclusions contained in the report. Essentially, it was impressed upon Su’a that regardless the validity of the report, the final say lay in the hands of ‘his’ Prime Minister. This was not a precept of any part of the legal system, but a tenet of the *fa’aSamoa*: that one shows respect to his elders and leaders and does not question their actions and requests.

The influence of this principle was also evident in the aftermath after Ah Chong was suspended from the auditor general position. Facts concerning the report and his refusal to suppress certain information, were made public and there was considerable support for what he did. However, while the support was considerable in was predominantly all ‘silent’: people would not publicly show this support. Only in conversations with Ah Chong would they convey their approval and endorsement of his actions. At least one reason for this was what he referred to as “the culture of silence”.

This stemmed from at least two factors, *fa’aaloalo* and fear. First, people did not want to be seen as disobedient to those in positions of higher authority. While confirming Ah Chongs findings, the government had denounced his report as beyond the powers of the auditor generals office. Publicly supporting Ah Chong would be in direct opposition to those in authority. Second, people, especially those who worked in the public sector, feared government reprisals not only against them but also their families should they be seen to support Ah Chong. Malifa made reference to these factors as significant barriers to open discussion and expression of opinions against allegations of corruption. He stipulated that many avoided publicly speaking out in cases of corruption as well as allegations of it because of a culture that promoted silence and *fa’aaloalo* for elders and leaders. Vermullen, a European non-government organisation worker,<sup>12</sup> likewise stated that people don’t make a stand because of “the culture of silence” He stated that in Samoan society,

there are those who talk and those who are silent – it comes back to the fa’asamoa. We have a system that promotes leadership in way that is good or dictatorship or corruption on the other side.

Anae TonyPereira, a prominent lawyer and former public servant in Samoa, stated that from his experience, one common reason for public inaction in the face of corruption and allegations of corruption was fear. He stipulated that the ‘fear’ to act against perceived public sector inefficiencies and corruption’s was significantly the product of the government actions.

The government itself is responsible for basically victimising members of parliament who are in the opposite party by denying any government projects to his constituency. It gets to the point where the villagers who voted for the guy (members of the opposition party) may now lobby him to change (parties) otherwise for all the five years of his term, nothing is going to be done by government (for their constituency). It (government projects) will go to the other constituencies where the members are supporting the governing party. That is very much an approach fostered by government.<sup>13</sup>

He posited a common case scenario of how fear is perpetuated within the public sector:

the departmental head is requested to do something for a minister. The HOD may ask that the minister put his request in writing. The minister will probably say; ‘just do it, I’ll give to you later. And, you never get it writing. “In order to protect yourself, you may ask for the directions to be in writing, but because your term is so short, it may come up for review, and if you ask too much for that, it can mean a review and an ousting of you. So why don’t they (ministers) expand (your term) out to fit in with their own term of five years, that would be fairer in all circumstances. So this is just a very short sighted view of the naked power of politics; wanting to keep the heads of departments under their (ministers) direct control.

### *A lack of transparency*

Public inaction is also the product of a tight control of the media by the government which significantly inhibits transparency. While people have a certain knowledge of corrupt practices and allegations of corrupt activities in the public sector, there is a significant degree of information that they are unaware of. This is

largely a result of media failure to explicate all such activities as well as all the information regarding such activities. According to Malifa;

The newslane is a government puppy, the television is government owned, the 2AB (perhaps the most listened to radio station in Samoa) is government owned.

Malifa stipulated that the tight control that the government has on the media was shown to some extent when, in February of 1999, they axed the FM news programme.<sup>14</sup> Malifa revealed that the government has placed and continues to place a significant amount of pressure on the ‘Observer’ when it wants certain things concealed. This has resulted in a significant loss of capital; “it cost us a lot of money in court fees and legal fees.” TuiAtua stipulated that the issues are not exposed for the people to understand what is going on. His rationale was that people in power have corrupted so many of our bureaucratic classes, entrepreneurial classes, family classes, that they have a stake in containing debate.<sup>15</sup>

In addition to tight media control, TuiAtua provided another example of how transactions are concealed by the government.

Take the Polynesian airlines case. What they did was to set up three companies; Polynesian Investments, Polynesian Holdings, and Polynesian Limited. They are doing what on the face of it is legal, but its quite wrong... they are trying to hide from the people, what the Polynesian (Limited) losses are. You are trying to hide from the people, who are suffering because they have to pay for these spectacular losses. What they do is give out these balance sheets, reports of how well they are doing. But what they’ve done is that they have palmed of the losses to this company (Polynesian Holdings). So that even when they lease a plane to Polynesian Holdings, that Polynesian Holdings releases it to Polynesian Ltd. The drill is that, all the bulk of the heavy stuff is taken up by Polynesian Holdings, and its released on less harsh terms to these guys down the road (Polynesian Limited.), and look good on paper. But in fact, this is not the real story, because they are palming off losses. For years, I have been saying (this)....Because I found out that they were losing money, at first I said, ‘your losing money’, they hit the roof,

(they said) you’re lying, you’re an adulterer, you’re bad hearted. But in fact at that point, when I raised it, we were down by something like \$120 million (did not specify what currency). They eventually came out and said well we’re in trouble, they said \$50 million, but in fact it was much more than that. Eventually they owned up, but they still have worked out this thing where they hide the true cost.<sup>16</sup>

Concealment of important issues is thus a big factor that cannot be discounted.

However, not all the inactiveness by the populace can be attribute to these.

Concerning the inefficiencies in the public sector, Malifa claims that their is an attitude amongst Samoan people that;

“I don’t really care. To them, whether their is no efficiency or whether there is efficiency, it is not really going to affect their lives that much. It really bears no burden on how they live their lives today or tomorrow.”

As a case of point, he pointed to the matters currently concerning Polynesian airlines.

Polynesian airlines is public owned; it is owned by the people of Samoa through the government. In 1997 their airlines debt increased from \$Tala 113 million to \$Tala 116 million. This debt was paid for by the public. Polynesian airlines was taken over by the government in 1994 and since then the debt has been increasing. Despite this situation the advancements by senior workers has gone unchecked by public opinion.

According to Malifa,

It is this kind of public sector activity that people seem to take little regard of. Their attitude is - so what?”

One reason for this is that they cannot see the relationship between corruption and their personal life.

“They cannot see how its (the proper management of such activities) going to affect them.... They cannot see the importance of stopping alleged corrupt activities – how it will make life better for them.”<sup>17</sup>

Su’a confirmed this to be the case in her experience. Asked why people don’t protest against government injustices, she noted that the rural villagers, in

particular the matai which she constantly interacted with had a “very blessed attitude”. They disregarded a lot of the inefficiency and mismanagement they saw in government because they perceived them as having no effect on their lives. Their needs were very personal and immediate. When satisfied they cared little for matters that did not seem to affect them. They approached life with a “why worry” attitude. When the government did appear to impact on their lives, it usually involved projects that benefited them such as roads and electricity. These tended to benefit the villages and on the whole, they were generally happy with government performance..

As an example Su’a noted the case of government grants for the construction of better roads for the plantations. One project that the government was current involved in with the villages was the granting of money to aid in the construction of roads to plantations. (This was part of the governments efforts to boost the agricultural production of the country.) The problem that Su’a encountered with this project was that her village was distributing the grant money to each member. She told of how she was given \$10 during a visit.<sup>18</sup> Upon questioning where the money came from, she was told that it was her share of the grant that the government gave to aid in the construction of the roads. She questioned the decision, with one of the matai, to spend the money in such a manner, stipulating that it should have been saved up in a fund to lay good roads. However, she was told that the construction of the road was the duty of the *aumaga* (the young men of the village). The people saw the money as a gift from the government and were generally happy with the initiative seeing it as a satisfaction of their personal needs above all else.

The *fa’aSamoa* is also responsible to a certain degree for allowing corruption to exist. The matai system is sometimes its own worst enemy. The process of reconciliation that it fosters may be abused. According to Malifa,

High ranking public sector workers may abuse the system. The matai may not condone his or her actions and ostracise him or her from the village. However, with the resources gained through mismanagement, the offender can easily ‘buy his or her way back into the village’.

The matai, acting according to the traditional notions of reconciliation may unintentionally foster corrupt activities. Malifa, speaking from a matai’s perspective stipulates that incidents of corruption, from his experience are despised by *matai*. The offender, taken in front of the village *fono* receives a severe vocal reprimand.

I am a matai myself, and they (the fono) have sacked people in the village, they just kick them out. I can tell you that they really say harsh words against these people; really scold them.

Offenders of this nature, knowing that the *fa’asamoa* stresses the importance of reconciliation can manipulate it to maintain their positions.

Several months later they come back, saying they are sorry, making promises that their will be no repeat of their offences, and they are accepted back.<sup>19</sup>

Once the offender re-enters the village, after his term away and after giving the village various gifts, “all is forgiven”.

Malifa noted that one person whom he personally knew, who had been involved in corruption and subsequently driven out from his village, later gave \$Tala 100,000 as a gift for being accepted back. The offender was forgiven by the village because he approached the village in the way the *matai* understand.

TuiAtua discussed in depth the sources of inaction by the public in the face of corruption. He stated that there are two factors which account for an apparent

public apathy, information and interest. In terms of information, TuiAtua stated that,

We have a constituency that is relatively uninformed. When I say relatively, compared to the constituency of New Zealand. They do not understand the norms of democracy. They do not even understand what their rights are. And what they ought rightly to expect from government

In terms of interest, TuiAtua stipulated that it was very dormant, a result of both the attitudes of people as well as government initiatives. He states,

Given an uninformed constituency, its very difficult for the newly enfranchised 21 year old to know what’s happening here. Or even to comprehend how what’s happening here in Apia, in the government affects his personal interests or the interests of his family. So as far as he’s concerned, he’s left to his devices, to fend for himself in five years. And then when all of a sudden father Christmas (government and ministers) comes over with \$20 tala or more, (he thinks) this is Christmas. So, what does it matter to me that they are allegedly spending \$400,000 million on building a new sporting complex,<sup>20</sup> what does it matter to me (whats happening at) Polynesian airlines. When you don’t account, you don’t audit your public accounts for nine years, you kick out the auditor for saying ‘this is not on’, how does this impact on a Falefa 21 year old whose fending for himself everyday as well as he can. And then somebody comes over with a bag-full of money and say, there you are. This is Christmas, you’re not going to get Christmas again. So, ...why not take Christmas. If I don’t buy the logic of a \$400 million sporting complex, then I don’t get Christmas today. What the hell has it got to do with me? At the very least I’ve got something that will ensure that I go and get myself soaked silly with beer.

Essentially, peoples interests in politics are satisfied to a large extent by meeting their personal needs. This is very similar to what Su’a stated had occurred in her village, concerning grants for roading projects. When interests are satisfied, there is little incentive to be involved in matters that appear to have no relevance to ones immediate well being.



## Conclusion

It is evident that the *fa’aSamoa* is inevitably tied to corruption. The important question however is how? The *fa’aSamoa* has on several occasions fostered attitudes that allow corruption to exist and even flourish. Attitudes such as *fa’aaloalo* and subservience to leaders are notable in this regard. Moreover, those in power appear to be taking advantage of these attitudes to further perpetuate activities that favour themselves and their families.

However, what is very clear is that the *fa’aSamoa* is not the cause of corruption. While it may facilitate such activities, it does not itself precipitate them. Moreover, there are other reasons that account for corruption in public sector. In this sense, the *fa’aSamoa’s* involvement may just as likely be reversed to promote efficiency as well as condemn corruption. This lies in the hands of those that are currently using the system.

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<sup>1</sup> Peter Larmour, 1997. ‘Corruption and Governance in the South Pacific’, *Pacific Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 3, September., p. 11

<sup>2</sup> *Islands Business*, August 1994., p. 35 cited in Larmour, 1997. Footnote No. 5

<sup>3</sup> *Pacific Island Monthly*, November 1995. cited in Larmour, 1997., p. 13

<sup>4</sup> Pacific Islands Monthly

<sup>5</sup> Subject 2

<sup>6</sup> Le Tagalao, cited in Lawson 1985;152

<sup>7</sup> A term that can be exchanged for the *fa’aSamoa*. However, it may have a slightly different meaning. Furthermore, this meaning is apt to change depending on the situation and the subject using the term.

<sup>8</sup> Subject 4

<sup>9</sup> Words in brackets are mine.

<sup>10</sup> Subject (Sano)

<sup>11</sup> Words in brackets are my own summary of what Subject (Tupua) discussed.

<sup>12</sup> Dr Vermullen, originally from Germany has lived in Samoa for over thirty years. He states that Samoa is his homeland. He heads one of the largest non-governmental organisation in Samoa, *The Siosiomaga Society*.

<sup>13</sup> Words in brackets are mine.

<sup>14</sup> This is a radio news programme that delivered daily news to its audience.

<sup>15</sup> TuiAtua

<sup>16</sup> Words in brackets are mine.

<sup>17</sup> Malifa

<sup>18</sup> Su’a resides in an urban village, but regularly visits her rural village.

<sup>19</sup> Malifa.

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<sup>20</sup> TuiAtua is referring here to the new sporting complex that is being constructed in Tuana’imatu.

# C ONCLUSION

Development discourse has, in the latter part of this century incorporated into itself a programme which claims to comprehensively account for the problems encountered in preceding efforts to attain sustainable human development. This programme, subsumed under the term 'good governance' has been a focal point of discussion and debate amongst various groups that include, scholars, academics, government agencies, development agencies, members of NGOs. It incorporates into the older economic centred models of development, a significant emphasis on social and political forces. Good governance has sought to contextualise economic strategies in an appropriate political and social framework. It may be argued that these three spheres are conceived and constructed in a symbiotic manner. The programmes success depends on the existence of its economic, social and political component. Moreover, they must individually as well as together, follow a specific blueprint.

This thesis has sought to investigate the validity of one portion of this blueprint: the good governance agenda for civil society. The inquiry was inspired by an apparent weakness in the agenda. The case against institutions based on affective ties is not convincing. There are at least two reasons for this. First, the conclusions were predominantly based on the development efforts in Africa. Admittedly there are similarities between Africa and other developing states. However, there are also significant differences that the good governance

programme does not cater for in its application to specific cases. Second, the charges levelled at these types of institutions are founded on very narrow suppositions. These focus on the ill-effects of these institutions without offering an appropriate balance by presenting an adequate appraisal of their value.

The investigation incorporated a strand of liberal theory posited by Ernest Gellner and John Hall which was relevant to this blueprint in at least three ways. First, there was a very close parallel between the two formulations. Gellner and Hall argued that a central tenet of civil society institutions is individual liberty and autonomy. They regarded institutions that had a high degree of solidarity and autonomy vis-à-vis the state, but which lacked this element to be contrary to the meaning of civil society. In arguing for individual freedom, they therefore posited a case set against institutions or groups that were formulated by way of 'social cages'. These, like 'ties of affection' comprised of non-contractual associations. They argued that 'social cages' must be eliminated from institutions that would be classed as civil society.

Second, Gellner and Halls argument elucidated a cogent part of the good governance agenda which the latter did not make explicit. The good governance agenda proposed to eliminate from civil society, institutions based on affective ties, through the process of constructing contractual type institutions. In the construction, elements such as accountability, transparency, legitimacy would be elevated as crucial and by default, would nullify the functional workings of and eventually the need for non-contractual type institutions. In fact, the latter would eventually become a barrier in the face of this new construction and be disposed of. Gellner and Hall, implicitly pointed out that the elimination process would

involve more implications than this strategy implied. It would also lead to the elimination of those factors which underpinned these types of institutions, 'social cages'. Therefore, in relation to this, it brought to the fore of the investigation the question of, 'are there other functions which these 'social cages' serve'? The good governance agenda had focussed predominantly on the positive consequences of eliminating non-contractual from the sphere of civil society. This investigation has pointed out the positive aspects inherent in non-contractual institutions.

### **Lessons from the fa'aSamoa**

The fa'aSamoa proved a very useful case study in which to undertake the inquiry. In terms of the immediacy of Samoa to the good governance programme, it illustrated that it was increasingly adopting the good governance programme. More importantly, it inherited the exact type of institutions which the good governance agenda and liberal prescription referred to. Moreover, it validated the association between the good governance agenda and the liberal theory as it related to these institutions. The *fa'aSamoa* comprised institutions based on affective ties which were maintained by elements befitting those described as a 'social cage'. The conclusions formulated from the study therefore have very strong implications for the good governance agenda and the liberal prescription.

The fa'aSamoa has a very strong and controlling influence upon the Samoan individual. It acquires this through various rites and rituals. These expose the individual to a range of values and protocols that guide their behaviour from birth. Although the rites and rituals may vary in character between the different agents that dispense them, they all promote the same things. Individuals that do not

reflect these values in their behaviour and abide by these protocols are subject to various forms of disciplinary acts. These range from the use of physical force to ostracism. For the majority of Samoans, this controlling influence is so ingrained that they have become naturalised to its demands. Moreover, they are ready to pass on its precepts to the generation that subsequent generation. Although they may not agree on the specific mechanics and manifestations of the fa'aSamoa, they strongly support the worth of the system.

The suppression of individual autonomy is paramount to the performance of at least two functions that the fa'aSamoa promotes. The first is controlling dissident behaviour. Dissident behaviour in fa'aSamoa terms includes those that are commonly conceived as such in the Western notion of the term, but is not exclusive to them. Behaviour such as being drunken and disorderly, rudeness to elders, are discouraged in the fa'aSamoa as inappropriate. Additionally however, behaviour such as non-participation in village activities, eating while standing, public acts of affection such as kissing, hugging, and in some places, holding hands are also discouraged. Behaviours are commonly defined dissident according to the predominant values of Samoan society which appear built into the fa'aSamoa. One of the most suggestive although not conclusive signs of the strength of the fa'aSamoa in carrying out this role is very small police force Samoa sustains and relative low crime rate. The strength of the fa'aSamoa is perceived to counteract the need for a larger police force.

The second is providing social welfare. In the fa'aSamoa, social welfare means providing for the needs of everyone. Every individual is prescribed a responsibility to take care of his or her family, extended family and those related

via other ways such as being from the same village, or being friends and so forth. This translates to a comprehensive welfare coverage for all Samoans. A compelling indication of the strength with which the *fa'aSamoa* performs this function is the governments very minimal social welfare contribution. The onus of such a task is borne predominantly by family members.

The *fa'aSamoa* inhibits private sector capital accumulation in at least two significant ways. First, there is a heavy sense of obligation on the part of proprietors and other entrepreneurs to contribute to special occasions such as marriages, funerals, births and so forth. Although these obligations are inherited by the majority of Samoans, regardless their occupation, those who operate or have some form of business are expected to give more, especially if their wealth is apparent. Second, aside from obligations that are expected during these times, this groups are perceived as sources of financial support by those with whom they are 'affectively tied'. These include kin, friends, and even people from the same village or district.

However, the *fa'aSamoa* also provides very useful avenues that facilitate private sector capital accumulation. Prospective businesses, businesses that are just forming, and those who are facing difficult times may find that their affective ties provide a source of aid through facilitating favourable trading and operating terms. Businesses may find labour on very favourable terms from relatives, friends and village associates. Moreover, in association with the changing land tenure, people may obtain resources in the form of land, that will provide a larger basis for attaining capital in the future.

The fa'aSamoa also plays a significant role in facilitating public sector inefficiency. First, public sector servants and clients are prone to carry expectations that are part of the fa'aSamoa into the workplace. Possession of a high status within the fa'aSamoa leads some to impose their authority in ways that negate transparency, accountability and principles of fairness. The breadth of the application of the fa'aSamoa reaches the national level. As such, positions such as the Prime Minister may be used by the holder to impose his or her desire on others in the public sector as stipulated by the auditor general. This flows from an expectation that the personal authority as understood in the fa'aSamoa is prevalent irrespective of time and space. Second, there are those in the public sector who find it difficult or simply do not desire to neglect and dispense with the demands placed upon them through the fa'aSamoa system. Often, public sector workers see it as their duty to provide for kin or associates access to public sector resources which they have no authority to do. There are even times when the obligation is not perceived as a burden but a joy, in that they are fulfilling their duties as expected of them in the fa'aSamoa.

However, the fa'aSamoa can also work against such inefficiencies. This is borne of the fact that the fa'aSamoa is not self governing but is governed by those that use it. People engender the content of the fa'aSamoa, and thus its variability. People imbue the system with their values and protocols, and these under the banner that carries the weight of tradition become the guiding principles that is the fa'aSamoa. In the same way therefore that the values, protocols that comprise the fa'aSamoa to be utilised for inefficient practices, these may also be changed so that the fa'aSamoa may be used as a facilitator of efficiency. As a case in point,



the matai who places pressure on the taule'ale'a in the public sector to acquire for their family financial resources or job opportunities in counter-efficient ways, may exert withdraw such demands, teaching and encouraging the latter to abide by rules of honesty and fairness. This is not something that is alien to the fa'aSamoa, in fact it is something that lies at the heart of the system, but has been clouded and covered by practices of dishonesty and unfairness. As one of Samoa's highest title holders stipulated, "the fa'aSamoa did not teach people to steal." The fa'aSamoa does not condone such practices but in fact condemns it. The fa'aSamoa is a powerful tool in the cause of inefficiency, but it can be an even more powerful tool for the cause of efficiency.

### **The implications of the fa'aSamoa for 'social cages'**

These findings have a strong bearing on the liberal prescription for 'social cages' as this relates to the fa'aSamoa. The liberal prescription as outlined by Gellner and Hall places a strong emphasis on the impact this has on individual liberty. There is another side that receives less attention but also must be considered before the liberation is used as a basis for this kind of change. A 'social cage' subjects the individual to norms and practices which in total deprives them of full autonomy and liberty. This subjugation is not absolute and it is done to serve the particular needs of society and its members. The 'social cage' serves functions that a society requires in order to be civil. The fa'aSamoa is utilised to provide a civility which places a high value on at least two things; behavioural control and provision of social welfare. The liberal prescription for change cannot be effected until there is a sufficient analysis of why individual liberty is curtailed.

**The implications of the fa'aSamoa for good governance**

They also have a bearing on the good governance agenda for civil society as it pertains to Samoa, on at least two fronts. First, the presumption that affective ties is a hindrance to capital accumulation requires more empirical study in order to confirm its validity. Although the fa'aSamoa inhibits capital accumulation, it also acts to promote it, especially in the early stages of business development and in times of difficulty. Thus, the argument that private sector development is hindered by an operative system of 'affective ties is highly questionable. Second, the argument that affective ties are a significant cause and facilitator of public sector inefficiency, is difficult to corroborate. Although it is true that affective ties account for inefficiency, this stems from the manner in which they are being used rather than any element of the system itself. The responsibility for inefficiency thus rests on those that would use the system in that manner. In total, there is not compelling arguments that would favour the implementation of the good governance agenda, as it is currently formulated in Samoa.

The propositions laid out at the beginning of this thesis have largely been confirmed in the case study. This suggests that the grounds upon which the good governance agenda and the liberal prescription seek to eliminate affective ties and social cages would not justify the implementation of such initiatives in Samoa. Moreover, through the fa'aSamoa, it has been shown that affective ties do not directly precipitate inefficiency and corruption, inhibits but also facilitates capital accumulation and can justify the existence of social cages. This suggests that the grounds posited by the good governance agenda, and the liberal prescription for eliminating civil society institutions based on affective ties have not fully

appreciated the roles and functions of the latter. This is cause for reservation concerning the adoption of such initiatives, at least until a further analyses, particularly ones pertinent to where they might be implemented, are undertaken.

### **A bearing on the South on the South Pacific**

This study also has a bearing on the South Pacific, which although is small, is nevertheless cogent. The island states of the South Pacific share at least one in common, a strong sense of and subservience to traditional institutions and values. What these are, how they are maintained and perpetuated, and what strength they inhere in their respective countries will have similarities and differences to the case of Samoa. These are encapsulated in various concepts such as the fa'aSamoa, but arguably function in very similar ways. They subject the individual and society to certain norms, values and protocols. These are under threat from a good governance programme whose initiatives are proliferating in the agendas of governments and international agencies. Under this threat, these countries must make a careful evaluation of their system vis-à-vis good governance and the strong liberal initiatives they carry. The functions of their traditional institutions and values must be weighed up against the assertions made in the good governance agenda and liberal prescription and from this the necessary changes, if any should be made. Changes should not be made without this prior analysis.

### **Limitations**

The relevance of this study should not disguise that fact that it has its limitations or at least, that there will be limitations that others will perceive of it.

So as to lessen these, a discussion of these limitations will be provided, to both highlight them as well as defend them where possible. First, the formulation of the good governance agenda and consequently the variables for the study, was based on material produced in the 1980s and early 1990s. The author has tried as much as possible to incorporate more recent material but cannot guarantee that he has comprehensively covered these. Therefore, the good governance agenda at the centre of this inquiry may have been subject to, or is at this time undergoing, change. If it has not, the validity and worth of this inquiry stands. However, even if it has changed, this inquiry should still have a utility. It will at least have provided an exploration of this kind of agenda, and any future formulations of this kind may be informed by it.

Second, the variables selected for the study are not inclined to quantification. Although this is not a weakness in itself, it does mean that the cause and effect relationship between the independent and dependent variables are lacking 'hard proof'. However, it is a difficult task to formulate quantifiable variables based on the nature of the study. Other studies of this nature have used smaller items as variables, to facilitate quantification. However, these studies predominantly been focussed in the economic sphere and dealt on a different level of specificity than this study. There is no doubt that this thesis could have benefited from such an approach. However, because it is more concerned with the general implications of the cause and effect relationship, it is not hindered from the absence of such data.

Finally, the thesis does not comprehensively analyse all areas associated with the selected variables. Firstly, the implications of the fa'aSamoa on business

development in terms of capital accumulation is only one small aspect of economic development. Moreover, capital accumulation is in itself only one aspect of business development and the latter also has its different variations between private and public business, and profit and non-profit business. Secondly, the political implications of the fa'aSamoa is also much broader than the notion of public sector inefficiency. There are implications for the particular mode of operation within politics, political trends, party and policy choice and so forth. Thirdly, the fa'aSamoa also performs other social functions which are not analysed here. These included, labour organisation, land distribution and so forth. Because of these additional factors, other variables of the antecedent and intervening kind must be incorporated for the construction of a more comprehensive picture concerning important relationships. However, in defence of the options taken here, it must be stated that the decision concerning these variables was based on the good governance agenda itself. If the relevance of this study is pertinent only to its formulation, then that is sufficient since that was the original goal. The incorporation of other variables will undoubtedly be of value, but for a more comprehensive study, that is well beyond the objectives of this.

### **Final remarks**

It may be suggested that affective ties equate with an instrument operates as it is wielded to. The charges laid against it in the good governance agenda and the liberal prescription, find little support. The good governance treatment of affective ties and 'social cages' as inhibitors of economic development and political efficiency neglects the many positives that these facilitate towards such ends. Furthermore, the liberal treatment of 'social cages' as an obstacle to individual

freedom neglects the functions that are served from this. In total, there is insufficient grounds upon which to implement the good governance agenda and adopt the liberal prescription for civil society.

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